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Introduction: New Paths of Colonial History
Hans Ha¨gerdal
On 26 February 1687, the Dutch yacht Negombo departed from the
roadstead of Batavia, the Asian hub of the still relatively vital and ex-
pansive Dutch East India Company, or VOC. On board was the Com-
pany official Arend Verhoeven, who had been appointed resident or
opperhoofd of the unprofitable trading post of Kupang in West Timor.
Verhoeven may have been less than enthusiastic about his promotion;
of the last eight residents, six had died of illness at the unhealthy place,
and one had been dismissed on complaints from the locals. With him
on the Negombo went Dasi, raja of the small princedom of Lamakera
on Solor, to the north of Timor. Dasi was an activist prince who did his
utmost with the limited resources at hand, forging a comprehensive
network on the easterly islands nowadays known as Nusa Tenggara Ti-
mur. This was to become one of the cornerstones of his policy and was
to make him indispensable to the Dutch in their rather fragile outpost
in westernmost Timor, and he visited the Dutch authorities in Batavia
from time to time.
After a lengthy sea trip, delayed by the doldrums, the vessel finally
reached Solor in April. There Verhoeven found a snake’s nest, where
supposed allies of the Company turned violent, murdering a Dutch re-
presentative there and clashing with a group of somewhat more loyal
allies. Reaching the coastal village of Lamakera, Dasi asked if he could
take his goods ashore, which Verhoeven gladly agreed to do, ‘the more
so since we were salvaged from a great stench and filth.’ As he pre-
pared to go ashore, the irascible Verhoeven told him not to stay long,
since the Dutch intended to sail on towards Kupang as soon as the
wind was right. Dasi suggested to the resident that he should at least
show him the honour to let him spend five or six days with his wife
whom he had not seen for many months. Verhoeven retorted that Dasi
knew the orders given by Batavia all too well, and that the raja was or-
dered go to Kupang with the resident to assist in quelling the political
troubles on Rote, another island under VOC suzerainty. As the grum-
bling Dasi stepped back onto the barge that would take him ashore,
Verhoeven asked the raja pointedly whether he intended to provide the
Negombo with tugboats, and whether he intended to follow him to Ku-
pang or not. Contemptuously, Dasi snarled, ‘You are just a new resi-
dent, and you should not act so sternly; or else we will complain about
you, as we did about the other one, and see that you are recalled.’ Ver-
hoeven barked back at Dasi, but there was not much else he could do.
The raja was too important a tool in the maintenance of Dutch inter-
ests via his many connections in this part of the Archipelago. However,
Verhoeven, like so many residents who came before and after him on
Timor, had fallen victim to the dreaded “Timorese fever” by November
of the same year. Dasi, meanwhile, lived to a ripe old age, dying in
1701 after a modestly successful career covering almost half a century.1
The story, culled from a contemporary Dagregister or book of daily
annotations, may offer a glimpse into the assertiveness that indigenous
people or groups could occasionally display vis-a`-vis the colonial estab-
lishment within the system. The type of early colonialism represented
by the VOC was for the most part indirect or informal, which provided
opportunities for those subjected to colonial authority to argue their
case with some degree of success. Most places, especially during the
last century of Western colonial dominance, may have offered less op-
portunity in that respect. Still, it must be remembered that colonialism
as a historical phenomenon is multifaceted and has engendered a very
broad spectrum of relationships between ruler and ruled, between colo-
niser and colonised, between foreigner and indigenous, between whites
and peoples of colour.
The economic and strategic aspects of European colonial expansion
have been the subjects of serious scholarly analysis at least since the
days of Karl Marx. Moreover, there is no denying that historians since
the rise of Asian and African nationalisms have devoted attention to
the agency of those who were subjected to colonial domination in its
various forms. Still, for a long time much of this was confined to as-
pects of national or anti-colonial struggles rather than the exploration
of communication and negotiation in a social science history context.
For example, it has been argued that the historiography of Indian na-
tionalism has been decidedly elitist since the beginning despite its
emancipatory ambitions (Guha 2000: 1). The ambitious publication
Subaltern Studies surfaced in India in the 1980s and was devoted to
writing a history from the underside of nineteenth- and twentieth-cen-
tury India; however, its tradition of historical materialism has not es-
caped criticism either.
In the last decades, three lines of research in particular have in-
formed the study of colonial relationships. The first is the field of post-
colonial studies that has emerged in the wake of the seminal work of
Edward Said (1978). Said succinctly pointed out that orientalism, or
the textual output about the ‘orient’, enjoyed an incestuous relationship
with the Western exercise of power over the non-Western world. This
implied a mutually supportive relationship between power and knowl-
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edge, and a historiography that produced essentialised statements on
the ‘orient’. In effect, postcolonial study critically analyses the hierarch-
ical power relationships that encompass the production of what is al-
leged to be scientific knowledge. It may thereby set out to destabilise
the Western discourse of modernity. It also explores the connection
and interaction between coloniser and colonised, and catches their re-
spective constituent roles (Slater 1998; Prakash 2000).
Secondly, global and transnational history has gained ground. The
field began to be explored by pioneers like William McNeill in the
1960s, and has dealt with comprehensive world system theories such
as the one offered by Immanuel Wallerstein, which sees the world as
an expanding system of inter-linked economic connections. There are
also revisionist models that challenge the assumed trend of an expand-
ing Western world towards ‘the rest’ (Frank 1998). Lately, this brand of
historiography has endeavoured to apply a broad spectre of methods
outside the traditional historical field, such as microbiology, linguistics,
geography, etc., as exemplified by the work of Jared Diamond (1997).
By seeing the processes of global history in a broader perspective than
the ‘traditional’ political and economic history, it is possible to regard
colonialism as an asymmetric interaction rather than just a movement
from centre to periphery. The point of global history may not be to
grasp the world as a whole, or to make it a history of globalisation, but
rather to discern the mutual influences of various regions and cultures
of the world (Casalilla 2007: 676).
Thirdly, certain perspectives and methodologies of social science his-
tory have gone global. Scholarly networks and conferences nowadays
encompass widely different geographical areas and academic subfields
(Burke 2001). Studies of colonial history have benefited from ap-
proaches that integrate culture, economics, class, gender, body, emo-
tions, environment, microbiology and other issues. This is especially
true as the rich possibilities that the colonial archival resources offer
are right now being explored; a good recent example is the study of
trade and society in colonial Malacca by Nordin Hussin (2007), which
uses local documents to reconstruct the interactions in a colonial con-
text that is in fact not so ‘colonial’ in character as commonly thought.
Recent studies of colonial relations have pointed out that technology
flows could very well have moved from local subjugated peoples to the
colonising community, casting a radically new light on the forms of in-
teraction that took place in an era of European expansion (a term that
becomes only partly applicable to the situation) (Ransel 2007: 633-634).
The present volume offers nine essays originally presented as papers
on the ICAS 4 and ICAS 5 conferences, in 2005 and 2007 respectively.
They all deal with situations and milieus influenced or dominated by a
Western colonial presence. The texts include descriptions of a wide
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range of efforts and strategies of indigenous groups to arrange their
lives in the face of the non-indigenous impact. In this, the authors
charter a wide array of ways to take advantage of, negotiate with, inter-
act with, resist or portray the non-indigenous authorities. Chronologi-
cally, the nine studies cover the period from the 1700s to the immedi-
ate postcolonial period after World War II, in other words, going from
an early and largely indirect form of colonial domination to a more di-
rect type of authoritarian governance, and finally to the demise of the
system. Geographically, the essays include studies on India, Southeast
Asia, Japan and Australia.
In the first essay, ‘The future of the Past, the Past of the Future: His-
tory in Southeast Asia’, Vincent Houben takes up the intriguing histor-
iographical connection between the past, the present, and the future.
Using examples taken from Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia, he
shows that the preoccupation with the future was an integral part of
the representations of the past in Southeast Asia during the colonial
period. Manuscripts from Java from the nineteenth century written in
a traditional context evoke a future without colonialism. This is inter-
estingly paralleled by twentieth-century, postcolonial cases from the
three nations, where the creation of official histories becomes a way for
the national elites to plot the future. Far from being neutral, political
landscapes, past and future are loaded with meaning.
Next, Ram Krishna Tandon studies ‘European Adventurers and
Changes in the Indian Military System’, where he focuses on the politi-
cal confusion that characterised the South Asian subcontinent in the
eighteenth century. In the wake of the European trading companies, a
number of Western adventurers entered India, engaging in business
activities to earn a quick fortune, but also offering their service as
‘hired guns’. Compared to the old military systems, they presented a
radically different input to the Indian political and military establish-
ment of the time. This no doubt added to the modernisation of the
military in the princely states that dotted the subcontinent, by attempt-
ing to arm the Indian military so that it would be the equal of Eur-
opean armies, and giving it a Western touch.
The third text brings us back to the theme of historiography. My
own essay, ‘The exile of the Liurai: A Historiographical Case Study
from Timor’, examines a dramatic event in the early colonial Dutch
trading post on Timor. A local Timorese ruler (a liurai) fled from Portu-
guese Timor in 1749 and sought refuge in the Dutch area of jurisdic-
tion. When he tried to defect from his new Dutch protectors three
years later, he was arrested and exiled to Batavia by the colonial autho-
rities. What makes this case interesting is that it is commemorated not
only by contemporary records, but also by oral tradition recorded in the
twentieth century. A comparison between the two types of sources pro-
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vides widely different perspectives that highlight the indigenous Timor-
ese processes of commemoration and history making.
Early colonial perceptions of racial relations form the theme of San-
dra Khor Manickam’s essay, ‘Africans in Asia: The Discourse of “Negri-
tos” in Early Nineteenth-century Southeast Asia’. The term Negrito or
Negrillo has been known since the seventeenth century, and was used
by European travellers and colonial officials to denote various groups
of people in the Archipelago considered smaller and darker than peo-
ples of the Malay type. Manickam investigates how this label (of ques-
tionable scientific utility) was applied initially by scholars working with
the discourses of race in early nineteenth-century Europe. She points
out the interactions between stereotypes of Africans, slaves and tribal
groups, and how these groups were visualised in Southeast Asia.
Rachana Chakraborty’s essay ‘Women’s Education and Empowerment
in Colonial Bengal’ continues the theme of colonial cultural hegemony.
The British rulers of India, in their civilising mission, ascribed the
backwardness of the Indian woman to local religion and culture. The
movement for female education as a discourse of modernity attempted
to coalesce the conventional Indian wife and mother with the Victorian
notion of womanhood. Chakraborty highlights this by studying the
genesis and development of women’s education in Bengal from the
nineteenth century to 1947. This protracted struggle for educational
emancipation brought them into the vortex of another struggle, namely
the one for empowerment, which remains an unfinished agenda.
The implications of colonial lifestyles are studied by Victoria Haskins,
in her essay ‘Her Old Ayah: The Transcolonial Significance of the In-
dian Domestic Worker in India and Australia.’ Using the life and colo-
nial trajectory of her ancestors in the nineteenth century as a point of
departure, she explores the construction of respectable white woman-
hood under British colonisation. Haskins uses the term transcolonial
construction when discussing the emotional economy of colonial mem-
ories of the beloved and nurturing servant. The Indian nursemaid or
ayah would provide a template for the ‘fashion’ of engaging young indi-
genous women as maids in both Australia and the United States in the
first half of the twentieth century.
The period after 1945 provides some striking cases of the agency of
indigenous groups in the course of the decolonisation process, and also
an example of ‘colonialism after colonialism’, which concerns the last
three essays of the book. In his text ‘The Chinese, the Indians and the
French Exchange Control during the French Indochinese War, or How
to Endure, Fight and Mock the Colonial Power (1945-1954)’, Daniel Le-
plat follows the intriguing paths of Asian money trafficking networks
during the violent last days of French Indochina. The background of
this trafficking was the official over-valuation of the Indochinese cur-
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rency, the piastre. Leplat shows in detail how the members of the In-
dian and Chinese diasporas managed to free themselves to some extent
from the constraints of colonial financial policy, and to make some
profit by selling their assistance to members of the colonial commu-
nity.
In ‘Living the Colonial Lifestyle: Australian Women and Domestic
Labour in Occupied Japan 1945-1952’, Christine de Matos returns to the
subject of domestic labour, this time in a quasi-colonial milieu. During
the allied occupation of Japan, a significant number of Australian wo-
men came to live in Japan for a period of years, as nurses, teachers
and the wives of soldiers. They became a symbol and agent of ‘civilisa-
tion’, adopting the role of coloniser-occupier with enthusiasm. The
most potent symbol and practice of this was the domestic labourer, the
‘housegirl’ or ‘houseboy’. De Matos explores the power dynamics of the
occupier-occupied relationship of female occupiers and domestic la-
bourer, and by implication, the interaction between race, class and gen-
der. She shows how the women easily adopted a colonial/imperialist
discourse rather than one based on democratisation and emancipation
– the ostensible aims of and justification for the Occupation.
Finally, Bambang Purwanto in his essay ‘Decolonisation and the Ori-
gin of Military Business in Indonesia’ explores the dynamics of indi-
genous economic activity in a turbulent time of decolonisation. As he
points out, those who have studied the role of Indonesian military busi-
ness have tended to see it as a phenomenon of the New Order after
1966, or at best, something that originated in the 1950s. Purwanto
challenges this notion by tracing the business activities back to the re-
volution in 1945-1949, and then follows the development up to the ta-
keover of Western corporate interests in 1957-1959. He argues that the
process of decolonisation provided the basis for subsequent military in-
volvement in business, at length, supporting the more sophisticated
military business format that has been visible since the 1960s.
In conclusion, the nine texts in this volume set out to explore the di-
versity of human relationships that was forged by the colonial pre-
sence. This is done through a fresh application of concepts, perspec-
tives, theories and methodologies, many of them taken from the fast
developing area of social science history. Taken together, the essays re-
veal, on the one hand, the variety of devices by which colonials wielded
and maintained physical and mental authority over the dominated so-
cieties, but also the numerous ways that the latter could use to respond
to colonialism. The response might be economic, such as the traffick-
ing in Indochinese piastres in a time of decolonisation, or it could be
literary, like the inclusion of the colonials in a historiographical frame-
work in nineteenth-century Java. It could also be an interaction that
took place on colonial terms but entailed an element of emancipation,
14 HANS HÄGERDAL
such as the issue of women’s education in colonial Bengal. For all its
features of structural oppression, colonialism – needless to say – was
not a one-way communication process; its study requires an analysis of
the ever-shifting constituent roles of coloniser and colonised.
Note
1 VOC 8310, in Nationaal Archief, The Hague, no. 1.04.02, sub. 18 April 1687.
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The Future of the Past, the Past of the Future:
History in Southeast Asia
Vincent Houben
1 Entanglements of histories and futures
The future in Southeast Asia is intimately linked to its past as well as
its present. Starting from any present anywhere, both the past and the
future can only be conceived of in relational terms. One has to imagine
overlaps between past and present / present and future or think in the
form of forward/backward strings of events, processes and structures
condensed into preconditions and consequences. Looking backwards in
time has developed into the science of history, while looking forward is
often felt as a much more haphazard practice undertaken by non-scien-
tific actors such as politicians, administrative planners and even for-
tune-tellers. Yet, the past cannot do without the present, as the present
without the future, the future without the past and even the past with-
out the future.
Screening through titles of studies on Southeast Asia, the multi-direc-
tionalities and asymmetrical linkages between past, present and future
become apparent. The present is historicised through a past that is per-
ceived, told, written, framed, mapped but also handed down, trans-
mitted, remembered, recalled as well as examined, interpreted or ex-
plained. The future, however, is viewed, faced, approached or bridged in
the form of trajectories, prospects and challenges. So it seems that as a
general rule the human past needs to be maintained as an ordered
space to assist in the structure and stability of the present, whereas the
future is primarily linked to change, risk and contingency. This is pri-
marily a function of linear, forward-moving perceptions of time, which
sees the present state of (post)modernity as the outcome of a specific de-
velopment of the past, prefiguring a future that is partly predetermined
by the presence of the past but also open to the new and unexpected.
However, the connections between future-past-present become mul-
tidirectional and highly charged if other perceptions of time are taken
into consideration. Hopes or fears of the future certainly impact on
present-day peoples’ attitudes, while the past only acquires meaning
through our preoccupations in the present, and the future is supposed
to be shaped via the experiences or ‘lessons’ learned in the past,
whereas the past is conceived of as containing the seeds of the future.
Yet, these kinds of multiple connections only display the ‘secure’ time
modes. In contrast, many temporal entanglements are also charac-
terised by instability, insecurity, crisis and even a psychological state-of-
mind called ‘angst’. Angst lies beyond fear, because what one fears can
be named and is therefore calculable, whereas angst refers to an un-
controllable and unspecific feeling of threat. Coming to terms with trau-
matic episodes of the past as well as with some angst about the future
shows how crisis-prone and charged the connections between past, pre-
sent and future often are, both on an individual and a collective level.
Past, present and future are entangled but what are the specific pro-
cesses involved and how can these be captured by using specific terms?
Recent literature offers some clues to these questions. One approach is
to use optical terms – that of reflecting and mirroring, which is more
sensate than the concepts of imagining and envisioning.1 These terms
clarify that we are looking at the past as well as the future in the form
of a space through a lens from a certain angle, which per definition
means biased. A second approach uses the language of power: The past
is empowered, the future is confronted, and history is revived in order
to be able to face the future.2 A third approach infuses quality into
temporal dimensions: The past has been turbulent and the future is
uncertain.3 Human agency is contained in it.
In this short essay, an attempt is made to show how past and future
interact in the spatial settings of what is conveniently called Southeast
Asia. The core conceptual instrument in approaching this theme is that
of ‘representations of social order’. Representations can be defined as
notions or ideas that define the world and allow people to organise it,
historically, socially and politically. They reflect certain cultural predis-
positions but, at the same time, open up cultural, spatial as well as
temporal dimensions that allow for the construction of social orders in
which subjects as well as objects can be positioned. Representations are
forms of knowledge that allow people to establish their world and can-
not be reduced to something that lurks between us and reality. Repre-
sentations create a social order but, at the same time, they are part of
it. Representations are not simply ‘depictions’ of the past or the future,
but resources for the creation of meaning vis-a`-vis the past and the fu-
ture, which enable the individual as well as multiple actors and even
whole societies to act both within and beyond the confines of the pre-
sent. By imposing meaning on the past through expectations of the fu-
ture and the other way around, cultural practices establish, maintain or
contest a particular social order.4 Two dimensions of one major strand
of representation are considered here: the way in which the future has
been embedded in the past during the colonial and postcolonial eras in
Southeast Asia. I will concentrate on Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia.
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2 Futures of the colonial
The preoccupation with the future was an integral part of representa-
tions of the past in colonial Southeast Asia. Studying prophetic writing
in Javanese history, Nancy Florida translated the Babad Jaka Tingkir, an
anonymous nineteenth century text that describes the transition of
Hindu-Buddhist realms in the East to the dominance of Islam in Cen-
tral Java 250 years earlier. She notes:
(T)his text does not chronicle a dynastic history preoccupied with
the doings of kings and their armies in a linear narrative fash-
ion. Rather this poem interrupts the dominant genealogical style
of the dynastic chronicle to treat the past episodically, to gener-
ate a novel genealogy of the future. … Rather than register a re-
cuperation of past reality in the name of ‘objective truth’ … or a
reinscription of the imagined pasts of dynastic presents with an
eye to continuing traditional status quos … this text constructs
an alternative past which, countering its oppressive colonial pre-
sent, would move towards more autonomous, perhaps even lib-
erating, futures (Florida 1995: 10).
The text was apparently written circa 1850 on the island of Ambon by
someone from the entourage of the exiled king of Surakarta, Pakubu-
wana VI.5 Instead of using a traditional linear narrative, it was com-
posed as a series of episodic fragments. Within the context of the ab-
sence of a genuine scion of the royal Mataram house being on the
throne, the text dwells on ‘other powers, which arise – repeatedly – at
the edges or margins of society’. It refers to the Jayabaya tradition, said
to be the prophecies of a Hindu Javanese king on the future of Java in
the form of eight eras to come. Contrary to babad tradition, however,
the marginalised figures do not move toward the centre but remain ob-
scure. Writing history (Jav. menge`ti) also has a connotation of bringing
about a desired future (Florida 1995: 270-274, 315, 397).
One can ask whether the Jaka Tingkir text was an exceptional way of
writing pre-colonial history, set within a troubled colonial present and
thus provoking a breakthrough into the future. I argue that this is not
the case. Even in the major Javanese chronicle on the history of Java,
the Babad Tanah Jawi, prophecies (pasemon) were regularly integrated
into earlier parts of the story as ways to foreshadow later ‘predestined’
events. The constant rewriting and extension of the so-called major ba-
bad had the intention of being in control of both present and future by
wielding power over the past (Wieringa 1999: 244-263). Nor was this
phenomenon of future orientation limited to Javanese history writing.
In the Acehnese Hikayat Potjoet Moehamat, the story of a conflict be-
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tween two contenders of the throne unfolds after the younger one has
a dream with a ‘concealed meaning’ in which the land is thrown into
chaos but then regains order. At the same time, the record of events
omits the conjunctions between them (Siegel 1976: 322, 327). A discus-
sion of the Malay hikayat style likewise referred to the feature of tem-
poral phrases that are attached to individual events but not placed with-
in an overarching temporal framework. Contrary to Western percep-
tions of the past as a line of events that heads towards the present as a
privileged point, in the hikayat events are temporally flat and recounted
when they come up. This does not preclude a sense of future though.
On the contrary, as Shelly Errington demonstrated: ‘Thus to be spoken
about in future ages provides an impulse for action, drawing the hi-
kayat’s figures into the future’ (Errington 1979: 38). The episodic nat-
ure of time in pre-colonial chronicles from Java and the Malay world
was linked to their function of being sung before an audience. The so-
cial meaning the sounds acquired through their performance was a
central feature and in this way hikayat history was transferred towards
the future.
The social meaning of the future was transported in other ways than
through historical chronicles and their performance. Throughout
Southeast Asia, ordinary rural people recounted stories of expectation,
which acquired a sense of immediacy and relevance in times of crisis.
In Java, the premonitions of Jayabaya, a Kedhiri king, were well known.
G.P. Rouffaer, a Dutch scientist who stayed in Central Java during the
years 1889 and 1890, retrieved and translated a Jayabaya manuscript
from the Solo Residency archive. It shows history as an alternation of
periods of prosperity and order versus times of chaos. The story con-
tains predictions (pralambangan) that are linked to the specific times
when an old century turned into a new in the Javanese time reckoning.
A fragment of the Rouffaer text reads as follows:
In the year 1900 the realm shall decay and as a consequence of
the will of the Almighty a brave European king will come, ac-
companied by countless armies, to which all kings will have to
bow, without being able to resist him. Java will also succumb to
him and he will be ruling there for a long time and in a strin-
gent manner, and establish himself immovably. In these times
the king of Rum in Constantinople will sit in a State Council
and say to his prime-minister: patih, it is known to me that there
are no longer ruling princes in Java, all having been forced to
submit to a European ruler. Leave with all your armies and
chase this usurper from there. If you won’t succeed you are not
entitled to go there. The patih and his people will leave for Java
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and drive the European king out. The people will thereafter be
happy, live peacefully and united.6
Jayabaya prophecies were circulated widely in Java and certainly fed
into the future expectations of the people. Similar prophetic expecta-
tions were contained in an Islamic vocabulary (al-Mahdi), whereas in
the Philippines they were of Christian provenience (Pasyon). Millenar-
ian and messianic movements in Southeast Asia have been studied ex-
tensively by authors like Michael Adas, Sartono Kartodirdjo, Ray Ileto
and others.
Ideas of a future beyond colonialism were therefore prevalent in in-
digenous societies and certainly served as a threat to the colonial order.
Therefore, manuscripts and pamphlets referring to the future were me-
ticulously collected by colonial authorities, creating fear among Eur-
opeans that ideas might lead to social action, as it sometimes but cer-
tainly not always did. The pasts contained in babad, hikayat and millen-
arian traditions were, however, far from ordered and singular. The
dynastical chronicles were connected to oral traditions, which circu-
lated widely but were manifold in their meaning, whereas narratives of
expectation on a change of eras had a timeless ‘empty’ quality. Like the
past, the future was therefore a reservoir of dreams that were beyond
control and unspecific with regard to time and space.
3 Projecting nationalist pasts
The first decades of the twentieth century fundamentally changed the
representations of past and future in Southeast Asia. The key to this
development was modernity, which, in the words of Anthony Giddens,
separated time and space and therefore opened up the social order to
time-space ‘zoning’. The historicity associated with modernity de-
pended on a new, unitary kind of ‘insertion’ into time and space (Gid-
dens 1990: 16, 20-21). The major vehicle of Southeast Asian modernity
was the idea of nation. Nationalism intertwined representations of
pasts and futures into a linear scheme and gave it a single meaning.
Whereas history in nineteenth-century Vietnam had, besides provid-
ing legitimacy for the ruling dynasty, the function of strengthening
‘timeless’ Confucian ethical principle. But in the beginning of the
twentieth century, this began to change because intellectuals such as
Phan Boi Chau and Phan Chu Trinh, began adopting the idea of linear
progress. The major philosophical change, however, was promoted by
the Vietnamese who had been to France and had been exposed to Wes-
tern philosophy. Tran Huu Do, who had a keen understanding of He-
gelian dialectics but gained little recognition, and Ho Chi Minh be-
HISTORY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 21
longed to this group.7 A similar development took place in Indonesia,
where a small urban intelligentsia received a Western education and
were exposed to Western versions of history. In a similar vein, on the
Malay Peninsula, the Malay College in Melaka introduced the subject
of tawarikh (‘history in dates’) in 1918, which led to the writing of new
sort of hikayat (Khoo Kay Kim 1979: 301, 307).
Both history and the future were encapsulated by the project of the
nation and their representations needed to be modelled on the social
order strived for. A fundamental qualitative change was that from then
on the future was the main orientation. Just as there were multiple
modernities (Eisenstadt 2002), there existed multiple ways to imagine
the national future. The nationalist movements of Southeast Asia often
contested not only colonialism but also each other. One could distin-
guish between secular, religious and Marxist versions of projecting the
past into the future, but all of them were characterised by hybridity
emanating from transfers between the old, the novel and the outside
turned inward.
When Ai Quoc (Ho Chi Minh) secretly returned to his home country
in 1941, he sat in a cave at Pac Bo typing letters to the people to be
published in the Indochinese Communist Party’s newspaper, in an at-
tempt to fuse anti-traditionalism with a nationalistic version of the his-
tory of Vietnam. He combined historical dialectics on a teleological ba-
sis with the idea of a timeless Vietnamese tradition, thus creating the
mould for all subsequent nationalist historiographies (Marr 1981: 284-
286). His pamphlet titled ‘The History of Our Country’ (Lich su nuoc
ta), published in 1942, was very important. The major lesson of history,
besides stressing the importance of resistance to foreign intervention,
was that the people should be united. An appended list of dates where
he tried to predict the year of Vietnamese independence ended with
1945 (Duiker 2000: 251-253, 260).
Early Indonesian nationalists also argued for a united stance on the
basis of a nationalist past, and were, in fact, inspired by Dutch histories
of pre-colonial Java published around 1920 (Reid and Marr 1979: 288-
289). Sukarno was the chief architect of Indonesian national history.
He set out his ideas on history and the future of Indonesia in a defence
speech read out in court in 1930, titled ‘Indonesia accuses’ (Indonesie¨
klaagt aan!), which was further complemented by a pamphlet in 1933
on the attainment of Indonesian independence (Mentjapai Indonesia
Merdeka). A recent biographer of Sukarno labelled his 1930 defence
speech as a ‘cogent set of Indonesian arguments, though always closely
wedded to the vernacular of European and other Western sources of
political thought’ (Hering 2002: 190). Sukarno adopted a simple but
‘classic’ three-stage temporal model of Indonesian history: glorious past
– dark present – shining future. The glorious future of the Indonesian
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people was, so he argued, already contained in its great past since his-
tory showed that the Indonesian nation was on a par with any Western
one (Reid and Marr 1979: 290-291). In the 1933 brochure, these ideas
were expanded upon but further strengthened by connecting the pre-
sent struggle against the Dutch colonialists to a mythic past from the
Ramayana repertoire, in which Ramawidjaja killed the overseas demon
Dasamuka (Hering 2000: 227). During the preparatory meetings that
eventually led to Indonesian Independence in June 1945, Sukarno
came up with the idea of Pancasila and again referred to the 1933
pamphlet, stating that political independence (kemerdekaan) was a gold-
en bridge (jembatan emas), on the far side of which the Indonesians
would rebuild their own society (kita sempurnakan kita punya masyara-
kat).8
Islamic and Marxist projections of a national future were quite differ-
ent, although both were part of a global movement set within a utopian
frame of thought. The Arab-Islamic sense of history has been based on
tarikh, or the study of events or occurrences with the goal of establish-
ing their nature and position in time (Johns 1979: 58). Religion proved
to be a powerful vehicle to inscribe the future of the nation and the im-
portance of so-called Islamic movements within Malayan as well as In-
donesian nationalism is well-known. The promise of eternal happiness
after one’s resurrection and final judgement constitutes an essential
message of salvation. The modernist religious renewal movement of
the late nineteenth century propagated the idea of the unity of all Mus-
lims and the need to strip local Islam of the customs that prevented its
progress towards its pure origins. Ideas on how to accommodate Islam
within the framework of independent statehood diverged, making it a
political issue of critical importance. However, pre-Islamic messianism
or the belief among Muslim peasants that the reappearance of al-Mah-
di would signal the advent of the Day of Judgement continued to be
strong. The same was true for mysticism, which allows for the immedi-
ate experience of the Creator’s presence, which transgresses time.
The Marxist goal of studying history was in order to change it. At
the same time, as argued by Tan Malakka in Indonesia, Marxism was
not a dogma but a guide for action (Marr 1979: 333; Poeze 2007: 851).
Communism, like Islam, had a global presence and a messianic mes-
sage. It claimed that history was governed by material dialectics that
would come to an end with a revolution that would spell the collapse
of capitalism, leading to a dictatorship of the proletariat and the estab-
lishment of a stateless communist society. The teleological characteris-
tics of history were in this manner linked to concrete expectations for
the future – a highly effective mix for mobilising the poor rural masses
of Southeast Asia. The Vietnamese communist party proved to be more
successful in the end than the Indonesian communist party (PKI). But
HISTORY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 23
the hybrid ways in which they combined Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy
with pre-existing popular expectations was common to both.
The PKI attracted a huge following in the 1951-1965 period but was
not so much based on anti-imperialism or social justice but, as Ruth
McVey argued, the idea that ‘by associating and thinking in a new way
one could again gain strength and become, in the end, invincible …
The essential symbol in this appeal was modernity’ (McVey 1979: 344).
In 1957, a historical analysis by D.N. Aidit was published under the ti-
tle Indonesian Society and the Indonesian Revolution (Masjarakat Indone-
sia dan Revolusi Indonesia). Only the ‘correct’ interpretation of history,
could determine the proper action for the future. History was not an
account of past events but a ‘pattern of organising thought. It provided
a past which was a model for the future not simply in terms of recom-
mended action but in categories of perception, presenting certain ways
of looking at things and excluding others’ (McVey 1979: 349). The past
was essentially national and the role of the Indonesian communist
party was to liberate a country that was independent in name only.
However, the communists in the 1920s continued to invoke local uto-
pianism, as the Jayabaya prophecy was linked to the Soviet Union and
revolution with the coming of the Ratu Adil (Tarling 2001: 374).
4 Plotting future from the present
In some societies, like in Mongolia, the past is up front while the fu-
ture lies far behind because the former remains visible, while the latter
is not.9 However, in contemporary society in Southeast Asia, the future
lies ahead. In Malay, it is masa depan, time that lies before. The conno-
tation of tuong lai in Vietnamese is different, however, because it sig-
nifies what one has not yet done but wants to do next.
The central idiom of the post-independence national existence is fo-
cussed on the future, like the present in post-World War II Southeast
Asia had, at least in the beginning, which did not have much to offer
in the form of political stability and economic prosperity. Since the in-
dependent states in Southeast Asia could not immediately realise popu-
lar expectations of social and economic improvement, they had to re-
sort to occupying the future as a tool for legitimating existing power re-
lations. A crucial way of representing this has been through
‘development’, essentially a continuation of a central project of the late-
colonial state. The most obvious way was by the introduction of plan-
ning. Through planning the future could be grasped, its underpinning
statistics could be presented as ‘objective’ goal orientation.
Planning, however, presupposed a certain national stability, which
was lacking in Indonesia of the 1950s. Therefore, President Sukarno,
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in his public speeches, prolonged the revolution. After a stage of survi-
val (1950-1955), a new period commenced, that of the socio-economic
revolution, with as its objective a just and prosperous society, phrased
as ‘tata-tentram-kerta-rahardja’, which alludes to the golden age an-
nounced by the puppet master (dalang) of the wayang.10 After 1965, po-
litical stability was guaranteed by the military, so the revolutionary
rhetoric was dropped. Economic progress under the Suharto regime
was represented through state planning. From 1969 until 1994, five
Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun (Five-year Plans) were announced,
with different foci ranging from infrastructure to industry and from
transmigration to education. In the official language, development be-
came the most frequently used term of the New Order, Suharto him-
self being hailed as its ‘father’ (bapak pembangunan).
Development planning in Malaysia, a relatively affluent country in
the region, has not been particularly effective. As K.S. Jomo argued,
postcolonial planning has provided only limited blueprints, whereas
private sector activities cannot be planned. The nature of the planning
here has been more political: ‘Development policies, plan allocations as
well as implementation reflect the nature, role and orientation of the
state’ (Jomo 1999: 86-87). In 1991, Mahathir launched his Vision
2020, a program that would turn Malaysia into a fully developed coun-
try. He stressed that this vision was not ‘just a slogan’ but ‘a framework
for action’, which included the application of science and technology
but also ‘attitude and value changes’ (Kidam and Hamim 1999: 339).11
However, in the midst of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, during a con-
ference in Tokyo, he deplored the destructive role of the so-called new
capitalists: ‘So what is going to be the future, the future of Asia? Actu-
ally there is not going to be much of a future for Asia, at least a future
that is distinctly Asian’ (Kidam and Hamim 1999: 155). The doom after
the boom did not materialise, however, since the Asian economies be-
gan to recover after 1999.
A second way of plotting the future is through the creation of official
histories, which are condensed into central representations upholding
the postcolonial national social order. Collective memory is constructed
through central discursive topoi, which are infused with a temporal ex-
tension within a demarcated territory – royalty, unity, culture, and reli-
gion. History is supposed to have extended itself beyond a centre or
core region. Moreover, in many Southeast Asian countries, myths of a
golden age, decisive turning points such as battles, key sacrificial
events, and heroes with exemplary characters all play a major role.
These historical representations are, however, contested by foreign pro-
fessional historians, critical home historians living abroad and from be-
low, in the form of local and regional histories that remain largely un-
written (Houben 2008). Furthermore, official histories are revealing in
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the sense of what has been ‘forgotten’ or censored, with the aim of
making sure that future is not destabilised by memories of a troubled
past.
An extreme example of national history as tool for regime justifica-
tion has been Indonesia under Suharto rule. The key theme of Sukar-
no’s version of the past has been the progression towards a brighter fu-
ture. During the New Order, a new vision of history was promulgated,
with Nugroho Notosusanto as its main composer. It converted the
armed forces into the main historical player as it defended the nation
at critical junctures in the past, notably during the Indonesian indepen-
dence struggle and, in 1965, during the supposed communist coup at-
tempt. According to Katharine McGregor, history was confiscated from
the Indonesian people to become the story of military triumphs, repre-
senting the New Order as the apex of history (Mc Gregory 2007: 217).
Yet, more than ten years after the fall of Suharto, a new official version
of Indonesian history has not taken its place.
The persistence of official historical myths is shown by the official
representations of the Nhan Van-Giai Pham affair during the middle of
1956, which consisted of a number of intellectuals and writers who
openly addressed the contemporary domestic problems of the DRV.
Dissenting views were briefly tolerated by the party leadership, only to
be suppressed later on. In the official historiography, these events were
then turned into an anti-socialist conspiracy, a myth that has survived
until the present day, although, since the beginning of Doi Moi (the
economic renovation policy), those who participated in this movement
have been unofficially rehabilitated. Dissenting private memories are
tolerated as long as they do not enter the public sphere. Meanwhile, of-
ficial renderings of history display a greater variety than in the past
(Großheim 2007).
These examples show how the future is configured both in a forward
trajectory (planning) and backwards by ensuring an official domination
over public memory. Numbers that designate how the future will be
and historical myths that allow people to understand the collective past
are a means to extending state control beyond the confines of the con-
temporary social order. These kinds of control are neither uncontested
nor stable in themselves but they have proven to be socially effective
and enduring in character.
5 Concluding remarks: controlled pasts, contingent futures?
This essay has attempted to make a few statements on how the future
is represented in history writing in Southeast Asia. The question has
been raised about how the past and the future interact in this region
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and what it means for the establishment, maintenance or contestation
of a social order. Past and future are not neutral mental landscapes; on
the contrary they are loaded with meaning for those who are living
consciously in the here and now. Distinguishing between colonial, na-
tional and postcolonial social orders has offered some general clues on
how representations of past and future are entangled. Indigenous his-
tory texts during the colonial era frequently addressed the future as did
millenarian traditions, but both the past and the future were framed
within an overall decontextualised time structure. Modernity encour-
aged the emergence of linear national pasts and futures. Chronology
and movement towards the future comprised its essential characteris-
tics. Future orientations combined with a control over history in the
form of planning and official historiographies were aimed at regime le-
gitimation, and have been the dominant modes of representation dur-
ing the postcolonial period.
Thus far, this essay may have created the impression that it supports
the received view that modernity, transferred directly or indirectly from
the West, has overtaken pre-colonial, culturally specific notions of how
past and future are intertwined. This kind of argument does not suf-
fice, however. First, this kind of generalisation ignores the intricacies
of transfer. Let me illustrate this with a Javanese notion about contents
(isi): the contents may change but the vessel (wadhah) remains is the
same. Western notions of modernity were selectively transferred and
fused with indigenous figurations, giving rise to distinct Indonesian,
Malaysian and Vietnamese representations of the modern, an inter-
mediate space in which the boundaries between source and outcome,
between indigenous and modern have become indistinguishable.
Secondly, the incorporation of the future into a present that is a con-
tinuation of the past is not wholly a function of modernity. Writing,
talking or knowing about the past has always been a way of inscribing
the future. Although the ability of the state to establish and control a
dominant version of the entanglements of past and future have be-
come stronger, alternative representations on how past events open up
possible futures have been and continue to exist. Thirdly, stabilising
the future through myth making about the past makes the representa-
tions that anchor the existing social order resistant to change. Recur-
rent crises between past-future representations and social orders that
are entangled in the processes of transformation heighten contingency,
a phenomenon that can hardly be interpreted as solely a function of
modernity.
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European Adventurers and Changes in the Indian
Military System
Ram Krishna Tandon
Introduction
Eighteenth-century India witnessed a very significant transitional
epoch. The traditional glory and greatness of the Mughals was tottering
and about to a fall into a state of degeneration and decay. Peace and
stability had been eroded. Centrifugal tendencies began raising their
heads and inexorable forces were seen as rapidly converging, one upon
the other, leading to an inevitable dissolution. Aurangzeb, the last
mighty Mughal, breathed his last in 1707, but during his reign, the
Marathas had already raised their heads and he had to fight them for
more than 20 years. None of his successors were capable of defending
his vast empire. This resulted in the emergence and rise of many other
independent local powers in both North and South India. These local
powers consisted of the Marathas in Poona, Indore, Gwalior and Gujar-
at, the Nizam in Hyderabad, the Jat in Bharatpur and the Sikhs in Pun-
jab. The Mughal Emperor was basically nothing more than a shadow
of royalty and the country was in a state of flux. The political vacuum
thus created provided very favourable conditions for the influx of for-
eign powers. The invasion of Nadir Shah in 1739, followed by a series
of attacks by Ahmad Shah Abdali between 1748 and 1761, dealt a
deadly blow not only to the tottering Empire of Delhi but also to the
Marathas.
At this juncture, the Europeans in India began to get involved in the
politics of the local rulers. These Europeans came to India on the pre-
text of engaging in trade and commerce, and in order to save their
trading interests they took up arms and started to take political control
over the area. They raised armies based on the European pattern and
when they fought the Indian rulers, the difference between a Eur-
opean-trained army and the Indian traditional army was obvious. The
Indian rulers understood that their armies were no match for these
European-trained armies; thus they needed to build an army based on
the European model.
The question was, who would raise a European-style army for these
Indian rulers? It turned out to be European adventurers who made
themselves available and were ready to sell their swords to whomever
paid the highest price; consequently, they were employed by the Indian
rulers for raising these European-style armies.
The objective of this essay is to examine the role played by these Eur-
opean adventurers in bringing about a change in the military system
that was prevalent in India by this time, by raising army units based
on the European model, and by demonstrating their superiority over
the existing Indian military system. In this way the process of westerni-
sation of the Indian military system began.
This essay will look at the following issues in chronological order:
A. The European military system during the eighteenth century
B. The Indian military system during the eighteenth century
C. European adventurers: their background, both military and non-
military
D. Armies raised by these adventurers and the changes that the armies
of the Indian states underwent
E. Conclusion.
A. The European military system during the eighteenth
century
Eighteenth-century Europe underwent large-scale social, political, eco-
nomic and industrial changes. Britain, France, Russia, Austria, Hol-
land, Portugal and Prussia were the major powers in Europe and had
interests outside Europe. Despite different forms of government, these
European powers had one thing in common and that was ‘to maintain
boundaries of the state; to expand them, if possible or desirable, by di-
plomacy of war to maintain internal justice and to protect the estab-
lished Church’ (Rude 1972: 103). During this period Europe became a
model for both military and non-military affairs.
Religion, which in the past had played a major role in European
wars, received a setback and social, political, economic, industrial and
technological developments were becoming the major factors in the
shaping of the nature of war and in turn the military system. The best
brains society had to offer were engaged in the cause of economic ex-
pansion and thus only the unemployed and unproductive sectors of so-
ciety were available to serve in the armies. ‘The officers were found al-
most exclusively from the nobility’ (Howard 1976: 69) and the other
ranks from the riff-raff of society. For example, the army of King Fre-
drick William I (1713-40) recruited as much riff-raff as possible from
the peasants, who were sent back to their farms during the sowing and
harvest seasons. They were paid a pittance and encouraged to supple-
ment their pay by practicing trade in their barracks.
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Professionalism also entered warfare during this period. The officers
were the servants of the state and were guaranteed regular employ-
ment and wages. They dedicated themselves to the service of their re-
spective states. This professionalism clearly discriminated between the
military and civilian elements of society.
The army in Europe during this period could best be described as a
state within the state. They were the symbol of state power. They main-
tained a subculture of routine, ceremonies, habits, dress and music, in
other words, a way of life known as soldiering. It would not be out of
place to mention here that traces of these practices could be seen in
the British army in far more recent history. The officers who stood in
direct relationship to the Crown led aristocratic lifestyles, while other
ranks were recruited from all over Europe by impressments or bounty,
disciplined by the lash, drilled until they were able to perform like
automatons, and were kept in order by the watchdog class. This regi-
mentation made it possible for these recruits to stand at attention for
hours while the enemy fired at them from point blank range (Howard
1976: 70).
The army, as a rule, was kept at a distance from society because the
rulers feared that they would create terror among the common people
or that they might desert, which was a common problem of the era.
And thus came the concept of cantonments.
The way troops were organised was almost the same throughout
Europe. The armies were organised in infantry battalions and regi-
ments; the cavalry in companies and regiments, whereas squadrons
were the fighting formations. In advance of any attack, the artillery
would be placed in the centre, the infantry on their right and left wings
and the cavalry on both flanks.
The first half of the eighteenth century saw the expansion of the
army and during campaigns there was a rigid sense of discipline in the
order to facilitate the execution of the battle. Importance was given to
the personnel and material aspects of the army. Large armies meant
that roads and weather conditions were major determinants in the op-
eration plans. New types of light troops were raised. These troops were
irregular, lacked discipline and were used for overrunning or holding
an area and were counted upon to gain intelligence. The light troops
consisted of a mix of infantry and cavalry and were known as legions,
and they used to provide security for the marching army or forced into
direct battle if necessary (Spaulding 1937: 538).
In the second half of the eighteenth century, we see a new pattern of
warfare emerging. The citizens’ armies replaced the professional ar-
mies (Earle 1944: 49).The rigid discipline became even more rigorous.
This concept of discipline was common throughout Europe. Frederick
the Great’s Prussian military system and army became the model for
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the rest of Europe. The ‘Prussian soldier, through incessant, brutal, ri-
gid drill and discipline, including cadenced steps, became an automa-
tion’ (Dupuy and Dupuy 1977: 664). His cavalry was used for shock ef-
fect in the field and for reconnaissance off the battlefield. He stressed
the importance of mobility over firepower. At the beginning of a battle,
his army used to stand still like chessmen. And thus, battle became a
methodical affair. Gilbert combined the advantage of dispersion and
concentration with those of mobility and called it ‘Grand Tactics’,
which were adopted by Napoleon later on (Montross 1946: 449).
B. The Indian military system during the eighteenth century
The Portuguese were the first Europeans to arrive in 1498 on the West
Coast of India. They confined themselves to Goa, Daman and Diu and
only left India in 1961. Then came the British, followed by the French
and the Dutch. During this period, there were two main military sys-
tems in India. One was that of the Mughals and the other was that of
the Marathas and others like the Jats, Rajputs, etc. who more or less
followed the Mughal military system. The Mughal armies were feudal
in character. The Nobles were given a Mansab (rank) and were ordered
to maintain a fixed number of troops and produce them whenever they
were needed. For this service, they were given a piece of land. The
troops were commanded by these mansabdars (military rank holders)
and the loyalty of troops depended on the loyalty of the mansabdar. The
army consisted of infantry, cavalry, artillery, elephants and camel
troops. The actual number of non-combatants in the army was much
larger than the number of combatants. The armies were huge and
when they were on the march, it was like a moving city with its various
types of fighting and non-fighting professionals. The camp life was lux-
urious and the number of women who came along was large. Armies
were usually in arrear of payment. Though the Mughals were fond of
their artillery, being the first to use firearms in North India in the first
battle of Panipat in 1526, their firearms were old-fashioned. Heavy as
well as light guns were employed. Battles would normally start with
heavy artillery shelling followed by a cavalry charge, followed by the in-
fantry. Once the battles began, more emphasis was placed on personal
bravery. The commander sat on a big elephant, directing the battle and
if he was not seen on the elephant for some reason it usually decided
the battle. The guns and an army’s numerical strength were the main
factors in winning a battle. Elephants and forts played an important
role in the military system. A huge Mughal army would have cumber-
some artillery drawn by horses and bulls and even by elephants. The
huge, luxurious character of the Mughal army came at the expense of
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flexibility and mobility. But this army allowed the Mughals to remain
the masters of India for more than 150 years; the Mughal army had no
equals in India.
The other major military system in India at that time was that of the
Marathas. The Marathas inhabited the regions of Nasik, Poona, Satara,
parts of Ahmadnagar and Sholapur and the western corner of Auranga-
bad, a total area of some 28,000 square miles (Sarkar 1973: 1-2) in to-
day’s Maharastra and the Konkan area of the Western Ghats. This area
includes three mountain ranges: the Sahyadari, Satpura and the Vind-
hyas, with numerous valleys and forests. The Chinese traveller Hiuen
Tsang noted that the Marathas were warlike and proud, but also grate-
ful and vengeful when the occasion warranted (Sen 1958: 1).
The Maratha family of Bhonsle came into the limelight in the court
of Ahmadnagar and one of its descendants Shivaji was the founder of
the Maratha Kingdom in Maharashtra. He associated a brave race from
the Poona area, the Mavle, and began his military career with them.
The Marathas’ military system consists of two parts: one, under Shivaji,
the founder of the Maratha Empire, and the other that arose after his
death. The core of Shivaji’s army was his Mavle infantry who had their
own arms such as swords, shields and bows and arrows. His cavalry
consisted of two categories, those with state horses – the Bargies or
Paga – and his own horses, the Silehdars. Both the infantry and cavalry
comprised an efficient organisation of units and an efficient payment
system. Swiftness, speed and mobility were their specialty and they
were experts in guerrilla-type warfare and in the use of swords, bows
and arrows and spears. A chain of about 240 forts was a major compo-
nent of Shivaji’s military system (Majumdar 1977: 566). These forts
were the fabric of his empire, and they served as his saving grace in
the days of adversity (Ranade & Telang 1961: 64-65). The artillery was
the weakest branch of the army of Shivaji. Meanwhile, the Marathas
purchased their guns from European merchants, who, alas, sold them
mostly inferior weapons. Shivaji also had a large fleet of ships to pro-
tect the coast of his empire. He understood the danger that the Eur-
opeans posed from the sea. Therefore, Shivaji’s foresight led him to
protect his people, punish his enemies, and develop his ports, as well
as a share of maritime trade and the freedom of the sea. ‘So he com-
bined the forts and ships’ (Sarkar 1984: 262).
Shivaji had a council of ministers who ran the administration known
as Astha Pradhan (Peshwas, Amatya, Sachiv, Mantri, Senapati, Su-
mant, Panditrav and Nayadish); excluding Panditrav and Nayadish, the
other ‘six ministers were bound in consonance with the needs of the
time, to conduct military operations when required’ (Sardesai 1946:
280). A very strict discipline was followed in the army and any breach
of discipline was very severely punished. In his battles, Shivaji resorted
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to hit and run tactics known as Gamini Kava. This army was so light
that it could cover 40 to 50 miles in a single march. Night attacks and
mobility were his main tactics. His army was expert in the art of har-
assment and cutting off the enemy’s supply lines and can be compared
to the strategy of indirect approach, developed by Liddle Hart after
World War I.
After Shivaji’s death, the political situation in the Maratha Empire
changed. The real power came into the hands of the Peshwas, the
prime ministers, and the king became a nominal figurehead (Nadkarni
1966: 221). The Peshwas adopted a policy of war in North India. This
led to a major change in army organisation and fighting techniques be-
cause they had to cover very long distances and thus the cavalry be-
came more important. The induction of non-Marathas into the army
brought major organisational changes and affected the discipline in
the army. Now the Marathas adopted field-battle techniques to replace
the Gamini Kava.
Non-Marathas, including Arabs, Siddis and Abyssinians, were also
recruited for the Peshwa infantry, and a trend toward an infantry
trained along the European model became the fashion of the time.
These European-trained troops were called Gardi troops, who were sup-
posed to be superior to the more traditional Indian soldiers. But, in the
Battle of Panipat in 1761, the Gardi troops failed miserably. These Hin-
dustani Sepoys were paid much less compared to those from other
counties.
The Peshwa’s policy of distant expeditions required more cavalry
troops. Furthermore, the Peshwas took advantage of the weak Mughal
administration and successfully plundered the area and levied taxes or
Chauth. The introduction of the concept of plundering meant the in-
flux of a large number of undesirable people into the cavalry. The ca-
valry regiments, however, still included large numbers of non-comba-
tants like the rest of the army’s units.
The artillery, as a branch of the Maratha army, began taking shape
with the Portuguese being the main suppliers of powder, cannon balls,
sulphur, lead and other military supplies at the right price. Local at-
tempts were also made to manufacture ammunition and artillery them-
selves. But the main suppliers of the Peshwas’ artillery remained the
Europeans. The Peshwas also purchased a lower grade of newer weap-
ons without ever mastering their operation, which left them dependent
on others.
The Peshwas extended their power beyond the Maratha territories,
but this meant giving insufficient attention to their forts and gradually
the forts lost their importance and utility and thus, by ‘course of events
and the neglect of the state rendered incapable, for different reasons,
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of doing any service in [the] later half of [the] 18th century’ (Ranade &
Telang 1961: 185).
The Peshwas’ navy during this time also reached new heights when
led by one of the Marathas’ naval chiefs, Kanhoji Angre. But after his
death the European powers took advantage of conflicts between his sur-
viving sons, and a chapter of Maratha naval history was closed. In fact,
the Peshwas never truly grasped the essence of naval strategy (Bhagwat
1977: 426).
The Peshwas adopted a method of warfare that was not really suited
to their character. Their army was always in arrear as far as paying the
wages of the troops, much like that of the Mughals. And the Peshwas’
armies eventually became similar to those of the Mughals, embracing
luxury, pomp and show, which inevitably affected their mobility, flex-
ibility and speed, which had been the main characteristic of the Mar-
atha army.
C. European adventurers: their background – both military
and non-military
During the eighteenth century, India was in a state of constant turmoil
– involving war and internal disorder. The Mughal Empire’s decay pro-
vided an opportunity for the oppressed native chiefs to begin engaging
in revolutionary efforts. But even while they were fighting against the
Imperial Crown of the Mughals, they were also fighting and bickering
among themselves. Thus India was broken up into a number of war-
ring states. Apart from these local warring states, the European nations
(or powers, as they were technically not nations, but rather companies
engaging in business-war on behalf of their respective national govern-
ments) were also milking India for their own purposes. The Dutch ex-
ploitation faded away over time and the Portuguese influence was lim-
ited to their possessions of Goa, Daman and Diu. This ultimately left
the English and the French as the only players in the battle for supre-
macy. These two European powers took advantage of the native rival-
ries in an almost continuous state of warfare, and began to exploit In-
dia’s riches for the benefit of their European investors. Their national
rivalry hid behind the agencies of France (the Compagnie des Indes)
and England (the British East India Company), which was given the
power of making both war and peace with any non-Christian power (a
new charter in 1661 authorised the English company to wage war or
make peace with any non-Christian power and to send warships, civi-
lians and troops to its factories in India). Both the English and the
French had their own armies composed of both European and native
troops. The emergence of a British political entity arose from the pre-
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vailing friction between the English and French in India. The anarchy
that followed the downfall of the Mughals paved the way for British
rule.
In this state of chaos and anarchy, a number of European adven-
turers came to India to seek their fortunes, with sword in hand. They
were French, English, Scottish, Irish, German, Dutch and Portuguese,
who lived by their guts, swords and wits, and assumed the ranks of co-
lonels and generals by themselves, changed their names and employers
according to their own convenience, and fought for the highest bidders
(Bhatia 1977: 118). They not only raised armies but also periodically
sold them; they commanded their own retinues of infantry and cavalry
troops ready for hire to the highest bidder. They were comprised of a
broad mix of people, with some having distinguished military records
while others were totally inexperienced. Furthermore, they sought ser-
vice with various Indian chiefs, raised armies for them, and fought
their battles. Some were deserters from European armies or navies;
while others were escaping their debts. Others included the idle wan-
derers or those who belonged to the respectable classes of by-gone eras,
while others came from the lower classes. Some of them had bright,
honourable and colourful personalities while others had the most sha-
meful or colourless pasts. Some were hard living and hard fighting,
while others were of the easy living and pleasure-seeking sort.
All these adventurers with their variety of backgrounds, different
characters and qualities, sought to enter the service of the native chiefs,
i.e., the Maratha chiefs, the Mughal emperor Nawab of Awadh, the
chiefs of Deccan and later on the Sikhs. They organised and com-
manded armies, helped the native chiefs in winning battles, conquered
kingdoms, overthrew princes, ruled provinces, won distinction, mus-
tered power and amassed considerable wealth. They also shared some
of the lifestyle features of these Indian chiefs. It is not an exaggeration
that the careers of these military adventurers would not have been pos-
sible anywhere else than India in the eighteenth century, when anarchy
prevailed. The political turmoil allowed for the establishment of power
and supremacy and this became instrumental in the building up of a
very favourable environment for these adventurers.
These European military adventurers varied greatly in terms of their
backgrounds, motives and personalities. The adventurers, who had
military training and battle experience in their home countries, came
to India to serve with the army units posted to India. They eventually
deserted and joined local leaders to help to raise an army based on the
European model. Others had no military background, but hopped a
ship sailing for India in any way they could, and during the voyage to
India, learned something from the other soldiers on board, deserted as
soon as they landed in India, assumed their own ranks and found em-
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ployment with some native ruler. There was a common feeling in India
during that time that every white person was a good soldier and an ex-
pert in training and raising troops based on the European model.
D. Armies raised by these adventurers and changes in the
environment of the armies of Indian states
The Marathas were the first to establish contacts with the Europeans.
Apart from being dependent upon the French and the Portuguese for
their supply of guns, cannons and ammunition (Sen 1958: 85), Shivaji
also permitted the French to build a factory at Rajapore and employed
Portuguese agents to purchase artillery from them (1679). Advice given
in tactical matters by the French Governor Martine to the Marathas at
the time of their war with the Mughals (1692) showed how long the
Marathas already had contact with the French (Hatalkar 1958: 48). It
was at this time, in the late seventeenth century, that the hybridisation
process of the Indian and European armies began.
In the battle of St. Thome (1746), the French officer M. Paradis,
commanding 230 soldiers and 700 sepoys without any artillery, attacked
an Indian force of 10,000 men and defeated them on the field of battle
(Mason 1974: 29-30). This shows the discipline, skill, and inventive-
ness of the few defeating poor leadership and the masses of untutored
troops (Malleson 1885: 6). It proved that an attack by properly trained
men could usually defeat the army of an Indian prince ten times as
large. It would be incorrect to believe that the Marathas who were en-
gaged in an expansion of their political authority would have not no-
ticed this course of events at that time.
By the middle of the eighteenth century, every power in South India
was aware that both the French and English had a military secret and
this appeared to be their unique training system. The best thing one
could hope for was to be able to persuade these adventurers to join
their army to properly train their troops. As early as 1751, the Maratha
chief Balaji Baji Rao, the Peshwa, was defeated by troops sent into bat-
tle by the Nizam (Mughal), who had been trained by Bussy and the
French. In order to boost the morale of the general public and the
army of the Nizam (Mughal), a general review of the French troops
was arranged during this campaign, on 14 October 1751. The uniforms
of the French soldiers, their discipline and manoeuvres had a magical
effect on all those who witnessed the review (Hatalkar 1958: 88). This
would have certainly led the Marathas to realise that there was some-
thing new in the way of fighting a war. The Peshwa, Balaji Baji Rao
tried to hire Bussy away from the enemy, but Bussy refused, thus, the
best Rao could do was to recruit two Muslim officers who had been
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trained by Bussy. Muzzarafar Khan and later Ibrahim Khan were used
by Rao to train his troops using the French method. These soldiers la-
ter became known as Gardi troops. The Maratha victory in the Battle of
Udgir, 1760, was to a great extent due to these newly trained troops.
In this way, the superiority and myth of the European soldier be-
came firmly established. Almost all of the Marathas chiefs fell under
this European influence and endeavoured to employ military adven-
turers who were mercenaries willing to undertake any work for a fee.
The Nawabs of Bengal were far ahead with this as they had already em-
ployed an adventurer named Sombre as early as in the 1750s. The Rana
of Gohad, Nizam, and Haider Ali also recruited various adventurers.
There is a long list of European adventurers who joined the native
states to help them to raise more effective armies. But there are a few
who were able to develop a new military system, while others merely
followed them. A study of some of these adventurers who influenced
India’s military system is presented in the following sections.
De Boigne
In 1784, Mahadaji Sindhia, the powerful chief of the Maratha Confed-
eration, through Mr. Anderson, the British resident attached to his
court, invited De Boigne, a French adventurer, to join his army. He was
commissioned by Mahadaji Sindhia to raise two battalions of disci-
plined infantry with suitable artillery.
Benoit La Boigne, who is commonly known as De Boigne, was born
in Cambrery in Savoy on 8 March, 1751. He was educated in his local
college and could speak French, Italian and Latin. He started his career
as an ensign in the Irish Brigade of France, the Brigade known for its
discipline. Later, he joined the Greek Regiment of Empress Catherine
of Russia, was taken as a prisoner of war by the Turks, was sold as a
slave in Constantinople and was relieved only after his parents paid the
ransom. He again joined the Russian Army as a major. In 1777, he
started for India to make his fortune and landed in Madras in March,
1778. In India, he joined the 6th Regiment of the Madras Native Infan-
try as a Subedar and served for three years, then went to Calcutta and
proceeded to Delhi to meet the Mughal Emperor, but could not do so
as the prime minister was in Agra, so he proceeded for Agra. Mahadaji
Sindhia was busy capturing Gwalior, which was in the possession of
the Rana of Gohad who had a battalion of disciplined infantry pur-
chased from the French adventurer Midoc. The battalion was com-
manded by a Scotsman named Sangster. De Boigne tried to join the
service of the Rana of Gohad but failed as his demand for Rs. 100,000
for raising five battalions of infantry was refused by the Rana of Go-
had. De Boigne also tried to join the service in the state of Jaipur but
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failed. Mahadaji offered him service. He was supposed to raise two bat-
talions of infantry with suitable artillery based on the model of the East
India Company. De Boigne employed other European adventurers like
John Hassing, a Dutchman, and Fremont, a Frenchman to command
the battalion. Sangster, who was in the service of the Rana of Gohad
and was expert of cannon casting, was also employed by De Boigne as
Superintendent of the Arsenal. Soon thereafter, he started manufactur-
ing artillery and small arms. Thus, within five months, he had properly
drilled two battalions with proper uniforms, weapons, and other field
equipment and prepared them to take the field. These trained batta-
lions proved their importance along with the conventional Maratha
army in the battles of Lalsot and Chaksana.
In 1790, De Boigne was asked by Mahadaji Sindhia to raise a bri-
gade of ten battalions with a suitable train of cavalry and artillery. All
were to be disciplined in the European style and commanded by Eur-
opean officers (Cotton 1927: 95). He had with him Sangster and Fre-
mont from France and Hessing from Holland. He also appointed Per-
ron, Baours, Pedron and Rohan, all French, and two Englishmen,
Sutherland and Roberts. They would all eventually command batta-
lions. These battalions had uniforms like those of the East India Com-
pany with blue Pagris. Some Pathans wearing Persian blue uniforms
were also recruited (Central Gazetteer 1908: 111). Their arms were
sword, shield and matchlock. Later on, bayonets would replace swords.
The commands were all in English. In De Boigne’s army, every opera-
tion was carried out with precision and routine; the men marched and
manoeuvred using the methods that were prevalent in the European ar-
mies (Compton, 1892: 50). By 1793, De Boigne had three Brigades
ready and the number of European officers increased to 300. They
were of different nationalities – French, English, German, Swiss, Ita-
lian, Irish, etc. Ten per cent of them were commissioned officers and
the rest were drill sergeants and artillerymen recruited from people
who had deserterted from Company service (Compton 1892: 68).
Perron
Pierre Cuillier, famous as Perron, was a Frenchman born in 1755. He
started his career as a businessman, then joined a cannon foundry and
mastered the art of cannon casting. He landed in India in 1780 on a
French ship, as a common sailor or petty officer. Just after landing on
the Malabar Coast he deserted and, in 1781, took up employment in
the Rana of Gohad’s army under the command of the adventurer Sang-
ster, who was assisted by two other Europeans, Tom Leggs and Michael
Filose. Later he joined the Raja of Bharatpur under Lastineau and took
part in the Battles of Agra and Chaksana. He lost his military employ-
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ment at a time when Lastineau fled from the battlefield. In 1790, he
joined the first brigade of De Boigne and took command of the Bur-
hanpur Battalion, and took part in the battles of Patan and Merta.
Thus, he joined the army of the Marathas and when De Boigne re-
signed he was put in charge of the army of Daulat Rao Sindhia. Later
on, Perron, along with Major Pedron and Sutherland, captured the Del-
hi and Agra Forts and won the confidence of Sindhia. He became in-
creasingly more powerful and by 1800 commanded four brigades
along with a number of European officers who served under him.
George Thomas
Born in 1756, into a very poor family of Tipperary, George Thomas had
no formal education. He fled home and reached India in 1781. After
serving the Polygars of Karnataka he joined the Army of the Nizam of
Hyderabad under the command of Franc¸ois Raymond. He left the Ni-
zam forces and joined Begun Samru’s forces in 1787, then left her and
raised his own band of 250 mounted men. He trained them and even-
tually joined Appa Khadi Rao, who asked him to raise a battalion of
1,000 men. In order to finance this he received the revenues from the
Jagir (fiefs) of three districts. He established a Jagir at Hansi and col-
lected a huge sum.
John Parker Boyd
An American born in Massachusetts in 1764, he served in the Ameri-
can Army in 1783 and reached India in quest of fortune. Ahilya Bai
Holkar of Indore had a contract with Boyd for raising a battalion of in-
fantry on the European pattern in 1793 (District Gazetteer 1908). In
1795, he took part in the battle of Kharda, fighting on the Nizam of Hy-
derabad’s side with a force of 1,800 trained men. He later raised two
battalions for Peshwa Baji Rao II.
It was not only Maratha or Jat or Muslim rulers who employed these
adventurers but later, in the early nineteenth century, the Sikhs also
employed the European adventurers to modernise their army. Ranjit
Singh’s army employed a very large number of European officers, for in-
stance. Ranjit Singh wanted to have an effectively controlled military
system that merged the best foreign elements with best aspects of indi-
genous war tactics. The European adventurers were in much demand as
technical experts in artillery and ordinance. The most famous of the Eur-
opeans in the Sikh army were Allard, Ventura, Court, Fort, Holmes, etc.
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E. Conclusion
In the eighteenth century, the Mughal successor states attempted to
modernise their armies. Both the Indian kingdoms and the British led
East India Company (EIC) attempted to set up hybrid military organisa-
tions (Roy 2005: 651). Maharaja Sindhia, one of the Peshwa Chiefs, be-
gan his expedition of North India in the post-Panipat (1761) period. At
this juncture, he thought of employing a European adventurer in his
army and hired De Boigne, and asked him to raise two battalions. Once
European trained battalions entered the Maratha army, their numbers
seemed to increase almost daily. Over the years, they became an inte-
gral part of the Maratha army. Practically all of the Maratha chiefs em-
ployed Europeans. The raising of trained battalions was a costly affair,
so the Marathas started assigning Jaidads (lands) to these adventurers
to meet expenses. Thus, the adventurers gradually became almost inde-
pendent but remained part of the army under the Maratha chief,
although on the battlefield, they were in command. Apart from the
Marathas, Muslims, Rajputs and later Sikhs employed European adven-
turers in order to raise trained battalions and modernise their armies.
It must be noted here that the impact of the military system of these
adventurers can only be seen and understood via the surveys and ana-
lyses of their participation in the various battles. The Battle of Lalsot
(1787) between the Rajputs and the Mughal Emperor’s army under Ma-
hadaji Sindhia, who had trained battalions under De Boigne, proved
that well-trained and disciplined infantry battalions could even face
cavalry charges. The training they underwent developed confidence
among the troops and the scientific method of warfare was considered
superior to the conventional method. The Battles of Chaksana (1788)
proved the superiority of calm discipline over mad valour, and the tri-
umph of war science over sheer numbers. The Battle of Agra (1788)
and the Battle of Patan (1790) again proved the importance of training
and discipline. The Battle of Merta (1790) showed that highly disci-
plined troops and tactical formations had saved the day. The impor-
tance of planning, to make ample provisions for essential amenities
like water in desert battles and the significance of a well-planned trans-
port system carrying ammunition to the frontlines was proven.
The unconscious acceptance of the superiority of these adventurers
who inspired a positive interpretation and adaptation of their military
strategies had a very significant impact on the armies.
A new type of administrative skill developed in how the various units
of the army – infantry, cavalry and artillery – were organised. So-called
Rasalas were attached to every infantry unit for skirmishing purposes.
Artillery pieces of different calibres were also allotted to the infantry
brigades. This made the infantry unit self-supporting. Apparently this
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was not due to the material additions to the Indian Army, but rather to
the impact of the European adventurers on the existing military sys-
tem. The II and III Brigades of De Boigne were examples of this.
Furthermore, a proper and efficient transport system for the convey-
ance of the troops, the equipment, the sick and water and even replace-
ment of horses eventually also developed.
The adventurers also gave the native armies the concept of uniform,
insisting that the troops wear uniforms. The infantry wore red and
black leather accoutrements, and blue turbans. The cavalry appeared in
green and red turbans and cummerbunds (English Records 1936: 397).
One could imagine the scene with two different armies, one properly
dressed in uniform and the other in personal clothes (almost similar in
design) of various colours. Apart from the aesthetic influence that uni-
forms had on the troops, there was also the development of a sense of
belonging, unity and discipline.
The concept of training was also entirely new when it was intro-
duced by the adventurers. Every able-bodied man in India who wanted
to join the army, learned to use a weapon that he knew from child-
hood. Horseback riding was also common in society. Thus anyone who
was physically fit could join the infantry and if he could ride a horse,
he ended up in the cavalry. The use of muskets and guns was just a
matter of experience but with the arrival of the European adventurers,
discipline and training were stressed. Through continuous training the
troops were so disciplined that they could remain immobile even in
the face of a heavy cavalry charge. The battle of Agra, Chaksana and
Patan are examples of their discipline. Intense drilling enabled the se-
poy to maximise the use of their weapons in the minimum amount of
time. Shooting practise and a perfect order of firing increased the
speed of fire. In more modern terms, the adventurers introduced the
man-machine system. The training allowed the sepoy to develop his
powers of endurance, patience, confidence, obedience, vigilance and
alertness, which resulted in increased efficiency and the development
of a sense of belonging and team work, which had been lacking in the
older Indian military system.
The native army’s weapons and equipment were of a heterogeneous
character. They used bows and arrows, swords, spears and shields, dag-
gers and firearms. Their guns were large and heavy and gun carriages
were clumsy. Cannons were also never made of any precise calibre.
The cannon balls were of the same composition as ordinary firearms.
These adventurers brought concrete changes and introduced new
weaponry. Sometimes narrow-bladed straight rapiers with gauntlet hilts
could be seen on the battlefield, which was an obvious western influ-
ence (Pant 1970: 187).
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De Boigne also established an arsenal at Gwalior where there were
iron mines for the casting of cannon balls and a gunpowder factory in
Agra. Saltpetre and sulphur were imported from Bikaner under the
supervision of another adventurer, Sangster, whom we met earlier
(Hutchinson 1964: 126). The role of the adventurers was obvious in
the way the arsenals were properly managed.
In South India, the Marathas in the early period adopted a type of
guerrilla warfare where the infantry was more important than the ca-
valry. Later on during the Peshwa period, when they had conquered
land extending to the north, the cavalry became more important. The
Maratha light cavalry was, however, not very effective against heavy ar-
tillery and a well-trained infantry supported by cavalry in the heat of
the battle. They lacked that Western-style of doing battle and had no
concept of discipline and training. Speed and sheer numbers were
their only weapons. Here the adventurers joined the Marathas and
trained the infantry battalions properly in the use of fire weapons and
artillery manned by European gunners. This Western style of training
and tactical formations became a part of the Maratha army and marked
the hybridisation of Western and Eastern warfare strategies.
Battle plans were another element that the adventurers added to the
Maratha army. The importance of an efficient transport system was
also emphasised, which meant the introduction of carrying ammuni-
tion up to the frontlines and providing drinking water for the sepoys in
the desert. During the Battle of Merta marching in formation became a
clear element of their disciplined approach. The co-ordination of com-
munication between the various wings of the army was also a new ad-
dition.
All these tactics and the above-stated battle preparations and plans
were, no doubt, introduced into the Indian military system by the Eur-
opean adventurers. But in the end, the British prevailed because, in the
eighteenth century, ‘India tried to acquire the superior methodology
and weapons of the stronger, i.e., the Europeans (the British) and the
British won because they retained their military superiority’ (Bryant
2004: 431).
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The Exile of the Liurai:
A Historiographical Case Study from Timor
Hans Ha¨gerdal
1 History in a non-literate society1
The methodological problems of writing the history of non-literate so-
cieties have been extensively debated since the groundbreaking studies
of Jan Vansina in the 1960s. The techniques of obtaining vital sociolo-
gical and historical information from oral tradition have not least been
developed in the study of the African past, where the lack of written
sources up to the nineteenth century necessitate the evaluation of this
type of material. Vansina himself initially believed that oral tradition,
i.e., stories spanning a time perspective beyond living memory, could
be judged according to a modification of the sound principles of histor-
ical criticism developed by Western historians in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries. Thus, comparisons between variants of
oral stories, analysis of the techniques of transmission, and observation
of circumstances of narration, could lead to conclusions about past
events and structures.2 Such studies have since thrived in research
about pre-modern Africa, and the methods of analysis have developed
accordingly. In recent decades, and presumably in the footsteps of the
‘linguistic turn’ that has influenced the humanities, many scholars take
a much more careful stance than (the early) Vansina with regard to oral
materials. The traps appear to be more formidable than conceived by
an older generation of scholars, and the chances of reinterpretations
and reinventions of ‘historical’ traditions are such that a reconstruction
of events older than a few generations proves to be adventurous. The
historical consciousness of a group, and hence its representation of
past events, is highly dependent on the political and social structures
of recent times pertaining to such a group.3 On the other hand, in the
footsteps of postmodern and postcolonial debate the processing of oral
indigenous data in former colonial societies becomes vital in order to
challenge Western narratives. The oral collective memory of these so-
cieties reflects on the past historical landscape in terms that serve as a
corrective to colonial perspectives and judgments on the same past.
Occasionally we are in the fortunate position to have access to two
categories of materials dealing with the early history of a specific area:
a corpus of oral traditions not influenced by written documents, and a
corpus of contemporary archival sources. This is the case in Africa with
a few geographical areas like Congo and Angola, which have engen-
dered several detailed scholarly studies over the years. At first glance,
Asia may seem to be fundamentally different: a vast region that is lar-
gely covered by more or less literate societies since long ago. If we nar-
row the scope to the extensive maritime areas of Southeast Asia, most
of the historical cultures in the western part of the island world have a
tradition of written historiography, albeit with frequent legendary and
mythologised features. In the eastern part, more or less corresponding
to eastern Indonesia and Timor Leste, by contrast, many of the socie-
ties are traditionally non-literate. Local princedoms often have a sub-
stantial corpus of ‘historical’ traditions, including origin stories, prin-
cely pedigrees and tales about particular events and persons. An inter-
esting question is naturally how these traditions compare in content
and perspective with archival documents. As it turns out, this question
can partly be answered due to the long-term presence of literate foreign
communities.
2 The Timorese scene
It is well known that the Dutch East Indies Company (Verenigde Oost-
Indische Compagnie, VOC) established a power base in maritime Asia,
especially in what is present-day Indonesia, in the early seventeenth
century. Although based in Batavia or Jakarta, it maintained its exten-
sive commercial and political network via a system of alliances and
conquests in various coastal places, where fortified trading posts were
constructed. One such outpost was Fort Concordia at Kupang, in the
westernmost part of Timor, which was first set up in 1653. The Dutch
had had contacts with Timor since 1613 because of the potential lucra-
tive sandalwood trade, since the best sandalwood in Southeast Asia
grew on Timor. However, they discovered rivals here in the seafaring
Makassarese people from Sulawesi, and above all, the Portuguese tra-
ders, missionaries and soldiers who had been established in eastern In-
donesia long before the Dutch. The Dutch and the Portuguese lived in
a state of intense enmity until 1663, when a peace treaty was made
public. By this time, the Portuguese possessions of Southeast Asia
were reduced to parts of Timor and neighbouring islands. Although
they were otherwise victorious against the Portuguese adversaries, the
Dutch were at a disadvantage in the Timor area, where their territory
was initially limited to a minor stretch of land in West Timor.4 The
commercial opportunities for the VOC were quite limited, and they
kept the Kupang post mainly for strategic reasons (Coolhaas 1968: 255;
Ha¨gerdal 2007: 7-8). The Company garrison usually consisted of no
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more than 40 to 50 men, and for larger enterprises they had to trust
their Timorese allies. The VOC officials nevertheless kept meticulous
records of their activities.
Timorese society during the VOC period (seventeenth and eight-
eenth centuries) was a low-technological, highly localised one with a
poor infrastructure, based on genealogical groups and divided into nu-
merous minor princedoms that tended to ally themselves with either
the VOC or Portugal. Timorese society was not influenced by Indian
models or by Islam to any degree. Catholicism made inroads in the
first half of the seventeenth century, although in a rather superficial
way, and the society remained illiterate and only very marginally
touched by Western material culture. Advanced metalwork, high-qual-
ity pottery and firearms were unknown to this traditional society and
these items had to be imported, initially in exchange for sandalwood.
At the same time, the political structures of Timorese society were
rather elaborate, following a complicated pattern of hierarchical rela-
tions. Much of this escaped the early Dutch and Portuguese colonialists
of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but modern ethnographi-
cal studies have revealed the complexities of traditional Timorese poli-
tics. Among the Atoni people, who dominate West Timor, there were
kinship-based villages on the local level, which were, however, not den-
sely settled but made a scattered impression on early visitors. Promi-
nent clan heads known as amaf (fathers) were important in the various
localities in a traditional Atoni domain, holding authority over lesser
clans. These amaf, in turn were ruled by a small number (sometimes
four, in accordance with the Timorese tendency of ritual quadruparti-
tion) of amaf naek (great fathers) whose functions varied from domain
to domain. In some places, they held authority over the land in part of
the domain, overseeing rituals and the harvesting of tributes and gifts
(poni and tuthais) for the ruler. In other places, they were less resource-
ful (McWilliam 2002: 66-67). Dutch sources usually knew these chiefs
as lesser and grander temukung – a term derived from the Malay-Java-
nese temenggung. At the apex of the domain was a ruler, known as atu-
pas, neno anan, liurai etc. The Dutch usually termed them radja, vorst
(ruling prince) or koning (king). Their position was strictly hereditary
and sometimes described in colonial texts as despotic. However, the
system also kept checks on the executive powers of the ruler. In most
domains, the ruler was a deliberately inactive figure, whose main task
was ‘eating, drinking and sleeping’ at the centre of the realm. By rest-
ing at the centre, the lord symbolically kept the system in place. A ri-
tual opposition between the ‘male’ and ‘female’ (mone – feto) permeates
Timorese socio-political relations, and here the ruler is counted as fe-
male (not withstanding his or her actual sex) (Fox 1982). An actively
ruling, ‘male’ part, known as usif or, in Dutch, rijksbestierder, was usual-
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Figure 1 Historical map of Timor
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ly found by the ruler’s side. Later in history, he was known by the Por-
tuguese-derived term fettor. There was normally a second usif family at
the side of the principal one, who took part in the governance of the
realm. Moreover, in some realms, there was a pah tuaf or lord of the
land, whose ancestors had once possessed the land but ceded it to the
current ruling family, but who still entertained an honoured position.5
At the dawn of colonial influence on Timor, in the seventeenth cen-
tury, there were some eight domains in the Atoni area in the west:
Sonba’i, Amanuban, Amanatun, Amarasi, Amabi, Amfo’an, Ambeno
and Mena. The Tetun-speaking realm Wewiku-Wehali dominated the
centre of the island, Belu, while the eastern part was divided into some
40 to 50 smaller domains.6 The population of these domains was not
more than several thousand people each, in a few cases maybe just
over 10,000. Although the Dutch and Portuguese termed these do-
mains ‘kingdoms’ it is doubtful that they were kingdoms in any mean-
ingful sense. In spite of their complex structure, they did not have the
means of resource mobilisation or indeed the manpower to act as
states. They fall instead within the category of chiefdoms. However, the
numerous domains were not on an equal footing; instead, there was a
marked hierarchy among them. From the then contemporary colonial
and later ethnographic records, it appears that a larger, even Timor-
wide political network was centrally located on Wewiku-Wehali in
south-central Timor. The ‘female’ lord, the Maromak Oan (the son of
God) was the central ritualistic figure and was revered across the is-
land. Under him, we find three liurai (‘surpassing the earth’), namely
those of Wehali in the centre, Sonba’i to the west and Likusaen (alter-
natively Suai-Camenac¸a) in the east (Schulte Nordholt 1971: 391; Ha¨-
gerdal 2007: 8; Fobia 1984: 9). Wewiku-Wehali was in particular ac-
knowledged as the highest in status by the Tetun-speaking domains in
central and eastern Timor. This does not mean that it ever constituted
an ‘empire’ in the literal sense; rather, it might have been a vehicle for
conflict resolution and deliberation among the numerous domains.
Sonba’i was thus the most prestigious polity of West Timor. Accord-
ing to various legends recorded in the nineteenth and twentieth centu-
ries, the first Sonba’i ancestor was a brother of the liurai of Wehali who
went to the Atoni territory of West Timor. There he met the daughter
of Nai Ke Kune, a powerful chief in the mountainous interior, and he
eventually married her. He thereby assumed authority over the land
held by the Kune family, who were reduced to pah tuaf, with honoured
but impotent positions.7 The other Atoni domains, Ambeno, Amfo’an,
etc., related themselves genealogically to the lord of Sonba’i, though
they were not actually politically obedient to him. The importance of
Sonba’i and Liurai (i.e., Wehali) in the mental universe of the Atoni is
seen by innumerable references. For example, the two basic means of
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nutrition, maize and rice, are known as Liurai-Sonba’i (Schulte Nord-
holt 1971: 55, 91).
History had a deep significance in this type of society, albeit in a
rather different way than in Western society. Timorese society until the
twentieth century was more or less illiterate, so there were no written
chronicles, like the Malay hikayat or the Javanese-Balinese babad. There
was, however, a rich treasure trove of oral tradition stories, which could
be related via folk stories or via institutionalised history telling. The tra-
ditional domains kept speakers, mafefa, in their employ; these people
had the task of representing the ruler and maintaining the traditional
regulations and stories. Similarly, there were non-hereditary historians
who kept track of origin stories, genealogies, etc., which were impor-
tant for the self-definition of the ruling strata of the domain.
In certain aspects, the scope of these histories is structurally reminis-
cent of the types of Indonesian historiography prevalent in the literate
parts of the archipelago. The social importance of origins is an over-
arching concern, whether we are dealing with a Timorese oral story or
a written hikayat or babad account. It was essential to establish the
coming of the ruling dynasty to a particular realm, and to set out the
original relationship between the dynastic founder and the various usif
and amaf naek. Historically, there were numerous migrations of Timor-
ese groups from one part of the country to another, and these migra-
tions were extensively treated in the oral stories and combined with lo-
cal topography. A succession of geographical place names was con-
nected to the stage of progress of a group by means of folk etymology.
Another parallel concerns the structure of the genealogies. While in
reality a dynastic succession seldom descends from father to son in
more than a limited number of generations, Indonesian historiography
frequently simplifies history. It prefers to present a straight line of des-
cent that leaves out brother-to-brother or uncle-to-nephew successions.
In the oral accounts of Timorese spokesmen, this genealogical stream-
lining occurs in nearly all cases that I have investigated, where compar-
isons can be made to Dutch or Portuguese documentary data. A third
parallel is the chronological uncertainty that applies to particular histor-
ical episodes. A story about an event occurring under a particular ruler
or generation might be retold in another story where it applies to an-
other ruler. By carefully comparing different stories, one may notice
certain probabilities, but the uncertainty is likely to persist if the epi-
sode cannot be substantiated by European documents.8
Occasionally there are episodes that are told by a number of storytel-
lers recorded in modern time, which can be checked against detailed
colonial records. The small Dutch outpost in Kupang in westernmost
Timor produced relatively abundant records about its own activities, re-
cords that are to a large extent preserved in the Nationaal Archief in
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The Hague. These records include diaries, letters, and the minutes of
legal proceedings, budget accounts and reports for the VOC hub in Ba-
tavia. The Portuguese materials have been less systematically pre-
served. Whenever a Timorese polity had dealings with the Dutchmen,
we can thus usually follow the events in some detail. This is not to say
that European records are above suspicion. The residents or opperhoof-
den of the VOC fort were, for the most part, placed on Timor on a tem-
porary basis, and thus most of them understood little about the local
customs or history. This ignorance was coupled with a relatively nega-
tive view of the Timorese and their way of life. The latter were fre-
quently denigrated in the documents for being rough, mendacious,
lazy, cowardly, etc. Thus, we do not obtain any unbiased or particularly
well-informed picture from the colonial material. The advantage, how-
ever, is that these records are from that period of time, and were writ-
ten in the context of a bureaucratic company whose leaders needed
facts and not fiction about what was going on in Timor.
On the following pages, I will investigate a case that is frequently
mentioned in late Timorese as well as contemporary Dutch records. By
such an investigation, we are able to clarify how a particular event is
commemorated in the two types of sources – one posthumous, sympa-
thetic and indigenous, and one contemporary, negative and foreign.
The differing perspectives may throw light on the construction and
function of history in a small-scale non-literate society, and demon-
strate how colonial narratives can be challenged by alternative perspec-
tives. The case occurred in the year 1752 and concerns the ruler of the
indigenous domain Sonba’i.
3 Sonba’i in early colonial history
The prestigious Sonba’i polity had a chequered history during the
course of colonial history. It is mentioned in European sources dating
from as early as 1649. By then, it was already a domain with expansive
ambitions, actively supported by the Portuguese. At this time, the Por-
tuguese – who were actually a mestic¸o group, also known as the To-
passes – were establishing their direct authority over Timor’s northwes-
tern coast, with their main port at Lifau in the present-day Oecusse-
Ambeno enclave.9 For a time it seemed that the Sonba’i were destined
to conquer a large part of Timor with Portuguese backing. However, in
1655, it suddenly switched sides and entered into an alliance with the
VOC, newly established in Kupang. As it turned out, this reversal of
loyalties did little to help the Sonba’is’ position. They were defeated by
the Portuguese and their clients in 1657-1658 and part of the popula-
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tion fled to Kupang under miserable conditions (De Roever 2002: 249-
267).
The defeat in effect led to a split of the Sonba’i into two separate do-
mains. The refugees settled in the vicinity of Kupang where they
formed the Lesser Sonba’i (Sonba’i Kecil) group, which was loyal to the
Dutch until the demise of the colonial state in the 1940s. Those who
stayed in the mountainous interior of West Timor, by contrast, became
subservient to the Portuguese, forming the Greater Sonba’i (Sonba’i
Besar) group. The colonial powers gave the rulers of the two Sonba’i
domains the lofty title of ‘emperor’ (keizer, imperador), which indicates
that the Dutch and Portuguese both understood the importance of
maintaining control over the ritually prestigious princes.10 The main
political forces of the respective domain were the usif families, the ex-
ecutive regents who were ‘male’ in relation to the ‘female’ monarch.11
The united Sonba’i domain in the mid-seventeenth century was gov-
erned by usif of the Oematan family. When the main branch of the Oe-
matan fled to Kupang in 1658, members of the Kono family soon re-
placed him.12 The Usif Kono (Uis Kono, Amakono) was elevated with
the assistance of the Portuguese; while at his side was a branch of the
Oematan clan who assumed the position of second usif.13 The Kono fa-
mily had their main stronghold in the region known as Miomaffo or
Amakono, while the Oematan family dominated the Mollo region. The
Greater Sonba’i realm was mostly known to the colonial powers as
‘Amakono’ due to the importance of the Usif Kono.
Although Portuguese colonial rule was eventually restricted to East
Timor plus the Oecusse-Ambeno enclave, its focus initially lay in the
Atoni areas in the west, in what is today largely Indonesian Timor.
Amakono-Greater Sonba’i was considered to be a cornerstone of Portu-
guese rule in the second half of the seventeenth century, together with
Amarasi, Amanuban and Ambeno. Nevertheless, Greater Sonba’i often
proved to be a disgruntled and rebellious client. The emperors of
Greater and Lesser Sonba’i often entertained clandestine contacts,
where the former might warn the latter over impending Portuguese at-
tacks on the Kupang area. There were also cases of open rebellion
against Portuguese rule, as in 1711-1713, and attempts to meddle in Por-
tuguese fractional strife, as in 1673 and 1722. The exacting of tributes
and forced deliveries of sandalwood and other products, appear to have
caused considerable dissatisfaction among some of the Atoni domains,
and not least Sonba’i.
The relationship between the colonial groups on the island was com-
plicated. After 1663, the United Provinces of the Netherlands were at
peace with Portugal. To actually implement this peace treaty on the
other side of the globe was another matter. Although the main colonial
bases at Kupang and Lifau did not commit direct acts of aggression
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against each other, there was a great deal of manoeuvring and warfare
by proxy. The respective allies or vassals of the two powers were con-
stantly pitted against each other, meaning that soldiers of the two Son-
ba’i domains sometimes met on the battlefield. It was a low-level type
of warfare with a few assaults, minor skirmishes and headhunting
raids rather than actual full-scale battles. Inside the Portuguese camp
there was a major conflict after 1702 that further complicated the situa-
tion. The mestic¸o population who upheld the authority of Portugal in
the initial colonial phase was challenged by the appointed representa-
tives of the Estado da I´ndia, the official colonial apparatus in Asian
waters. For certain periods, the Estado-appointed governor of Lifau
fought outright wars with the mestic¸os and routinely accused the Dutch
in Kupang of scheming against the Portuguese positions (Matos 1974:
84-101; Ha¨gerdal 2007: 7, 10, 14-16; Boxer 1947).
4 The crisis of 1748-1749 in written and oral history
While some of these accusations were apparently unfounded, things
indeed came to a head in 1748. The ruler of Amfo’an-Sorbian, a do-
main in the northwestern part of Timor, had hitherto acknowledged
the King of Portugal as his overlord. Now, however, he suddenly turned
to the Dutch in Kupang and asked them for assistance in his planned
rebellion against his old masters, referring to severe Portuguese op-
pression. The VOC post had long-standing orders from Batavia to avoid
meddling in the troubles afflicting the Portuguese sphere. This time,
however, neither Kupang nor Batavia was completely averse to a weak-
ening of Lusitanian influence on the island (Generale missiven 1997:
652, 779). At any rate, Amfo’an-Sorbian violently attacked the core area
of the mestic¸os in late 1748, which was a somewhat reckless undertak-
ing since the mestic¸os and Lifau’s governor were at relative peace at that
time.
The mestic¸o leader or tenente general, Gaspar da Costa, reacted to the
attacks with a desperate sense of brutality. He began threatening the
other Atoni vassals to prevent them from joining the rebels. This policy
did not work, however. The domain of Amanuban was the next to de-
fect to the VOC. In view of this, Gaspar da Costa arrested a brother of
the Greater Sonba’i emperor and some other grandees, to apparently
keep them hostage. These arrests were accompanied by acts of violence
whereby 120 Sonba’is were killed. The Emperor Bau (Baob), with the
Christian name Dom Alfonso Salema, now took to evacuating the old
homeland and fled to Kupang. He was accompanied by 2,305 armed
men with wives and children in tow, comprising a total of more than
10,000 people.14 The Amanuban and Sonba’i refugees were cheerfully
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received by the Dutch and their allies in the Kupang area in the early
days of 1749.15
These events are mentioned in some detail in oral stories recorded
by the Timorese scholar F.H. Fobia, mainly in the 1960s. These stories
were edited down to a digest that was published in a chronicle-like
manuscript, Sonba’i dalam kisah dan perjuangan (1984). According to
this material, Bau or Baob Sonba’i was indeed an important ruler or
liurai of the ‘kingdom’ of Sonba’i (also known as Oenam) who was able
to strengthen the realm for a while. Sonba’i had not experienced any
subjugation under the Portuguese until this time. Now, however, the
Portuguese attempted to secure his person by inviting him to a meet-
ing. Knowing the untrustworthiness of the Portuguese, Baob Sonba’i
declined to show up, and as a consequence, a war broke with the Por-
tuguese. In the beginning, the Sonba’i troops were able to push back
the Portuguese positions to the point where they were verging on re-
treating off of Lifau and Oecusse. After bringing in reinforcements
with modern weapons, however, the enemy turned the tables on Son-
ba’i. The religious authority of the Catholic padres was so great that
several grandees chose to submit to the might of Portugal. Baob Son-
ba’i’s troops eventually surrendered to the enemy. The ruler himself
fled to a place called Oeluan where he hid in a dry rice paddy with his
wives and extended family but he was captured in the end. Meanwhile,
many people fled westward because of the Portuguese attacks.
At this point, Fobia’s digest proves to be somewhat muddled, per-
haps as a consequence of his attempt to write down the data of several
oral spokesmen. In his version, the liurai was taken together with some
others to the foreign stronghold of Kupang to hold them accountable
for not having surrendered earlier. Curiously, Kupang is mentioned
here as a Portuguese place. At any rate, the informants interviewed by
Fobia agreed that Baob Sonba’i went toward Kupang, and that numer-
ous followers had accompanied him. Along the way, he was joined by
people involving solemn ceremonies. The story about his progress does
not give the impression that he travelled to Kupang as a Portuguese
prisoner. Instead, the text asserts that he went to request that the Por-
tuguese take responsibility for their policies, since they had forced the
population to cut sandalwood trees and to deliver beeswax and other
goods. At Fatule’u, he helped the local amaf to distribute land for agri-
culture. He stopped in other places to open up the dry rice paddies dur-
ing the right time, and continued his journey only when the harvest
had been reaped.
Finally, Baob Sonba’i reached Kupang, which is, from now on, un-
derstood to be a Dutch port rather than a Portuguese one. He en-
camped at the spring of Airnona, which was also known as Oel-Feot-
nainu-pehkin, the spring where the princesses washed their hair. The
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sisters of the liurai, Bi Sulat Sonba’i and Bi Aolasi Sonba’i, who accom-
panied him on his journey, are alluded to here. One of them became
the ancestress of the Nisnoni family, which ruled Lesser Sonba’i from
the late eighteenth century onwards.16
More than two centuries passed between this event and the final re-
cording of indigenous accounts. Fragments of these events were men-
tioned in a few inaccessible Dutch publications, which were probably
unknown to the Timorese storytellers.17 Thus the two sources must be
considered independent of each other, although substantial portions of
the oral stories clearly refer to the same events as the Dutch reports.
The threatening attitude of the Portuguese, and their ambition to con-
trol the princely family by force, are mentioned in both sources. The
same goes for the eventual defeat of Sonba’i, the exodus of his people
westward, and the eventual arrival of Bau or Baob Sonba’i to Kupang.
It is also important, however, to note the omissions and obvious fac-
tual errors in the oral accounts. First, the entire context of the war is
missing; no mention is made of the role of Amfo’an-Sorbian, let alone
Amanuban, in the events leading up to the clash. This is a rather typi-
cal feature of traditional Indonesian historiography in general. Dynastic
histories, which followed the vicissitudes of a ruling line, were pro-
foundly parochial in their perspective, meaning that the role of other
polities in a chain of events was reduced or omitted. The actions of the
other Atoni domains were quite simply dispensable, since the aim of
the accounts was to point out conditions important to the understand-
ing of the subsequent dynastic position of Sonba’i, in particular, its
temporary retreat to Kupang and its approaching the Dutch.
Second, it goes without saying that Kupang was not a Portuguese
port. It is also surprising that at least one version picked up by Fobia
lets Baob Sonba’i be captured by the Portuguese and sent thither, while
he actually fled from the Portuguese and he and his people joined the
Dutch. There is confusion between different external groups that is not
uncommon for Timorese traditions. The basic and important ‘fact’ re-
mains that a migration from the highlands in the interior to the coastal
site Kupang did indeed occur, which had important implications for
subsequent Sonba’i history. The itinerary where the liurai moves from
place to place, opens up rice paddies, etc. is also a typical Timorese his-
toriographic device, where conditions at various locations are traced
back to the historical progress of a polity.18
5 Forgotten showdown
The events following the arrival of the Greater Sonba’i in Kupang are
among the more dramatic in the recorded history of Timor. The mestic¸o
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leader Gaspar da Costa considered it essential to force the important
Sonba’i polity back to its old settlement. The rather meagre Portuguese
records from this period show their concern that the emperor had
slipped away to join his Dutch rivals. Da Costa assembled an army of
mestic¸os and still-loyal vassals, recruited from the entire island. Accord-
ing to an oral story recorded by Fobia, the decision was made at a
grand meeting of Timorese chiefs in Nunheun, the centre of the Am-
beno domain south of Oecusse (Fobia 1984: 83). The Dutch estimated
the army to be between 40,000 to 50,000 men, which is probably a
gross exaggeration, but it was surely sizeable. A new emperor was ap-
pointed to lead the Sonba’is who had stayed behind in the old home-
land, a certain Bastiano, who allied himself with Da Costa (Haga 1882:
393). What exactly Da Costa was up to is not altogether clear. Witnesses
later asserted that he intended to exterminate the stronghold of the ‘cat
eyes’, meaning the white Dutchmen, and convert them into parasol car-
riers – a symbol of subservience in the Southeast Asian context. He
would then turn against the white Portuguese in Lifau and dispose of
them as well.19 The Portuguese documents, on the other hand, only
say that he pursued the fugitive Sonba’is. The governor of Lifau tried
to discourage him, but to no avail (Castro 1867: 208; Haga 1882: 401).
The campaign ended in an enormous disaster. When the Portuguese
army approached Kupang, the Dutch authorities managed to prevent a
panic among their Timorese allies. Da Costa’s forces built stone re-
doubts at Penfui to the east of the town, but were slow to take advan-
tage of the initial shock among the VOC side. Instead, a multi-ethnic
Dutch army consisting of 500 men – Europeans, Solorese, Rotenese,
Sawunese, mardijkers (non-whites in the VOC service) – marched out
of Kupang on 9 November 1749. They were followed at some distance
by their hesitant and fearful Timorese allies. The VOC troops steadily
attacked the stone defences and took them by storm, one after another.
The weakness of the large but non-uniform Portuguese army was im-
mediately demonstrated, since large contingents fled the field at the be-
ginning of the battle. Timorese warriors had no interest in extended
campaigns in distant places, let alone major pitched battles, and their
motivation to fight for the mestic¸o leader was apparently limited. At the
end of the day, Gaspar da Costa lay dead along with thousands of his
followers including the ill-fated Bastiano.20
The battle of Penfui had far-reaching consequences for the political
map of Timor. The defecting domains of Amfo’an-Sorbian, Amanuban
and Greater Sonba’i were confirmed as new VOC allies, and a number
of Atoni and Tetun domains soon followed suit and acknowledged the
Dutch. From being limited to a small area around Kupang, the Dutch
sphere soon encompassed a major part of Timor – or so it seemed.
The lands adhering to the mestic¸os were limited to some tiny territories
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in the north of West Timor. The white governor in Lifau was careful to
distance himself from the enterprise of Da Costa, and made no initial
attempt to impede the Dutch expansion.
The oral Sonba’i histories say nothing at all about the battle of Pen-
fui and its aftermath. The battle itself is mentioned in other traditions,
but it seemed to have no place in the stories about Baob Sonba’i. Once
again, we must consider that Penfui, however important in a Timor-
wide perspective, had no direct consequence for the dynastic and geo-
graphical position of Sonba’i. They had already arrived in Kupang by
that time, and remained there until some time after the battle. Once
again we are reminded of the parochial outlook of the Timorese, and
indeed much of Indonesian historiography.
6 The confrontation
The events of 1749 seemed to reserve a bleak future for the Portuguese
on the island. Daniel van der Burgh, the resident of Kupang, was an
activist who worked incessantly for the rest of his short life to mini-
mise the Portuguese sphere of influence. The Atoni domains sub-
mitted to the VOC, but the Tetun princes of the centre and east of Ti-
mor also began to withdraw from the Estado da I´ndia. The ritually
prestigious lord of Wewiku-Wehali approached the Dutch a couple of
years after the battle of Penfui, and with him went a considerable num-
ber of local lords who acknowledged him as their symbolic leader.21
However, the Portuguese mestic¸os and their remaining clients dis-
played a perseverance not untypical of the small Lusitanian colonial
settlements in Asia. Resistance against the Dutch centred on Noemuti
in the highlands, which had previously been a possession of Sonba’i,
but which had later been taken over by anti-Dutch elements. Moreover,
the governor of Lifau and the new mestic¸o leader Joa˜o Hornay got into
touch with some of the rulers who had recently switched sides, and at-
tempted to win them back (Matos 1974: 419-420). In 1751, Hornay
handed a letter to a Chinese man who resided on Timor, and asked
him to deliver it to the Emperor of Sonba’i in utmost secrecy, although
the Dutch ultimately found out. The contents of the letter stated that
the emperor and his forces would be completely crushed unless he
once again became a subject of the Crown of Portugal.22
By Spring 1752, the VOC had plenty of indications that something
was not right among their new allies. Apart from Sonba’i, there was
trouble with Amarasi, a domain that had defected from the Portuguese
side immediately after the battle of Penfui. Incited by Joa˜o Hornay’s
promises of pardons if they returned to the Portuguese, the two king-
doms reportedly became allies. They planned to embark on an exodus
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from their present settlements close to Kupang, and along the way they
were to receive muskets, bullets and gunpowder from the Portuguese
governor in Lifau to further their ends. Furthermore, the plotters pro-
mised to bring along the people of Amanuban, who were also former
Portuguese subjects, and if they resisted they would be cut down.
On 19 March 1752 the urgent issue was discussed in a landvergader-
ing in the Dutch fort, that is, a meeting where the local VOC council
and the allied princes convened. At the meeting, the emperor and most
of his grandees were ordered to stand outside the venue. After due de-
liberation it was decided that it would be best to arrest the emperor, his
son Sane, and his main sub-regents. The emperor was informed and
arrested on the spot. The pro-Dutch allied rulers sent out their retai-
ners in order to urge the Sonba’i people who had already withdrawn to
return. A forceful order was issued by the VOC that the refugees were
not to be violently assaulted – the tradition of headhunting in this part
of Southeast Asia could otherwise lead to killings and atrocities.
In April it was reported that most of the Sonba’i people had been
subdued. The various sub-regents reportedly wished for nothing more
than to be brought directly under the VOC’s command. Ten Sonba’i
grandees then made a solemn oath before the Dutch opperhoofd that
was based on their animist religion. As for the captive, Alfonso Salema
alias Baob Sonba’i, he was sent via the next available ship to VOC head-
quarters in Batavia together with his eldest legitimate son Sane and six
sub-regents.23 The exiles were sent to the Island of Edam off Batavia;
but, alas, their subsequent fate was never documented. Eventually a ru-
mour had it that the Sonba’i lord had been beheaded.24 The Sonba’is,
who had formerly been under his rule, were now temporarily governed
by local VOC authorities. Later they were restored to power under a
younger son of the exiled ruler. Four years after this incident, the Son-
ba’i elite lodged complaints against the deceased resident Daniel van
der Burgh, who had supposedly acted in some corrupt and despicable
way. When he was imprisoned, the ruler would have handed over part
of his gold treasure to Van der Burgh to regain his freedom. The resi-
dent, it was asserted, simply took the gold and then proceeded to exile
the royal prisoner anyway.25
Later that same year, the Amarasi domain was brutally attacked by
VOC forces and their native allies. In a bloody showdown, the Amarasi
forces were routed and the ruler made the cruel decision to order the
guards to kill him and more than a hundred women and children who
remained behind in his stronghold.26 The events of 1752 seemed to de-
monstrate that the VOC system of governance, successful in the im-
mediate surroundings of Kupang for over a century, failed to secure
the loyalty of the former allies of Portugal. The VOC documents com-
plain about the ungrateful attitude of Sonba’i and Amarasi who repaid
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their good intentions with malicious plots. As far as can be seen from
a study of the original documents, Sonba’i left the Portuguese side in
1748/49 mainly due to the individual despotic rule of the mestic¸o leader
Gaspar da Costa. After his fall, the emperor and his chiefs had second
thoughts about all those Portuguese symbols of authority, such as the
Portuguese kingdom and Catholicism.27 To this were added severe
abuses on the part of the VOC. These abuses were emphasized four
years later by a Batavian commissioner sent to Timor (Van der Chijs
1872).
The two remaining sons of the leader in exile reigned in turns,
namely Don Bernardo (reign 1752-1760) and Tafin Sonba’i (reign 1760-
68). The Dutch authorities kept them under close watch to prevent any
further misadventures. Tafin, however, was suspected in particular of
being involved in plots against the Dutch. The VOC policy of forcing
contingents of their new allies to pan for gold in the highland rivers
led to a lot of dissatisfaction while producing preciously little gold
(Mu¨ller 1857 II: 138-139). All this led to the emergence of political net-
works that circumvented the control of colonial authorities. Tafin’s son
Kau Sonba’i (reign 1768-1819) inherited the two domains of Greater
and Lesser Sonba’i. In 1782, however, he hastily fled Kupang for the
highlands, reputedly because the Dutch opperhoofd plotted against him
(Heijmering 1847: 193). The two Sonba’i domains once again went
their separate ways, and a pro-Dutch side-branch of the family called
Nisnoni henceforth governed the Kupang congregation. As for Greater
Sonba’i it remained an important inland realm for the next century,
practically independent from the Dutch colonial apparatus and some-
times waging war against the latter with impunity (Kartodirdjo et al.
1973: 429-430). Due to internal dissention the realm broke up in smal-
ler domains by the late nineteenth century. Colonial forces captured
the last titular ruler in 1906, although a surviving branch was per-
mitted by the colonial administration to govern the Dutch-created land-
schap (territory) of Mollo from 1930 to 1959 (Doko 1981: 28-29; Fobia
1984: 100-121).
7 A posthumous perspective of the confrontation
The story of the arrest and exile of the ruler can also be told from quite
another perspective. During the twentieth century an indigenous oral
account was recounted at least three times. One version, by a member
of the Sonba’i clan, was recorded by the missionary Piet Middelkoop in
1927, and published in 1938 along with a Dutch translation. A second
version, or rather a digest of several versions, was recorded by F.H. Fo-
bia and documented in his unpublished 1984 manuscript. A local
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grandee in Kauniki, the one-time residence of the Sonba’i rulers, told
the third version to Australian scholar Peter Spillett in 1998.28 The es-
sentials of the story are similar in each case, although the three ver-
sions add and subtract various details. The storytellers cannot have
been influenced by the published Dutch historiography, which barely
mentions the event.29
The oldest version, the one recorded by Middelkoop, tells of the early
migrations of the Sonba’i, who eventually arrived in Camplong in the
Fatule’u region. The Portuguese are not mentioned in this context; the
account seems to suggest that the Sonba’i chiefs arrived there in order
to clear fields for agriculture.
A lord called Bau [Baob] Sonba’i stayed there; he stood up and
went to Kupang, and stayed at Kiu Tuta [Bakunase, south of Ku-
pang]. He searched for lands to put him on equal terms with
the Company [VOC]. As he remained behind there, Bau Sonba’i
begat three children, two girls and a boy named Tafin Sonba’i;
the girls were named Bi Sul Sonba’i and Bi Au Lais Sonba’i.30
Bau Sonba’i’s territory was enormous. The Company re-
quested he come to Kupang. Then he [the VOC resident] took a
blowpipe and turned it toward him, and said: ‘If you are a ruler,
then crawl through the blowpipe barrel, and come out the other
end as Sonba’i’. Sonba’i responded: ‘Good, I will crawl in there
first, and then you shall follow me’. The ruler then performed
his trick – I do not know how – and was turned into a snake.
He crawled into the hole and came out the other end. He then
gave the blowpipe back to the Company and said: ‘Crawl in’. But
the gentleman could not do it.
Then they made ten wax candles; the Company made them.
Then they lit them at one end, and they blazed like a lamp. He
was told to ‘take these candles between your teeth. If you are
really a ruler, then put the candle in your mouth and let it burn
until it has melted completely in your mouth’. Handing over
other candles to the Company gentlemen, Bau Sonba’i said:
‘Then you must also do it’. Bau Sonba’i opened his mouth, and
there was no candle to be seen; it had melted. He gave another
one to the gentleman so that they [the VOC staff ] could also
burn the candles like him, but the gentleman could not do it.
Upon that he was ordered: ‘If you are really a ruler, then we
shall take the large iron weight and weigh you with that weight’.
Bau Sonba’i hung in the scale at one end, and they put the large
iron weight in the other scale. ‘If you are really a ruler, you will
outweigh this weight. If you are not a ruler, then the iron will
outweigh you’. Well, they put him in the scale and he lifted the
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iron weight, he hung in balance but then suddenly became hea-
vier and outweighed everything.
Then Sonba’i in turn said: ‘Knead the earth into a ball and
weigh me with that. If I am just as heavy as this earth, then this
is my land; then I am its ruler, the earth having the same weight
as me’.
At that the Company said: ‘Sonba’i has numerous lands. His
tricks overcome mine. We should exile him to another land’. He
had three children; only the father was exiled. His two daughters
remained in Kupang, and the young boy who was still quite
small, remained with his sisters. The two sisters wept and wept
and thought about their father, and their tears became a spring
at Oe` Pula [close to Kupang]. They cried and cried; then water
came streaming from the ground in the middle of the house.
The main pillar still stands in the midst of the present spring.
The two sisters then gave birth to the rajas of Kupang.31
The account goes on to relate the fate of the later Greater Sonba’i ru-
lers. The son of the exiled Sonba’i, Tafin Sonba’i (reigned 1760-1768 in
Dutch records) was in due time approached by the four main chiefs of
the domain. They smuggled him out of Kupang in a mat and estab-
lished his residence in a place called Te`lom Talmanu, although they
did not break completely with the Dutch in Kupang who still received
tribute in kind. Tafin Sonba’i’s son in turn, Ais Le’u (that is, Kau Son-
ba’i, 1768-1819), moved further into the interior highlands upon the in-
stigation of the two principal lords, Kono and Oematan (Middelkoop
1938: 442-443). The story is followed to comparatively modern times,
when the power of the Dutch is being felt; the last royal prince men-
tioned by the account passes away in Dutch-dominated Kupang.
8 Differing perspectives
There is a basic similarity between the colonial and indigenous ver-
sions of the story. The Sonba’i ruler Baob Sonba’i arrives in Kupang
after being attacked by the Portuguese in his homeland. He is given a
place to stay in the vicinity, but after a while, a non-warlike confronta-
tion occurs with the Company. The ruler is apprehended by the ner-
vous Dutch and exiled to Batavia. The Dutch resident himself is de-
picted as a mean and dishonest type. The son of Baob remains behind
in Kupang; he later succeeds to his father’s royal prerogatives and con-
tinues the line of the Sonba’is.
What is most apparent here, however, are the differences in the ver-
sions. That Sonba’i was plotting against the Company is at the most va-
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guely alluded to in the Middelkoop version (‘he searched for lands to
put him on equal terms with the Company’). Nor does tradition men-
tion the Portuguese effort to secure the renewed allegiance of Sonba’i,
or the collusion with Amarasi.32 The VOC records, of course, do not
mention anything about a personal contest between the ruler and the
resident, let alone any supernatural properties attributed to Sonba’i. Fi-
nally, the dynastic situation has been very much simplified in the latter
version; it omits all of the ruler’s sons except Tafin who perpetuated
the dynastic line and, furthermore, erroneously presents Tafin as a
minor at the time his father was exiled.33
For our purposes, these similarities and differences are only part of
the picture. We must also inquire about how the indigenous account
was constructed, against a background of the values of prestige and
governance that are epitomised in the figure of Baob Sonba’i. The im-
age of a Dutch-Timorese contest, which establishes Baob Sonba’i’s ma-
gical powers, is historically implausible but this does not detract from
its interest as a historiographic construct; on the contrary, its inclusion
demands a contextualisation of the process of history-telling in the Ti-
morese world view.
In the traditional system, the position of an individual Timorese was
basically determined at birth. Although there was no literal noble class,
the amaf, usif, liurai, etc., all maintained their positions based on her-
edity, and established a political system with a relatively limited degree
of social mobility or input from the outside. The system was accentu-
ated by a large number of ritualistic opposites, often in terms of ‘male’
versus ‘female’ components. According to H.G. Schulte Nordholt, the
West Timorese Atoni society ‘can best be characterized as a political
system which is based on ritual relationships which are laid down in
rites and myths, consolidated by a network of affinal relationships,
maintained by a system of tribute consisting of agricultural products,
and both strengthened and weakened by repeated, almost regularly re-
curring wars’ (Schulte Nordholt 1971: 403). In this society, the Liurai-
Sonba’i were at the ritual apex, and were associated with great superna-
tural forces. Even storytellers who were hostile to Sonba’i did not ques-
tion his centrality.
Then, what happens when this ritually significant figure is con-
fronted with an external force, which does not share the Timorese cul-
ture? Several instances indicate that the Timorese tended to incorpo-
rate these external entities into their own myths and origin stories. In
Timor Leste, the Mambai people have incorporated the Portuguese co-
lonisers into their mythical genealogy, which represents the latter as re-
turning Mambai relatives (Traube 1986: 52-54). Similarly, the mestic¸o
leaders of Oecusse are included in legends that fix the relationship be-
tween the mestic¸os and the local Timorese to particular (but unhistori-
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cal) events upon the arrival of the first Portuguese ships on the island
(Mu¨ller 1857 II: 189; Fobia n.d.).
In the same way, the confrontation between Baob and the Company
is the first Sonba’i-Dutch meeting mentioned in these oral stories.34 In
a way, it determines the future relationship between the two realms,
which will always be marred by suspicions and incidents. The account
does not question the Company’s might, however. It was all too clear
for the twentieth-century storytellers that the small Timorese prince-
doms had no chance to defeat the colonial forces. None of the versions
suggest that the arrest and exile of the liurai took place after an armed
clash; like in the contemporary VOC records, the Sonba’i subjects of
the VOC in the oral story are understood to have silently acknowledged
the deed without a show of resistance.
As for the contest itself, it consisted of three parts: the crawling
through a blowpipe, the wax candle in the mouth, and the weighing.
This is found in both the Middelkoop and Fobia versions; Spillett omits
the wax candle but adds two other parts (making trees change place,
walking on a string). This threefold contest is significant, since it
touches three important aspects of princely power. By changing into a
snake and crawling through the hole of the blowpipe, the liurai were
referring to the totemist aspects of the dynasty. Princely lines on Timor
were often associated with particular animals in the origin myths. In
the case of Sonba’i, he is portrayed as a python.
The second part, the burning of the wax candle in the mouth, al-
ludes to the beeswax and honey that was collected in the local prince-
doms and delivered to the Dutch and Portuguese along the coast.
While the sandalwood trade had its ups and downs, the frequent occur-
rence of bee swarms in the woods made these two items, and particu-
larly beeswax, important export products (Ormeling 1956: 115-116). Tri-
butes handed over to the colonial masters often consisted largely of
beeswax, which made the collection of the wax a princely concern. This
is made more explicit in Fobia’s version, which has the Dutch com-
mander saying: ‘If you are the king of all the honey and beeswax pro-
duction on the Island of Timor, then try to put the burning end of the
wax candle that I lit in your mouth. If you are the ruler, then surely
the wax candle will burn down but your mouth will not be burnt by
the flame.’35
The third part of the contest involves the scales and refers to the san-
dalwood. The valuable wood used to be brought down to the coast by
the subjects of the various Timorese princes, and was there weighed by
the Europeans or mestic¸os on a large scale. The high prices for sandal-
wood in India and South China made it a strategically vital product,
which was actually a prime reason why the Europeans colonised Timor
(Ormeling 1956: 94-103). Again, this is more clear-cut in the Fobia ver-
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sion, where the contest is preceded by a conversation. The Dutch com-
mander asked: ‘If I wish to fetch sandalwood, honey and beeswax, to
whom shall I make the request?’ The liurai answered: ‘You must seek
approval from me, since I rule the Island of Timor.’ The Dutchman
then challenged the liurai to weigh more than the assembled sandal-
wood on the other end of the large scale, which he easily did.36
In this way, the three-part contest represents a discourse of kingship,
where the Dutch are each time subdued in terms of ritual/supernatural
prestige/power. The turning point in the Middelkoop version is when
the ruler threatens to prove his rights to the land by being of equal
weight as a ball made of earth. No longer daring to challenge him di-
rectly, the Company resolves to get rid of the dangerous prince by ‘un-
just’ means. A reformulation of this basically historical event proves,
one may say, the existence of the various levels of power the two prota-
gonists have: the indigenous ritual and the external executive. An inter-
esting view of colonialism emerges, where the white foreigners are por-
trayed as somewhat ridiculous and despicable, although, at the same
time they are shown to be superior arbiters of physical power.
It is almost unfeasible to accurately reconstruct Timor’s historical
events up to the nineteenth century from oral materials. A comparison
between various versions and with European documentary records de-
monstrates the difficulties of such an undertaking.37 However, a careful
comparison between various categories of materials may enrich our
understanding of how history is made and remade by posterity. Histori-
cal consciousness is closely tied to the emotional and ideological fea-
tures in a given society, and the purported continuity of history will le-
gitimate the institutions of such a society (Karlsson 1999). In spite of
widely differing significations of ‘history’, this is likely to also apply to
materially advanced literate societies, as well as low-technologically illit-
erate societies. In our case, the exile of the liurai was a calamitous
event from the perspective of subsequent generations; still, the liurai
himself was never seriously criticised. Posterity needed to see the event
in terms of ritualistic relations and transcendental power rather than
Realpolitik. A man considered by the colonialists to be a despicable trai-
tor was seen by the Timorese as an upright figure of superior superna-
tural skills, who could only be vanquished by evil forces. The historio-
graphical tables had been turned.
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Africans in Asia: The Discourse of ‘Negritos’
in Early Nineteenth-century Southeast Asia
Sandra Khor Manickam
Introduction
After having spent nearly ten years in Southeast Asia, John Crawfurd
wrote in 1820 of ‘so unusual a phenomenon’ that there were two indi-
genous races in Southeast Asia,1 the ‘brown’ thought to be the original
race of the region, and the ‘negro’ who was assumed to be indigenous
only to the African continent. The other labels he used in reference to
African or African-like people in the region were ‘dwarf African negro’,
‘woolly haired race’ or ‘Papua’ (18-23). Earlier in 1817, Stamford Raffles
spoke of a ‘race of blacks entirely distinct from the rest of the popula-
tion’ found in the mountain regions of the Malay Archipelago and who
formed the majority of people in the island of New Guinea. He did not
label this group of people ‘Negrito’, which would have called attention
to their small stature. He did, however, highlight the ‘black’ colour of
their skin and the ‘woolly’ texture of their hair (ccxxxv). Both authors
were building on previous speculation by European travellers on the
subject. The terms ‘Negrito’ or ‘Negrillo’ were first applied by Spanish
missionaries who came to the Philippines to apparently small(er) sta-
tured and dark(er) peoples on those islands in the seventeenth century
(Leyden 1811: 218; Blair and Robertson 1973: vol. 38, 27). These terms
were copied and used by other European travellers and colonial officers
in Southeast Asia to label various peoples considered to be small(er)
and dark(er) compared to other people thought to be more widespread
on the islands of Southeast Asia such as the Malays.
Locating Africans both literally (in terms of Negritos2 being seen as
remnants of prehistoric or more recent migrants from Africa) and fig-
uratively (in being compared to Africans though not necessarily identi-
fied as African) in Southeast Asia was propped up using the ‘hard
science’ of racial typecasting and migration theories. Physical attributes
given to so-called Negritos by Europeans formed the basis for the as-
sumptions about connections to Africans. The authors above listed the
ways in which both groups ‘looked the same’ with their similar skin
tones, hair types and bodily proportions. Migration theories posited a
few scenarios, such as Negritos being the descendants of slaves whose
ship was wrecked somewhere in Southeast Asia, or Negritos as the first
wave of peoples populating Southeast Asia from Africa during a prehis-
toric time (Crawfurd 1820: 27-30; Raffles 1817: ccxxv). However, other
migration theories were formulated to explain the simplistic notion
that those who looked ‘African’ were incongruously found in Asia.
There are several problems with these underlying tenets of the Ne-
grito label. Purporting that someone looks like another makes the act
of looking as objective, monolithic and comparable from one person to
the next. It places the act of looking outside of cultural influences and
changes across time and space. Listing the ways in which people are si-
milar to other people by virtue of physical attributes camouflages the
cultural and scientific meaning of those attributes in the eyes of the ob-
server. These were not the only elements that supported the African-
ness of certain people in Southeast Asia. British authors saw similari-
ties between the degraded states of both groups of people in the gener-
al scheme of races. This pervasive attitude influenced how Negritos
were portrayed in texts and images in the early nineteenth century. Vi-
sual technologies, such as engravings and drawings with text, were
used to naturalise character similarities already perceived between Ne-
gritos and Africans.
This article questions the very notion of Negrito as a category and in-
vestigates the ways in which the term was problematically used and
perpetuated in the context of an emerging field of anthropological
study following closely at the heels of, or growing concurrently with,
British colonial expansion in parts of Southeast Asia. Instead of de-
scribing these scholars’ actions as ‘identifying’ Negritos, they were in-
stead actively constructing the category and fitting various peoples into
it. A person was only classified Negrito when he was compared to an-
other type, either similar to stereotypes of Africans, for instance, or dis-
similar from stereotypes of a more widespread group on the islands of
Southeast Asia, namely, the catch-all ‘Malay’ racial group. The encapsu-
lation of various groups under a single heading was a scientific endea-
vour, one that entailed describing people through words and images.
As noted by Peter Hanns Reill in reference to another early subject of
natural history, plants,
the illustrator has to use conventions of representation and in
doing so, no matter what the medium, enter into a world that
encompasses far more than the desire to render as faithfully as
possible a true, ‘objective’, view … (Reill 1996: 293-304).
These modes of representation, as applied to Negritos, are examined as
they appeared in the primary writings of Raffles (1781-1826) and Craw-
furd (1783-1868), two well-known British administrators and authors of
books on the Malay Archipelago. Raffles’ A History of Java, published
70 SANDRA KHOR MANICKAM
in 1817, and Crawfurd’s History of the Indian Archipelago, containing an
account of the manners, arts, languages, religions, institutions, and com-
merce of its inhabitants published in 1820 are of particular interest here.
Besides writing on people later called Negrito and being early propo-
nents of categorising some people in the Archipelago under a similar
heading, they also present the reader with early instances of drawings
of Negritos. The combination of the text and drawings brings to the
fore the stereotypes surrounding Negritos and illustrates how they
were aligned with Africans.
Early studies on Negritos could come under the heading of colonial
anthropology or merely European anthropology depending on the em-
phasis put on colonial endeavours during this time. Together, the two
authors served in the British administrations of Penang, Melaka and
Batavia in the period before writing their books. Extrapolating from
these circumstances, these authors’ writings could be approached from
the perspective of colonial knowledge based on colonial conditions in
Southeast Asia. Yet, if knowledge can never be separated from the con-
ditions of its making, colonial anthropology is repetitive, since colonial
relations characterised much of European anthropology in the region.
As Talal Asad writes, while anthropology did not necessarily push forth
colonialism in a remarkable way, colonialism was an important, if not
the determining, mindset of the anthropologist at this time (1991: 315).
Furthermore, though colonial inroads were just being formed in the re-
gion, the contact between Europeans and Africans had been taking
place for hundreds of years and an unequal relationship was consoli-
dated in the fifteenth century with the subjugation of Africans in the
trans-Atlantic slave trade (Curtin 1964: 30). This relationship between
Europeans and Africans is central to this study of Negritos in South-
east Asia due to the parallels drawn by these authors between Negritos
and Africans.
John Crawfurd and Stamford Raffles as early anthropologists
The works of Crawfurd and Raffles have been positioned under many
fields of study, history and the literature of Southeast Asia being the
most common two. Not many, however, would consider them relevant
to the field of anthropology or see them as anthropologists, though
their work clearly comes under the rubric of early anthropological data
gathering and theorising on the region.3 In the early nineteenth cen-
tury, the study of anthropology relied heavily on travel accounts and re-
ports from overseas as information for their studies. It also utilised the
study of language and investigated the relationship between languages
to determine connections between groups of people and their civilisa-
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tional status. Raffles and Crawfurd stayed and travelled extensively in
the Malay Archipelago, placing them outside the category of ‘armchair
anthropologists’, those Europeans who wrote about peoples and places
far away from Europe without ever having left their chairs. However,
these authors do have some of the stereotypical characteristics of that
group, because, although they reported on their personal experiences
of meeting various people, they often repeated reports from other tra-
vellers especially when it came to a theorisation of Negritos who were
in general difficult to meet because they lived in inaccessible areas or
in locations beyond the sphere of influence of the European powers
(Stocking 1987: 50).
The analysis of the representations of Negritos will start with Craw-
furd’s History of the Indian Archipelago. Crawfurd was one of the early
scholars of Southeast Asia who, along with Raffles, produced works on
the region still utilised by scholars today. His History of the Indian Ar-
chipelago, as the Malay Archipelago or the island portion of Southeast
Asia was then called, is an ambitious work written in three volumes.
Contained therein are accounts on the ‘manners, arts, languages, reli-
gions, institutions, and commerce of its inhabitants’, as well as maps
and engravings of scenes and people in the region. It was based on
nine years’ experience in the Archipelago, as the advertisement assured
the reader, from the time he was appointed as medical staff member in
Penang in 1808, to his stay in Java from 1811 until it was returned to
the Dutch. The testimony on his background was important to readers
of the time as a way of determining the veracity of his account. His
own experiences were supplemented with, and compared to, anthropo-
logical knowledge from other individual authors. This emphasis on the
personal account was one of the ways in which claims may be sup-
ported or refuted; based on the type of description offered, whether ‘ac-
curate’ and ‘interesting’ or ‘vague and general’, and the reputation of
the author, further inferences can be made by the anthropologist who
otherwise was not present and could not speak from ‘experience’
(Crawfurd 1820: advertisement, v, vi, 25-7; Crawfurd 1856: v).
There are features of a text of this sort that were expected of the writ-
ings of British authors in the tropics. C.A. Bayly notes a ‘sharpening of
racial attitudes’ in general among Britons of the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries, and indeed, racial attitudes abounded in Crawfurd’s
book (1989: 147). Stating judgements on culture and civilisation in
terms of ‘inferior’ and ‘superior’, assuming hierarchies among peoples
and civilisations and within the region were features of Crawfurd’s
work. These judgements, however, influenced how Crawfurd thought
about the development of peoples in the region. The topographical dif-
ferences from one place to another and the varied species of animals
and vegetation all had an impact on the type of people and civilisation
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perceived in the archipelago. Thus, well before Alfred Russel Wallace’s
book, The Malay Archipelago, was published in 1869, Crawfurd divided
the region into five ‘natural and well-grounded divisions or classes’
making the generalisation that the level of civilisation of the people
there decreased from West to East, in conjunction with the change in
geographical features and food production of those countries. While he
found this to be true in general, he noted the presence of inferior Ne-
grito races in the western portion of the archipelago, although they
were usually more commonly found in the east (1, 3, 6-16).4
Crawfurd’s writing on Negritos was based in part on material already
presented by Raffles in his A History of Java. Crawfurd, in fact, had
served under Raffles and was well acquainted with his work, though
he had a low opinion of the book (Raffles 1817: xviii; Smithies 1983:
366). Raffles’ earlier discussion on a ‘race of blacks’ relied on his en-
counter with an individual from New Guinea. While discussing the
background of slave-raiding practices in the archipelago, he recounted
how a young boy named Dick came to be in his service after having
been kidnapped from New Guinea and brought to Bali. Dick was con-
sidered to be an ‘Oriental Negro’ and was brought to England and ex-
amined by the medical officer Sir Everard Home, where Dick was com-
pared to an African.5 That Dick should and could be compared to
someone from Africa seemed natural. Earlier in the passage, Raffles
had already mentioned the theories regarding Oriental Negros. He pos-
ited that they were either migrants from Africa or indigenous to the
area, theories reproduced in Crawfurd’s History (Smithies 1983: 366).
Dick was compared on the basis of the colour of his skin, his type of
hair, the angle of his forehead, the shape of his lips and his buttocks
among other things. Based on Home’s initial examination, he reported
that the boy, and Papuans in general, were different from ‘the African
negro’, thereby shifting the analysis from an individual specimen to
the general type. This examination was also reproduced in Crawfurd’s
History but applied to a discussion on ‘dwarf African negroes’. Craw-
furd then added that only ‘in [a] mere exterior stamp that the puny Ne-
gro of the Indian islands bears any resemblance to the African’ (Raffles
1817: 23-24; Crawfurd 1820: 24).
If the only physical examination made by Home did not support the
comparison between Dick and Africans, and this was reaffirmed by
both Raffles and Crawfurd, how was such a link maintained and rein-
forced with the on-going labelling of some groups as ‘Oriental Negros’/
‘race of blacks’ by Raffles and ‘dwarf African negros’ by Crawfurd? The
physical examination was but one pillar that supported the fac¸ade of
those labels. The inclusion of certain groups in an African-like race
went beyond how similar they supposedly looked to Africans. Instead,
the reader was led by the authors to see similarities based on the
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authors’ presentation of the groups as being primitive. As mentioned
by Jan Nederveen Pieterse in reference to the science of race, ‘beyond
their grounding in biology or skin colour, is a pathos of inequality’
(Pieterse 1992: 51). The connections between impressions of Africans
and African-like people seen in Southeast Asia by Europeans were
fraught with assumptions concerning the hierarchy of and relationship
between races. Raffles and Crawfurd painted impressions of certain
groups as Negrito in a number of different ways, but three main asso-
ciations will be analysed: Negritos as slaves, Negritos as Africans, and
Negritos as exotic miniature people.
Seeing Negritos as slaves
Slavery as practiced in Southeast Asia was different from slavery as it
was practiced in the trans-Atlantic slave trade from the fifteenth to the
nineteenth centuries. Resulting from the huge volume of the latter
trade and its particular practices, slavery now is understood to mean
chattel slavery whereby a slave is property that can be owned, sold or
purchased wholly by a master (Pieterse 1992: 52-53). In Southeast Asia,
the terms slave and slavery used by Europeans to describe the various
forms of servitude they encountered may encompass such a definition
but not necessarily.6 There were other forms of institutionalised servi-
tude that did not consider slaves property. Slaves sometimes retained
certain rights and could even purchase their freedom after a certain
period of time, depending on the societies in which they were found.
As such, some scholars have preferred the term debt-servitude/debt-
slavery/debt-bondage rather than, or in addition to, slavery (Endicott
1983: 216; Valentijn 1994: 82).
Slavery was made into a visible issue for Raffles during his time as
Lieutenant Governor of Java. In 1807, the slave trade was outlawed un-
der English law, but it was only in 1811 that this was understood to ap-
ply to Asia as well (Wright 1960: 185). Raffles arrived in Java in 1811
during the British invasion of the island. He held his post until 1815,
when Java was returned to the Netherlands based on agreements made
as a result of the Napoleonic Wars. In 1817, the History of Java was pub-
lished with accompanying illustrations. In it, he frequently alluded to
the ills of slavery and to his successful attempts at eradicating forms of
slavery. However, H.R.C. Wright points out that Raffles’ commotion
over slavery was lip service paid to his and, in general, the British ad-
ministration in the archipelago. It was an attempt to draw attention to
the shortcomings of foreign and native people who were involved in
the slave trade, in particular the Dutch, for not doing enough to stamp
out slavery, and Arabs and Chinese for continuing the practise. Slavery
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was a pawn in the public relations campaign in which the British were
poised as the responsible caretaker of the region to those in the British
Isles who were against slavery. Wright further argues, however, that
this did not have much impact on the way the British and Raffles were
viewed by people back home or the locals (Wright 1960: 185). Never-
theless, the ways in which slavery was discussed, and the descriptions
of people who were enslaved, tell us much about the act of classifying
people as ‘a race of blacks’ and subsequently ‘dwarf African negros’.
Raffles was aware of the connotations of ‘slave’ and ‘slavery’ and the
feelings that these words would evoke in a British parliament and pub-
lic that had in the late eighteenth century begun to outlaw slavery in
its possessions. In the lead, until the British invasion of Java, Raffles
compared the Dutch government in Java to those European countries
who sold people in their possessions in West Africa to the Americas
(Wright 1960: 184). He used the term slavery despite evidence that he
understood that conditions in Java may have been different from condi-
tions of the West Africans in the Americas.7 Using ‘slavery’ in History
of Java could also be seen as strategic on the part of Raffles. He wanted
to draw comparisons between the trans-Atlantic slave trade of Africans
to the Americas, and what he depicted as a similar trade transpiring in
Southeast Asia, and, further, to highlight his role in abolishing slavery.
According to Raffles and other sources, those who were brought into
servitude consisted of a variety of different people. Franc¸ois Valentijn
(1666-1727), who was in the Spice Islands while the Dutch East Indies
Company were in ascendancy in the archipelago, wrote about the slave
trade and the conditions of people under debt-servitude in Bali. He also
provided an engraving of a Balinese slave woman and mentioned Ma-
kassar slaves in his account (78-88). Owen Rutter, publishing in 1930
but referring to the mid-nineteenth century, highlighted a slave trade
on the island Nias off Sumatra, slavery in Borneo and Sarangani off
Mindanao. Papuan (or Papua, according to Raffles), Spanish and Filipi-
no slaves were apparently commonplace (49). Raffles mentioned that
‘the pagan tribes in the vicinity of the Mahometans, such as those on
Bali and some of the tribes of Celebes, the Harafuras, the black Papuas
or oriental negros, the original inhabitants of Halamahira, Goram, and
other easterly nations’ were often kidnapped and turned into slaves
(1817: 234). Despite the scepticism that should accompany these ac-
counts of rampant enslavement based on the aforementioned reasons,
we can deduce that forms of servitude, whether a trade in chattel slaves
or societies producing debt-bonded people, formed parts of many differ-
ent societies in Southeast Asia at this time such that there may not have
been one single group of people targeted and known as slaves per se.
Despite this, one group was more closely linked to slavery by Raffles,
a group he considered to be ‘black’. The few places Raffles discussed
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‘black Papuas or oriental negros’ were in tandem with slavery. Oriental
Negroes were often victims of slave raiding by Arab, Bugis and Chinese
traders. In his one personification of Papuans, in retelling the story of
Dick and the examination he underwent, Raffles presented him in the
context of his enslavement and emancipation. David Smithies hypothe-
sises that Raffles may have purchased Dick in a slave market in Bali,
which was how Dick came into the service of Raffles (1960: 366). In
Raffles’ stereotyping of Oriental Negroes as slaves, he associated slavery
with perceived blackness, as many Europeans before him had done.
Pieterse and Curtin write that the association of the curse of Canaan
with slavery and eventually black skin colour became commonplace in
the seventeenth century and was used up until the nineteenth century
as a justification for slavery (Curtin 1964: 30; Pieterse 1992: 44). In
Raffles’ attempts to portray the depravity of slavery and to argue for
emancipation, he saw blackness in the Papuans and thereby reinforced
and transferred the associations of blackness and slavery in European
literature to Southeast Asians whom he saw as ‘black’.8 The association
between Papuans and enslavement in Southeast Asia was parallel to
the association between Africans and the well-known Atlantic slave
trade. Both groups were enslaved and both groups were stereotypically
regarded as being less than human: the former group due to European
racial theories surrounding the inferiority of ‘blackness’ and people
coming from Africa which supported practices of slavery, while the lat-
ter due to practices of slavery within the archipelago.
Crawfurd repeated this connection made by Raffles between Pa-
puans and slavery and blackness. Crawfurd further provided a context
for new information subsequently collected on them. The association
between Oriental Negros and slavery was left intact and supported with
new evidence. He cited subjects brought from the mountains of Kedah
and from New Guinea whom he had seen as slaves and whom he said
were Negritos, adding yet another aspect to this grouping, that of their
diminutive stature. Though he did not explicitly make enslavement a
determining feature of this group, he was sweeping in his assumptions
of the relationship between the ‘fairer’, lank-haired or brown-complex-
ioned race and the Papua woolly-haired, dwarf African Negro race. He
said that ‘whenever the lank and the woolly-haired races meet, there is
a marked and wonderful inferiority in the latter.’ Furthermore, ‘when-
ever negritos are encountered by the fairer races, they are hunted down
like the wild animals of the forest, and driven to the mountains or fast-
nesses incapable of resistance’ suggesting that Negritos were frequently
brought into a condition of servitude by ‘brown’ races due to their in-
herent inferiority (Crawfurd 1820: 25-26). His confidence in stating
such a relationship draws from his observation of this truism in the
Western world as well.
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The brown and negro races of the Archipelago may be consid-
ered to present in their physical and moral character a complete
parallel with the white and negro races of the western world.
The first have always displayed as eminent a relative superiority
over the second as the race of white men have done over the ne-
groes of the west (Crawfurd 1820: 18).
In a much later article by Crawfurd entitled ‘On the Physical and Men-
tal Characteristics of the Negro’, he reiterated that Africans had always
been considered slaves by the Egyptians, Jews, Arabs and Persians
(Crawfurd 1866: 212-239). Thus, while Raffles alluded to the relation-
ship between Asiatic blacks and servitude, Crawfurd brought the con-
nection into sharper relief and made it into a stereotypical role of ‘ne-
gros’ in general, and Asian Negritos in particular.
This discussion has focused on the ways in which Raffles and Craw-
furd saw slaves in Southeast Asia. To Raffles, slaves were an important
point in his tenure as administrator in Java. He attempted to show that
slavery was inherent in Southeast Asian societies and that it was en-
couraged by the former Dutch colonists. He presented himself as the
saviour of the slaves whom he said were numerous and encompassed
several groups including Papuans. However, of all the groups known
to have been enslaved the only group that was represented pictorially
and personified in the form of a personal encounter was Dick, the Pa-
puan. In the course of the book, this special attention paid to Dick tied
him inextricably to slavery and Raffles’ civilising mission. Crawfurd
continued to write in this line of thought. He linked Oriental Negroes
and the condition of being enslaved even closer together and at the
same time introduced comparisons from the West between the white
races of Europe and the black races of Africa. Whereas in Raffles’ book,
the report of the physical examination by Home refuted any links to
Africa and Africans, Crawfurd reinforced these links in a variety of
ways. The parallels between the black races of Africa and of Southeast
Asia in their perceived inferiority to, and enslavement by, white and
brown races, were meant to highlight the Africanness of the Asiatic
Negroes. The construction of the Negrito revolved around the percep-
tion of blackness, which was related to Africans, which was then linked
to slavery. In the next section, I will discuss how blackness and Afri-
canness were shown to exist among the Oriental Negros.
Portraying Negritos as African
Depictions of Africans in European travel and exploratory literature
abound. Africa had been known to Europeans for hundreds of years
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and the depiction of Africans throughout history is by no means uni-
form. David Brion Davis writes that the association between black skin
colour and demeaning characteristics was present in Arab literature in
the eighth and ninth centuries. This viewpoint was subsequently also
professed by European Christians (1984: 42). Gustav Jahoda argues
that while Africans were not portrayed negatively in pre-medieval litera-
ture, a change came during the thirteenth through the fifteenth centu-
ries due to the animosity between Christians and Muslims (1999: 28).
However, these associations emerged and spread prior to the eight-
eenth and nineteenth centuries, with the advent of scientific studies on
the origins of humans, on the demarcations between apes and hu-
mans, and on the origins and nature of particular races, particular
tropes about Africans emerged. In the early nineteenth century, stereo-
types of Africans as savages, child-like or sub-human or ape were com-
monplace in scientific and travel literature. The facial angle, used initi-
ally as an aesthetic device but later as a marker of racial difference, was
one way of rationalising the perceived differences between Europeans,
Africans and other people. The impact of this theory can be seen from
the depictions of Africans during the eighteenth through twentieth
centuries (Smith 2006: 182, 186, 200-202; Stafford 1996: 254; Pie-
terse 1992: 46-49, 58).
We can discern some overlap in Raffles’ and Crawfurd’s depictions
of Negritos with the tropes used in the discourses of Africans. With
Africanness ‘seen’ in their analogous state of slavery, it was also ‘shown’
through the mere presence of an aquatint of Dick (Figure 1). As men-
tioned previously, the discussion of slavery in Raffles’ book was not
limited to Papuans. They formed only one of a number of groups that
were enslaved. Yet, despite the pervasiveness of enslavement, the only
representative of slavery referred here is Dick who belonged to ‘the
black Papuas or oriental negroes’, even though he might not be the
most common of slaves (1817: 234). Thus we have the distinction be-
tween the drawing of a slave, and the text which discusses slavery in
various parts of the book. Raffles typified the drawing of black Papuans
as slaves, even though the text mentioned more diversity among the
population of slaves. This reinforced the link between slavery, black-
ness and Africanness.
These three elements are drawn closer together in the details noted
in the text relating to Dick and the image of him. Before focusing on
the aquatint itself, it is useful to consider the artist who created the im-
age and his experience in depicting people and scenes in Southeast
Asia. William Daniell was employed to produce coloured aquatints re-
presenting figures in Raffles’ History of Java. William and his uncle,
Thomas, had been travelling in India since 1785 and Thomas had be-
gun painting watercolours and engraving plates of scenery in India
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shortly after. Both Thomas and William learned the engraving techni-
que of aquatinting while they were in Calcutta, where their skill in pro-
ducing aquatints was admired and their prints popular (Archer 1980:
13-16). They travelled from India to China, passing through the Strait
of Melaka and drawing and producing aquatints of various people and
scenery along the way (Sutton 1954: 161). John Bastin, in his introduc-
tion to the History of Java, suggested that Daniell was approached by
Raffles in 1816 to produce the aquatints based on drawings by Captain
Godfrey P. Baker, based on surveys done in Java (1988: vii). Raffles
himself, in the preface to the book, states that ‘many of the designs
[were] from the pencil of Mr. William Daniell, who has devoted his un-
divided attention in forming a proper conception of this subject, and
spared neither time nor exertion in the execution’ (x). The aquatint of
Dick, however, may have come about via a variety of means. He may
have been drawn by Baker and aquatints were produced based on those
by Daniell, or Daniell himself may have drawn and made aquatints of
Figure 2 Dick, a Papuan from New Guinea, illustration taken from Thomas Stam-
ford Raffles, History of Java.
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Dick. Michael Smithies asserts that Dick was drawn by Daniell himself
sometime during Dick’s stay in London with Raffles, instead of having
been painted from a sketch by Captain Baker, and instead of being
drawn in Java or Bali (366-367).
The depiction of Dick has to be read in tandem with the other depic-
tions in the History of Java. The plates that accompanied the History of
Java encompassed a large variety of subjects. There were drawings of
scenery, architecture including religious temples, carvings of deities,
musical instruments, weapons and even alphabets. Of these, only a
handful were drawings and paintings of particular people. There were
paintings of several members of Javanese society, from court officials
to ordinary people, as well as sketches of Balinese society. What is ap-
parent in comparing these drawings and sketches to the drawing of
Dick is the starkness of the latter drawing. For instance, the drawing of
a lower-class Javanese woman was depicted in front of kampong scen-
ery, with a bullock cart and a device to pound rice. These objects were
placed there to indicate the subject’s place in society and to give mean-
ing to the drawing. Much attention was paid to the subjects’ dress
based on a variety of roles and occasions, as was evidenced by the sepa-
rate depictions of a Javanese in wardress, ordinary dress and court
dress.9 Whereas the previous drawings presented the subject in ornate
costumes with implements and background, Dick was shown in a loin-
cloth with few other objects in the background to indicate his place in
society. In the drawing, Dick is standing on a cliff looking out to sea.
There are rocks and grass on the cliff, with a handful of palm trees.
There are the outlines of far off islands or mountains and two ships,
and the sky is overcast. If attention to clothing can be taken as an indi-
cator of civilisation, Dick’s lack of ornate clothing may be taken as an
indication of a lack of civilisation.10 The lack of accompanying objects
in the background could also indicate that the painter was not sure
how to rationalise Dick’s position and present it in the scheme of his
painting, or perhaps that Dick was not to have any position other than
a person close to his natural surroundings, in other words, ‘primitive’.
Dick’s body was presented in profile, looking up into the sky with
his hands crossed across his chest, with his weight on one leg and the
other bent. The side view allowed the viewer to deduce the facial angle
of the subject. In fact, this was one of only three times in the book
where the profile view was used to depict anyone in Java. There are
several questions that should be asked about the use of the profile. To
what extent did the ideas of facial angles influence Daniell’s or Baker’s
depiction of Dick? Theories surrounding the face were still circulating
and the influence of these theories can be seen in many artworks, espe-
cially subjects presented in profile (Staum 2003: 23-35, 105-108). In Da-
niell’s depiction of the head, a profile angle was used whereby one can
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presumably calculate Dick’s facial angle. The facial angles of the other
two subjects could also have been calculated from their portraits and
the conclusion can be made that their angles indicate a measure of ci-
vilisation. They were also depicted in ornate costumes and captions
that read that they were important figures in their societies, whereas
Dick has no such accompanying objects and the caption merely reads
‘A Papuan or native of New Guinea. 10 years old.’
In Crawfurd’s History, the same drawing was used and the context
surrounding Dick was expanded to make him into a specimen of ‘ne-
gro’ and ‘woolly-haired races’ found throughout the archipelago, includ-
ing the Semang in the Malay Peninsula. Crawfurd made an engraving
of the same person, but with a few crucial additions. He combined it
with another engraving and together they were to be in contrast with
one another and serve as types (Figure 2). Dick was a type from the
‘negro race’, as the caption ‘A Papua or Negro of the Indian Islands’ in-
Figure 3 The Papuan Dick and Katut, native of Bali, illustration from John Craw-
furd, History of the Indian Archipelago.
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dicated, and the other was a type of the ‘brown race’, as the caption
‘Katut A Native of Bali, one of the Brown complexioned Race’ read.11
The contrast operates on a number of different levels. Going back to
clothing, the drawing of Katut showed him wearing a sarong or dhoti,
which covered most of the body from his waist down, while Dick was
still in a scanty loincloth. The difference in skin tone, or the darkness
of Dick’s skin, was emphasised by also presenting a drawing of a light-
er-skinned person. Hair types were distinguished in the drawing, from
Katut’s ‘lank’ hair to Dick’s ‘woolly’ hair. These aspects of the drawing
equated Dick with all ‘woolly haired races’ and to other groups consid-
ered darker and different from the ‘brown race’.
Seeing miniature people
Besides showing the African-like qualities of Dick, another characteris-
tic was attributed to Dick, which was associated mainly with Africans:
that of being miniature or pygmy. In re-presenting Raffles’ drawing,
Crawfurd added a crucial trait, that of Dick being dwarf-like compared
to Africans from Africa and to other Asians in Southeast Asia. Though
Home referred to Dick as a ‘puny Negro’ in his examination and this
comment was reproduced in Raffles’ History of Java, nowhere else were
Papuans referred to as being small or smaller in comparison to other
Southeast Asians or Africans. No mention was made when recounting
the circumstances surrounding Dick’s emancipation or when slavery in
general was discussed. Even when Papuans were mentioned in an ear-
lier travelogue that Raffles inserted into the History, they were de-
scribed as ‘a race as black as negroes’, and not additionally as small
(ccxxxv). It appears that Raffles did not think the stature of Papuans
worthy of mentioning, or that he did not consider them to be any smal-
ler on average than Southeast Asians or Africans.
The same cannot be said of Crawfurd, who said that ‘the Papua, or
woolly-haired race, of the Indian islands, is a dwarf African negro.’
This was shown by a ‘specimen’ of a ‘full-grown male’ brought from
Kedah in the Malay Peninsula, and slaves from New Guinea and neigh-
bouring islands where he said he saw them firsthand, who were no tal-
ler than five feet. They also had ‘spare and puny frames’. Dick was
brought into this interpretation of small-ness when testimony of
Home’s examination was included as part of the description of a dwarf
negro and when the same drawing of Dick, which appeared in Raffles’
History was included in Crawfurd’s book with a few additions and dele-
tions (23-25). What had been a specific drawing of a ten-year-old Pa-
puan boy had now been expanded and generalised into a typical speci-
men of a puny Asian ‘negro’. Dick’s original engraving was combined
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with another engraving in the same frame, highlighting the contrast in
height. The fact that the original drawing was of a child who may still
be growing was omitted from the caption and in Home’s description of
the examination. The drawings were presented as examples of two
adult members of their respective racialised groups, reinforcing Craw-
furd’s interpretation of minuteness.12
Interestingly, the term ‘Negrito’ was not employed by Raffles. The
term negrito del monte (little negro of the mountain) had been used ear-
lier by John Leyden in 1811 in an article published in the Asiatic Re-
searches. Leyden was aware of its initial application by the Spanish to
the Igolote (Illongot?), which he applied to the Papuans as well. How-
ever, other than this initial mention of the name, there was no further
mention of the diminutive stature of the groups called Papuas, which
included Andaman islanders and Semang Bila. Leyden, who was in ill
health during his time in India, came to know Raffles when he took a
leave of absence to go to Penang to recover. Leyden became close to
Raffles and his wife, and it was likely that the two men shared notes
on their academic activities and writings, making it all the more strik-
ing that both men did not draw more attention to the height of their
subjects. While it could be that Leyden did not encounter many of the
people he wrote about, Raffles, however, professed to having personal
knowledge of Dick.
Another explanation for the sudden interest in the height, or lack
thereof, of Papuans by Crawfurd, is the mythology of pygmies in stu-
dies of people in newly explored regions. Chris Ballard traces the Eur-
opean fascination for people smaller than themselves in the classical
writings of Homer, Aristotle and Ovid. The pygmy, a Greek term refer-
ring to the distance between the elbow and knuckles, reappeared in
mediaeval literature of the late sixteenth to early seventeenth centuries
(Ballard 2006: 133-151). Spanish missionaries in the Philippines, for in-
stance, drew from this mythology when they met with and tried con-
verting what they saw as a group of diminutive blacks they termed ‘ne-
grillos’ in the late sixteenth century on the island of Panai. It is note-
worthy that while some groups in the Philippines were described by
missionaries as black with curly/woolly black hair, and were compared
to Africans, missionaries did not always see them as Negritos or Ne-
grillos although Blair, Robertson and Rahmann presented just such an
interpretation.13 Such discrepancies are typical, as were the discrepan-
cies between Leyden and Crawfurd, on the one hand, and Raffles on
the other, whereby earlier information was reinterpreted under the
heading of Negrito.
Positioning Dick as a dwarf or pygmy was yet another way of empha-
sising his inferiority and tying him more closely to the negative conno-
tations of blackness and being African. The mythology of the pygmy
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was the assertion of the ‘lack’ in those peoples in terms of civilisation,
in comparison to either colonising powers or other native groups.
‘Their puny stature, and feeble frames’ were compared to the ‘vigorous
constitutions’ of the archipelago’s brown race. The diminutive aspect of
their stature was translated into deficiencies in other areas of civilisa-
tion. So reluctant was Crawfurd to discard this category that he discre-
dited testimony that there were people from New Guinea who were ‘ro-
bust’ (25-26). He preferred to stick to the idea that there were pygmies,
which allowed him to draw from the stereotype of pygmies as being
African, as Jahoda argues was the general understanding (35). The
miniature person was also an assertion of childhood, and represented
stunted growth, someone trapped at a particular point in the history of
human development.
The perpetuation of Negritos
The desire to explain African-looking people in Southeast Asia as ex-
emplified by Crawfurd and Raffles has not diminished over time. Nu-
merous articles are still written today, particularly in the field of biolo-
gical anthropology, seeking to place Negritos within the scheme of peo-
ples in Asia and taking their outward appearance as a starting point.14
In an article published in 1999, David Bulbeck writes that ‘the distinc-
tiveness of the Negritos’ distinguishing traits in a Southeast Asian con-
text is clear enough. Coiled or woolly hair… exceeds 90% in its fre-
quency among Luzon, West Malaysian and Andaman Negritos…
[A]necdotal evidence [of Negrito skin colour] suggests darker shades
than the medium brown tones which dominate between Indochina
and Sulawesi’ (Bulbeck 1999: 15). He goes on to talk about these char-
acteristics in relation to migration theories, much like Crawfurd and
Raffles did, though minus the remarks concerning their inferiority.
Others, however, refute that there is any obvious distinction between
Negritos and the neighbouring populations. Geoffrey Benjamin writes
not of the Negritos but of the Semang, indicating a tribal grouping dis-
tinguished by a foraging lifestyle and an egalitarian social system
among other things. This emphasis on lifestyle, rather than physical
features, is supported by R.K. Dentan, who points out that entire tribes
are called Negrito even though members may not fit the stereotypical
outward appearance of what the term implies (Benjamin 2002: 10;
Dentan 1981: 422). Regardless of who has ‘got the facts right’, in the
present or in the past, the main concern of this paper has been to pro-
vide some critical background to the early uses of this term. The issue
at stake is not so much whether there was a difference between groups
called Negrito and those not, but that scholars such as Crawfurd and
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Raffles perceived differences and sought to quantify, enunciate and ex-
plain these differences using whatever vocabularies of inferiority were
available at that time. In the writings of Crawfurd and Raffles, the Ne-
gritos’ ‘difference’ was explained by using the negative tropes of slavery,
Africanness and miniatureness. Interest in Negritos continued with ex-
panding colonial and anthropological activity in Southeast Asia, which
had lasting effects on racial categories of people in the region.
Notes
1 The area referred to by Crawfurd and in this article is slightly different from present-
day Southeast Asia. It sometimes includes the Andaman and Nicobar Islands in the
western extreme and part of New Guinea in the eastern extreme. This area was often
called the Indian Archipelago in nineteenth-century texts. Throughout this article,
the terms Southeast Asia will be used in reference to this region, with the Malay Ar-
chipelago used to indicate the island portions only.
2 For the remainder of the article, ‘Negrito’ will be written without single quotes and
with initial capitalised ‘N’. Following Chris Ballard, this choice is based on the as-
sumption that Negrito is a potentially flawed category and that the term refers to
stereotypes of people labelled as Negrito (Ballard 2006).
3 Crawfurd’s later ascendancy to the Presidency of the Ethnological Society of London
notwithstanding, most scholars of Southeast Asia know him for his work on South-
east Asian history and literature, and not for his later anthropological writings and
his term as president. See, for instance, Merle Ricklefs’ introduction to John Craw-
furd’s A Descriptive Dictionary of the Indian Islands and Adjacent Countries.
4 Wallace would also divide the archipelago into five groups of islands with a main dis-
tinction being between islands on either side of his Wallace line which ran from the
east of the Philippine islands, between Borneo and Sulawesi down to between Bali
and Lombok. While the distinction was based mainly on his collection of species and
observations of the natural environment, civilisational attributes of the peoples found
on those islands also played a part. The distinction between Malays (Indo-Malayan)
and Papuans (Austro-Malayan) was partially based on physical attributes and on their
supposed intellectual and moral characteristics, with the Papuans found to be lacking
(Wallace 1869; 2000: physical map, 8, 450-453).
5 The reader is not told what the ‘standard’ was for an African ‘negro’ used in this
comparison. It was taken for granted.
6 Southeast Asian languages have a broad range of terms that describe conditions of
servitude. See, for instance, the terms in Malay (Matheson & Hooker 1983).
7 Wright described Raffles as being uninformed regarding the concept of slavery when
Raffles withdrew from his earlier definition of slavery as chattel in order to justify his
lack of action in completely eradicating slavery from Java in 1812. It is equally possi-
ble that Raffles was well informed regarding the meaning of slavery as chattel. In-
stead, he altered his understanding of slavery in Java in order to justify his actions
(Wright 1960: 185).
8 Various Southeast Asian groups such as Malays in the Malay Peninsula have also re-
marked on the blackness of non-Muslim and non-Christian tribes, which were called
Negrito by Europeans, suggesting a more complex relationship in the construction of
Negrito that takes into account the viewpoints of locals (Leyden 1811: 218).
9 See Plates two through six of Raffle’s History of Java.
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10 If Daniell indeed drew Dick while they were both in London, it is certainly curious
that Dick was depicted in a loincloth where presumably he would have been wearing
something quite different in the London climate. However, this choice of clothing in
the drawing may also point to Daniell’s knowledge of the way slave attendants
dressed in the period of Dutch power in Batavia. Jean Gelman Taylor writes that a
slave’s non-Muslim status was indicated by sparse clothing, a loincloth in the case of
men (Taylor 2007).
11 Raffles’ original caption read ‘A Papuan of Native New Guinea, 10 years old’.
12 Raffles himself, in a critique of Crawfurd, pointed out this blatant disregard for the
context of his original drawings and writing (Barrow 1822: 114).
13 Though Rahmann uses sections of Blair and Robertson’s translations as though they
pertained to Negritos, some of those references did not seem to mention Negritos,
but simply “blacks” who were sometimes even considered “strong and robust”. See,
for instance, Vol. 16: 75, and Vol. 37: 170-171.
14 See, for instance, articles by Peter Bellwood, David Bulbeck and Keiichi Omoto.
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Women’s Education and Empowerment in
Colonial Bengal
Rachana Chakraborty
Summary
The basic aim of this essay is to trace the genesis and development of
women’s education in colonial Bengal until the country’s independence
in 1947. My investigation begins in the nineteenth century, when the
women’s question became a part of the greater discourse of progress
and modernity, and a movement for female education started as part of
the ‘colonised males’ search for the ‘new woman’. At the outset, the
missionaries took up the cause of educating women, as a way of en-
lightening the poor, heathen women. However, indigenous forces re-
presented by the educated Indian male reformers later on took up the
cause of women’s education and worked towards its proliferation. The
British government also responded by setting up a host of new schools
and institutes of higher learning for the women of Bengal; but it pri-
marily corresponded to the gendered construction of womanhood and
the dicta of traditional prescriptions, i.e., the ‘good mother’, ‘good wife’
models. As in colonial Bengal, socio-cultural and socio-political re-
sponses to colonialism were not unrelated, but facets of the same phe-
nomenon, i.e., the growth of nationalism. But as political awareness
was also intimately connected with social awareness, women’s entry
into the public ‘male’ space of politics undermined the socially con-
structed artificial dichotomisation of the ‘male’ sphere of the public
and the ‘female’ sphere of the domestic domains. This inevitably
meant that alterations at many levels would have to follow. Women be-
came aware of the existing gender inequalities in Indian society as they
became educated, and generated an urge to free themselves from the
grip of prescribed belief systems and roles that had historically oper-
ated against their interests. The cue for the women’s uplift came initi-
ally from men. This set an implicit limit to the aspirations of women.
For the more sensitive women, however, participation in the freedom
movement meant a protracted struggle against two different badges of
servility: colonialism and patriarchy. While education empowered wo-
men, to play a historic role in eradicating British colonial domination
as co-partners of men, their struggle against patriarchal domination re-
mains an unresolved issue.
Women’s education: the nineteenth century backdrop
In the nineteenth century, the ‘woman’s question’ loomed large. This
was not so much a question of what women wanted, but rather how
they could be modernised. It became the central question in nine-
teenth-century British India, because the foreign rulers had focused
their attention on this particular aspect of society. Enamoured with
their civilising mission, ‘influential British writers condemned Indian
religion, culture and society for their rules and customs regarding wo-
men’.1 The women’s question figured prominently in these discourses
as Western observers, like James Mill, used it to construct a ‘civilisa-
tional critique of India.’ The degraded condition of Indian women was
taken as an indicator of India’s inferior status in the hierarchy of civili-
sations.2 It is therefore no wonder that the status of women became
the main focus of the reforming agenda of the modernising Indian in-
tellectuals of the nineteenth century. In their response to the damning
critique of the West, they imagined a golden past, where women were
treated with dignity and honour; they urged reforms of those customs
that they considered to be distortions or aberrations. Thus female in-
fanticide was banned, Sati abolished; and widow remarriage legalised.
Female education received special encouragement. In the new age con-
struction of womanhood, it was the conventional image of woman as
wife and mother, simply garnished by education and some Victorian
womanly ideals borrowed from the West, that was projected as ‘ideal’
for the ‘good’ Indian woman. Even the Bamabodhini Patrika, the jour-
nal for women’s enlightenment, published in Bengal by the enligh-
tened and educated Brahmos, propagated such a model.3 The Bama-
bodhini Patrika in (1311 B.S.) 1904 AD wrote, ‘The wife, who like God-
dess Lakshmi worships her husband as if he is a God Hari, will go to
heaven after her death and will taste every happiness along with her
husband just as God and Goddess, Hari and Lakshmi, enjoy eternal
happiness.’ In their resolution of the ‘woman question’, as shown by
Partha Chatterjee,4 the home was projected as the inner spiritualised
space of the nationalist male, where women preserved the age-old In-
dian dharma. The material world might have been lost to the colonial
rulers, but the home remained the site of the nationalist victory. That
is why the idea of the modern, educated housewife was always tied to
the older patriarchal imagination of the mythical divine figure of
Lakshmi. Lakshmi as a model Hindu wife combined submission with
loyalty. This new concept of womanhood was a fine blending of the
self-sacrificing Hindu wife and the Victorian helpmate. Far from hav-
ing an emancipating effect, education therefore reinforced the confine-
ment of women to idealised domestic roles as good wives and better
mothers.5 Although there were some differences, the Muslim bhadra-
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mahila also shared significant common grounds with their Hindu
counterparts. The goal of the Muslim educators of women, as Gail
Minault argues was ‘to create women who would be better wives, better
mothers and better Muslims.’6
In the nineteenth century, the women’s question became a part of
the greater discourse of progress and modernity, and a movement for
female education started as a part of the ‘colonised males’ search for
the ‘new woman’. The agency for the spread of education lay with three
groups of people, as Geraldine Forbes has classified them: the British,
Indian male reformers and educated Indian women.7 The initiative
was taken in Calcutta by men like Radhakanta Deb and the School
Book Society and later on by Keshub Chandra Sen and the Brahmo Sa-
maj, in Western India by Madhav Govind Ranade and Prarthana Sa-
maj, in North India by Dayanand and his Arya Samaj and in Madras
by Annie Besant and the Theosophical Society. So far as the issue of
Indian educated women was concerned, we should mention the endea-
vours of Pandita Ramabai in Western India, Sister Subbalakshmi in
Madras and Begum Rokeya Sakhawat Hossain among the Muslim wo-
men in Bengal.8
Official agenda on women’s education
During its early years, the English East India Company, with its preoc-
cupations in trade, had remained somewhat indifferent to the pro-
blems of Indian society. It is therefore not surprising, that the official
surveys on the state of indigenous education undertaken by the govern-
ments of Bombay, Madras and Bengal Presidencies in the 1820s and
1830s revealed almost a total absence of female students in the village
schools as well as in the higher institutes of learning, both Hindu and
Muslim.9
Though the majority of girls had not yet acquired the opportunity of
entering the portals of schools, not all of them were illiterates. Women
from ‘respectable’ families often studied at home. Adam found in Ben-
gal, wives and daughters of zamindars, courtesans and the Vaishnavis;
i.e., women followers of the sixteenth-century saint Shri Chaitanya, as
literates. Gauri Vaisnavi, for example, taught the women in Dwaranath
Tagore’s family. Raja Radhakanta Deb too engaged a Vaisnavi to in-
struct the women in his household. The Vaishnavis could read the Ra-
mayana, Mahabharata and stories of the Purans. Pearychand Mitra, a
great literary giant of nineteenth-century Bengal, wrote in the preface
of his autobiographical work Adhyatmika that his grandmother, mother
and aunts could read books, write in Bengali, and keep accounts even
though there were no female schools in those days. Debendranath Ta-
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gore’s mother-in-law could read difficult religious texts. Similarly,
upper-class Muslims employed Uttanis, who were often wives or wi-
dows of maulavis, to teach women the Quran and other religious teach-
ings at home. Sir Syed Ahmed Khan’s mother, Azizunnisa Begum
(1780-1857), a woman in strict purdah, knew Arabic and Persian.10
While Christian missionaries and social reformers had been active,
the East India Company still remained passive in its efforts to provide
steps for the education of girls of Bengal. In 1853, Col. Jacob had told
the Select Committee of the Parliament, that he did not think that a
single female had been educated by the government education system
of that time.11 In none of the Dispatches relating to education sub-
mitted or received from the Court of Directors during the first half of
the nineteenth century was there any mention of female education.
A significant change in the official attitude came with the advent of
John Drinkwater Bethune, the Law Member in the Governor General’s
Council and President of the Council of Education. Convinced of the
need to educate girls in Bengal, Bethune opened a school for the sake
of female education in Calcutta in 1849. Though originally known as
the Hindu Female School, it maintained a secular approach. Instruc-
tion was imparted in Bengali and there were no fees. For girls who
lived far away, and were unable to afford transport, a carriage was pro-
vided. On the carriage was emblazoned a Sanskrit verse declaring that
a daughter’s education was her father’s religious duty. The first two pu-
pils of this school were the daughters of the orthodox Pandit Madan
Mohan Tarkalankar.
In addition to the donation of his personal library collections, includ-
ing books worth Rs. 5,000 for the school, Dakshinaranjan Mukherjee
also presented a plot of land in the Mirzapur area, in favour of the con-
struction of a building for this school. The wealthy merchant, Ram Go-
pal Ghose also provided help. The citizens of Calcutta also lent a help-
ing hand to the cause of female education in Bengal, when Bethune
died an untimely death in 1851. Lord Dalhousie, the then Governor
General of India, between 1848-1856, decided to support the school
and renamed it he Bethune School, after its primary benefactor.
It was in the Wood’s Dispatch of 1854 that the first positive interests
towards female education were expressed. In his famous Dispatch, Sir
Charles Wood noted, ‘The importance of female education in India
cannot be overrated; and we have observed with pleasure the evidence
which is now afforded of an increased desire on the part of many of
the natives to give a good education to their daughters. By this means
a far greater proportional impulse is imparted to the educational and
moral tone of the people than by the education of men.’12 Dalhousie
hailed it as ‘the beginning of a great revolution in Indian habits.’13
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Bethune had led the way; Indian social reformers furthered the
cause of women’s education in Bengal. The Brahmo Samaj led the
movement for female education in Bengal. Keshab Chandra Sen orga-
nised in 1862 the Bamabodhini Sabha to facilitate women’s education.
In the same year, Umesh Chandra Dutt started publishing the Bama-
bodhini Patrika that not only carried articles on women’s issues, but
also organised a correspondence course for girls through its columns
known as antahpur shiksha or education in the seclusion of the home.14
In Bengal, as elsewhere, a debate on the content and purpose of wo-
men’s education was unleashed at the end of the nineteenth century. A
wide cross-section of the people ranging from social reformers, to con-
servatives, housewives and even women who were receiving education
actively participated in this on-going debate. The Bamabodhini Patrika,
for example, published a number of articles under the title Strisangini
(wife as companion), which were basically vignettes from the lives of
women who helped their husbands in their careers by providing them
with a caring and understanding home ambience.
Upon his return from England in 1871, Keshab Chandra Sen had
started a Native Ladies’ Normal School under the auspices of the In-
dian Reform Association. But Sen’s views on women’s education did
not satisfy the radical exponents of the Brahmo Samaj. By 1874, the ra-
dicals – Dwarkanath Ganguly, Shibnath Sastri, Durgamohan Das and
others – broke away from Keshab Chandra Sen to set up the Hindu
Mahila Vidyalaya with the help of the visiting Unitarian, Annette Ak-
royd. They believed that women also had the right to receive a higher
education and study subjects such as mathematics, philosophy and
sciences – a claim that was denied by Keshab Chandra Sen. Miss Ak-
royd, however, did not stay long with the reformers. Undaunted by her
desertion, the eminent Brahmos like Durgamohan Das sent his own
daughters, Sarala (who later on married PK Ray and started the Go-
khale Memorial Girls’ School) and Abala (who later married the emi-
nent scientist Sir Jagadish Chandra Bose and founded the Brahmo
Girls’ School.) Jagadish Chandra Bose’s sister, Swarna Prabha, Manmo-
han Ghosh’s sister, Binodmani as well as Kadambini Basu (a cousin of
Manmohan Ghosh and later Dwarkanath Ganguly’s wife) all joined the
new school. In 1878, this school merged with the Bethune school to
give birth to Bethune College.15
The Indian Education (Hunter) Commission instituted in 1882 to re-
view the progress of education in India had exclaimed that primary
education among the girls had registered some progress, since the
opening up of the Bethune school in 1849, but the state of education
at the secondary and higher levels were yet to record any advancement.
The Hunter Commission thus recommended that ‘female education be
treated as a legitimate charge alike on local, municipal and on provin-
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cial Funds, and receive special encouragement.’ It demanded that all
females’ schools should be regarded as eligible for receiving govern-
ment aid and that the conditions for receiving the same should be
made somewhat easier than that imposed on the boys’ schools. The
standards of instruction in the girls’ schools were to be made accord-
ingly, undemanding and simpler than that what the boys received. Spe-
cial attention was to be paid to the requirements of household life in
the case of girls’ schools. It further recommended that liberal aid be of-
fered to girls’ schools that taught English in addition to the vernacular
languages. Similarly, it suggested that provisions be made for special
prizes and scholarships for the girls to motivate and encourage them.16
With the gradual increase of girls’ schools both in numbers and en-
rolment, the necessity of starting up something like a normal school to
train female teachers in Calcutta was strongly felt. In tune with the call
of the day, a normal school had already been instituted for the Chris-
tian female teachers of Calcutta. With the arrival of Miss Mary Carpen-
ter, a philanthropic English lady and a friend of the Women’s welfare
movement, in Calcutta on the 20 November 1866 new endeavours
were made in this direction. With the help of some of the ardent advo-
cates of the cause of women’s education in Bengal, such as Pandit Is-
war Chandra Vidyasagar, Keshub Chunder Sen, Manomohan Ghose
and Dwijendra Nath Tagore, she suggested the necessity of opening up
a non-denominational normal school in the metropolis.17 She insisted
that the greatest obstacle to the improvement of females’ schools and
to the expansion of female education was indeed a dearth of female
teachers. In 1868, the Secretary of State approved her proposal and the
Government of India’s scheme for the establishment of females’ nor-
mal schools in the Presidencies of Bengal, Madras and Bombay was
well under way. A sum of Rs. 12,000 was designated for this purpose
over a five-year period. The Female Normal School survived for only
three years. In the latter half of this period, Dwaranath Ganguly, editor
of Abala bandhab, a Bengali monthly, worked earnestly to make the
school a success. He even collected a number of adult pupils for the
school, but his efforts proved in vain. The Government, too, could no
longer be satisfied with the state of things and the opinion of Vidyasa-
gar with regard to the fate of such an institution proved prophetic. The
result was that official orders were given for the abolition of the Nor-
mal school on 24 January 1872.18
The abolition of the Female Normal School brought the Bethune
School back to its former prominence. It remained under the direct
supervision of the Government for some time. The Report on the Pub-
lic Instruction of Bengal, for 1876-1877, observed that the amalgama-
tion of the Bethune School with the Ballygunj Banga Mahila Vidyalaya
in 1876, would lend it a new dimension.19
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The years of transition: From Bethune School to College
Hitherto, no girl student of either school had ever taken the entrance
examination of Calcutta University. Miss Chandramukhi Bose, daugh-
ter of Bhuban Mohan Bose, a native Christian of Dehra Dun had al-
ready prepared herself for the entrance examination and wanted to take
the exam in 1876 from the Dehra Dun school. Although the Junior
Board of Examiners had granted her permission, the authorities of the
Ballygunj Banga Mahila Vidyalaya forced the Vice-Chancellor of the
Calcutta University, Sir Arthur Hobhouse, to arrange for a test exami-
nation for two of its students, namely Kadambini Bose and Sarala Das
as a precondition for their qualifying for the entrance examination.
The University Senate, in its meeting of 27 April 1878, accordingly
agreed to allow the two female candidates to take the entrance exami-
nation, subject to certain rules pertaining to the conduct of the exami-
nation. Miss Bose was successful in obtaining a second division, miss-
ing the first division by only a slender margin of one mark.20
A new era was ushered in for the Bethune School,21 and women’s
education received a fresh impetus in India, because of Kadambini’s
success, as well as her desire to further her studies in the same institu-
tion, the Lieutenant Governor decided to appoint a lecturer qualified to
teach the first arts course and consented to raise the status of the
school. Baboo Sasi Bhusan Dutt, who had transferred from the Cuttak
College was asked to serve the Bethune School on a full-time basis.
With the initiation of College classes at the Bethune School, in 1879,
both Chandramukhi and Kadambini could attend these classes and
take their B.A. examinations from this institution. In January 1883,
they became the very first women graduates in the British Empire.22
Chandramukhi Bose preferred to continue her studies to receive her
M.A., while Kadambini Bose, who had by then married the Brahmo
leader Dwarkanath Ganguly, forsook the beaten track and applied for
admission to the Calcutta Medical College, as a regular student. During
the previous year, other women such as Miss D’Abreu and Miss Abala
Das had applied for similar reasons but were denied entry from the
Council of the Medical College in Calcutta. Not baffled by the opposi-
tion at home, these two ladies joined the Madras Medical College,
where there was a provision for the instruction of women in Medi-
cine.23 The Brahmo leaders led by Dwarkanath Ganguly now started
agitating for opening the admissions at the Medical College to women.
But before the movement could gather momentum, the Lieutenant
Governor of Bengal, Sir Rivers Thompson intervened, and Kadambini
was admitted into Calcutta Medical College. The medical profession
had thus been opened up to women in Bengal.24 When the Govern-
ment in 1884 announced a scholarship of 20 rupees a month for wo-
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men medical students, Kadambini took advantage of this assistance
and in 1886 was awarded the GBMC (Graduate of Bengal Medical Col-
lege). Kadambini immediately began a private practice and found her
services much in demand. By 1888, she was appointed to the Lady Duf-
ferin Women’s Hospital, earning a monthly salary of 300 rupees.25
Women’s education under diarchy
Diarchy is the name of power sharing outlined in the Government of
India Act of 1919 (Montaigue Chelmsford Reforms), which had placed
the nation-building portfolios in the hands of Indian legislators. Trans-
ferred subjects at this time included local self-government, education,
health public works, agriculture and industry, while revenue and law
and order departments remained in the hands of the Governor. This
was at a time when the Indian population became increasingly agi-
tated, the trade balance had shifted against India, and agricultural pro-
ductivity was on the decline. At this very difficult juncture of history,
the Indian middle class with its limited franchise (considering the very
small numbers of Indians who actually had the right to vote) had be-
come partners in the ‘civilising mission’. They too were now engaged
in answering the awkward questions regarding the health, education
and welfare of the Indian population.26
While inaugurating the Bethune School on the 7 May 1849, J.E.D.
Bethune had expressed his hope that the day would soon arrive when a
new call by the young men of Bengal to extend the benefits of educa-
tion, from which they themselves had so largely benefited to the other
half of the population. He had also emphasised that the happiness of
domestic life would be enhanced ‘by the graceful virtues and elegant
accomplishments of well-educated women’.27 Issues and the debates re-
lating to girl’s education continued to dominate the leading educational
surveys and reports in the first two decades of the twentieth century.
By 1916-1917, there were already three girls’ colleges in Calcutta: the
Diocesan College, Bethune College and the collegiate department of
the Loreto House. But the contributions to the Bethune College could
not be compared to the other two. The Fifth Quinquennial Review of the
Progress of Education in Bengal (1912-1913 to 1916-1917) noted that ‘The
Bethune College is the oldest Government institution for the education
of girls in India’.28
The issue of women’s education once again became a compelling is-
sue when India’s Secretary of State, H. Sharp, received an important
announcement on 5 November 1915.29 This announcement highlighted
some of the major impediments that stood in the way of progress re-
garding female education in the country. It pointed out the insignifi-
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cant number of girls being educated, and the utter lopsided ratio of
male to female students, it further expressed its deep apprehension
that if this problem were to go unresolved, it might endanger the well
being of the Indian community. It recommended the formation of re-
presentative committees to enquire into the matter. The Government
of India’s response was to invite local governments to poll the opinions
of competent people, local governing bodies, committees and other
authorities in order to draw up a uniform policy on the matter.
In the meantime, the Calcutta University Commission had been con-
stituted under the stewardship of Sir Michael Sadler (1917-1919). The
Commission raised two pertinent issues regarding women’s education.
The first one was, to what extent and in which areas were additional
and special facilities required for the higher education of women? The
second question was related to the more thorny issue of identifying the
particular needs and difficulties that affected the higher educational op-
tions of women in India.30 The Commission identified some of the key
factors preventing progress in women’s education in Bengal such as
early marriages, the custom of purdah and, of course, a general distrust
of Western education. All of these factors were inextricably related to
the very fabric of Indian society, and so, only a radical change in the
life, customs and ideals of the country could usher in the desired
changes. Numerically speaking, however, within a decade (1907-1917),
the number of girls in school had already doubled.31
The Calcutta University Commission explained the drawbacks of the
system of educational progress, in terms of a paucity of private enter-
prise engagement as distinct from Governmental and missionary efforts
in matters of post-elementary training of female students in Bengal.
Turning to the characteristics that were hindering the development
of female education in Bengal, the Commission pointed out the diffi-
culty of providing sufficient numbers of competent teachers as an im-
portant factor. As very few Hindu or Muslim women adopted the teach-
ing profession, the employment of foreigners or members of the domi-
ciled community, became imperative, which was expensive, however.
Christian teachers, or the employment of male teachers in girls’
schools were generally not considered the best options. Secondly, the
unsuitability of the curricula was partly responsible for this. Finally, it
was also the dominance of the examination system that added to the
problems. Sir Michael Sadler had observed in the report,
Secondary education for girls, labours under exceptional difficul-
ties in Bengal; it is surrounded by prejudices; it is distorted,
even more unnaturally than the education of boys, by the ma-
lign influence of the examination fetish … The Commission
feels that the schools must be saved from the desolating domi-
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nation of the examination system which now mischievously in-
fluences all their work.32
Though the report of the Calcutta University Commission had struck a
sombre note regarding the question of women’s education in Bengal,
the subsequent period (1918-1927) saw an overall expansion of female
education in the province. By 1918, the Bethune College had already
earned considerable praise from the Indians. The steady increase in en-
rolment, no doubt put increased pressure on the available accommoda-
tions at the College. But the College undertook new initiatives to estab-
lish a company of ‘girl guides’ and to revive its magazine Usha in
1918.33 The Sixth Quinquennial Review of Progress of Education in Bengal
(1917-1918 to 1921-1922) also remarked that a redeeming feature of the
College during the period under review was that there had been a re-
markable increase in the demand for science education among the
girls.
The question of women’s education was also mentioned on the floor
of the Bengal Legislative Assembly. In reply to a question (Question
No. 23) on the issue, Dr. Brajendranath Seal confirmed the judgment
of Dr. Adityanath Mukherjee who had written from his personal experi-
ences as a long-time faculty member at a women’s College. He re-
garded the intellectual capacities of the Bengali girls to be equal to that
of the boys. Dr. B.N. Seal added that from his personal examinations of
matriculation figures and other examination scripts of the Calcutta
University, he was convinced that the quality of work done by the girls
were of a high order, while, in the case of written English, the writing
style as well as the power of expression of the girls, was often better
than that of the boys; and was marked by a greater degree of indepen-
dence of opinion.34
By the early decades of the twentieth century, the educated woman
of Bengal had already developed a voice of her own. This discernible
change becomes nowhere more pronounced than in the response of
the young woman, Ashabati Sarkar, a third-year student at Bethune
College. She wrote an article entitled ‘Message of the Age to Girls’, that
was published in the college’s magazine and was included in the Cal-
cutta University Commission’s Report of 1919. In it she wrote,
The girls of Bengal have been receiving education for about forty
years. The time has come when we shall have to choose one or
other of the ways. What way are we going to choose? The first
glamour of awakening has passed. It is time some of the unplea-
sant features of the emancipation of women should pass also,
and make room for reason and clear thought which will make
every girl of Bengal a true woman … It is the spirit in which life
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is led that matters. The power of self-control is another name
for liberty. Liberty consists in the right of choosing according to
conscience and reason. This control was forced upon women by
men before, but now has to come from within ourselves. To this,
love must be added. Reason is supreme only by the side of love.
She further reiterates,
Received and given in this spirit, education may impart the
power alike of self realization and self restraint. The woman is
[the] true guardian of the early education of the children of the
race, and she herself must have that which she alone can impart
in turn to them. The way to much of what is best in education
lies through the education of girls and women.35
The late 1920s and early 1930s saw the growth of a rich and highly
complex spectrum of political experience in Bengal, including a resur-
gence of the Congress-led nationalist movement from 1928, revival of
revolutionary terrorism and a wide variety of peasant and working-class
actions. With the launching of the first Non-Cooperation movement by
Mahatma Gandhi in 1921, and his appeal to women to join satyagraha,
women emerged out of their homes in large numbers to picket shops
selling foreign cloth and liquor, march in processions in the streets,
hold public meetings and risk imprisonment, all of which helped
weaken the traditional bondages.36 In the towns of Comilla and Noa-
khali in Eastern Bengal, women from upper-class conservative Muslim
families played a similar role. Bose managed to get Nari Satyagraha Sa-
miti in Burrabazar, the business heart of Calcutta, involved and she
also organised special wings for girl students within the Bengal Provin-
cial Student’s Association.37 In fact, the use of women in certain types
of demonstrations seemed to have been a deliberate Congress strategy,
as this was expected to reduce the intensity of police repression, espe-
cially in the case of respectable middle-class, urban women.
The apparently smooth, painless politicisation of women belonging
to a certain milieu that had traditionally restricted their role within
well-defined domestic confines was a process that met with applause
rather than resistance from their male guardians. This was for most
women the first time they had been allowed to participate in activities
outside the household. There can be no denying that this step must
have been preceded by an acute, indeed revolutionary, struggle with
their own sensibilities and inhibitions that they could overcome with
education and awareness.38
Women’s associations had started to emerge all over India by the
late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. Although their activities
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were limited to the holding of discussions on women’s issues such as
education, child marriages, the observance of the purdah and women’s
status in the family, nevertheless, they shared the common goal of
bringing women together to discuss their own problems. In Calcutta
for example, Swarna Kumari Debi, sister of poet Rabindranath Tagore,
founded Sakhi Samiti (Society of Friends). Her daughter, Sarala Debi
Chaudhurani, started the first all-India women’s association, the Bharat
Stree Mandal in 1910, which unfortunately was short lived. Three ma-
jor national women’s organisations emerged in the post First World
War period: the Women’s Indian Association (WIA), the National
Council of Women (NCW) and the All India Women’s Conference
(AIWC). The main objective of the AIWC was the promotion of wo-
men’s education. True, the AIWC did not advocate mass education for
all women, but the majority of delegates wanted the education system
to produce better wives and mothers in addition to women teachers,
doctors, professors and lawyers. The AIWC collected donations for an
All India Women’s Education Fund, which, in turn, led to the establish-
ment of Lady Irwin College in Delhi.39
Conclusion
As education was a necessary pre-condition of women’s social empow-
erment, it was meant to contribute positively towards women’s agency,
and to free her from her passive victimhood that colonial society had
imposed upon her. At the onset of colonial times, the missionaries of-
ten took up the issue of educating women as a way of enlightening the
poor, heathen women. However, the indigenous forces soon took up
the cause of women’s education and worked towards its spread.
In colonial Bengal, socio-cultural and political responses to colonial-
ism were not unrelated but were facets of the same phenomenon, i.e.,
the growth of nationalism. Women’s entry into the public ‘male’ space
of politics undermined the socially constructed artificial dichotomisa-
tion of the ‘male’ sphere of the public and the ‘female’ sphere of the
domestic domains. This inevitably meant that alterations at many le-
vels would follow. Women became aware of the existing gender in-
equalities in Indian society and generated an urge to free themselves
from the grip of prescribed belief – systems and roles that had histori-
cally operated against their interests.40
When the enlightened bhadralok of nineteenth-century Bengal sup-
ported the reform movement, their aim was not to attack the prevalent
patriarchal system in any way, or to challenge the power and position
enjoyed by men, still lesser to make women the equal partners of men
in the societal or economic roles outside the family. Their purpose was
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to improve the position of women within the patriarchal framework, so
as to make them into good wives and mothers within the family. That
is why the paradigm of a model woman was imported from Victorian
England with the traditional qualities of Indian women embedded in
it.41 The reform movement was the upshot of the struggle between the
two ideologies – the colonial and the indigenous. The challenges envi-
saged and faced were attempts to challenge ‘the pretended supremacy
of the culture of the coloniser’ as well as ‘to reassert the cultural iden-
tity of the colonised’. The result of this double pull in two opposite di-
rections was the evolution of a Western model and the Indian ideal,
where the Indian women were expected to combine the womanly quali-
ties prized both in the ‘modern’ West and the ‘ancient’ East.
While nineteenth-century contradictions were not resolved in the
twentieth century, new forces and influences were released to shape
the contours of women’s consciousness. British feminists like Annie
Besant, who had been an active suffragette in England and had played
a key role in forming the Women’s Indian Association (1917) in India
or Margaret Cousins who had also been a Theosophist and a suffragist
from Ireland and a promoter of the All India Women’s Conference
(1927) brought Indian women under the influence of Western feminist
ideologies, and the spread of education generated new ideas.42
In Bengal, the chief women’s organisation to fight for women’s fran-
chise was the Bangiya Nari Samaj, guided by Kumudini Bose, Kamini
Roy, Mrinalini Sen and Jyotirmoyee Ganguly. Though the initial resolu-
tion to permit women to vote was defeated in Bengal Legislative Coun-
cil in 1921, by 1925, the Bengal Legislature had approved a limited fe-
male suffrage, which the women exercised for the first time in 1926. It
symbolised for them formal entry into the hitherto exclusive male pub-
lic world of political decision-making.43
The cue for women’s uplift came initially from men. This set an im-
plicit limit to the aspirations of women. For the more sensitive women,
however, participation in the freedom movement meant a protracted
struggle against two different badges of servility: colonialism and patri-
archy.44 Involvement in the freedom struggle had taught women the
basics of activist politics, and the breaking of the carapace of traditional
domestic life had widened their horizon. It had whetted their appetite;
but it did not satisfy them.
According to the Baconian engineering model, ‘knowledge was
power’ implying that knowledge was an instrument for gaining power,
although the two could exist quite independently. Foucault on the other
hand, argued that the goals of power and that of knowledge were inse-
parable for in knowing we control and in controlling we know. For ex-
ample, the system of examination in any educational institution com-
bined hierarchical observation with normative judgment. It was a
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prime example of what Foucault called power/knowledge, since it com-
bined into a unified whole ‘the deployment of force and the establish-
ment of truth’. It was thus an instance, whereby the truth about those
who underwent the examination could be elicited, informing us what
they actually knew, and at the same time controlling their behaviour by
forcing them to study.45
The fact that women were latecomers in the newly organised educa-
tional space the issue was fraught with the entire baggage of the
power/knowledge syndrome, to a degree unimagined by Michel Fou-
cault, the author of this hypothesis. Thus education was constantly in-
tertwined in the caste-class ethnicity divide that was even more fortified
by gender discrimination. Thus during the colonial period education
not only emancipated women but also brought them into the vortex of
yet another struggle, the struggle for empowerment that remains as
yet an unfinished agenda.
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Her Old Ayah: The Transcolonial Significance of
the Indian Domestic Worker in India and Australia1
Victoria Haskins
The historical representation of white women in India and Australia
bears a striking similarity: on the one hand, we find the ‘memsahib’
and, on the other, the ‘missus’, with both of them designated by their
role not only of wife and mother to white men, but as mistress to na-
tive workers. In the case of the former, this designation as mistress is
paramount, for, in the nostalgic construction of the British Raj, per-
haps no one figure looms quite so large as the cherished ayah or lady’s
maid. This paper is a rumination on the significance of this image of
the Indian domestic worker in imagined women’s relationships of (An-
glophone) colonialism. Sparked by the recollections of my Australian-
born great-grandmother, Joan Kingsley-Strack, reflecting on the life of
her Anglo-Indian grandmother, Maggie Hobbes (and in her case the
term ‘Anglo-Indian’ is fittingly ambiguous), my discussion tentatively
traces the constitution of an ideology of white colonial womanhood,
through the systems of circulation of cultural ideas and attitudes that
emerged in Anglophone colonialism. In a transcolonial culture, the fig-
ure of the ayah was significant, in a way that the very banality of the
women’s work she performed tends to obscure.
The domestic frontier in Australia
In the settler-colonial nation of Australia, domestic service, as a site of
colonialism – a frontier of colonisation – became an arena for state in-
tervention and manipulation in the twentieth century. Relationships
between indigenous and white women were created in this crucible in
interwar Australia, as the state (literally, state governments of the for-
mer colonies) forcibly and systematically removed young Aboriginal
women from their families and communities and indentured them as
household servants. They were almost always placed in the homes of
married white women with young children, and many of those homes
were in the newly emerging suburbs of Australian cities (Haskins
2005).
Such policies were carried out with the aim of breaking up persistent
Aboriginal communities in south-eastern Australia, while in areas
where white settlement was sparse, the policies targeted mixed-descent
girls especially, there being a concern that unless they did so a danger-
ous ‘hybrid race’ in the centre and northern regions would eventually
emerge. The participation of white women as employers was crucial to
the success of this project, providing their homes as the locale for a
policy of dispersal (Haskins 2004). While there was a persistent ser-
vant shortage in urban areas (Walden 1995: 196),2 the decision of a pri-
vileged white urban woman to engage an unknown Aboriginal girl as a
servant, most commonly as a nursemaid, was indeed remarkable, con-
sidering not only the racism of the times, but the Board’s public justifi-
cation of its policy on the grounds that the girls came from ‘contami-
nating’ and ‘vicious’ communities, and were inherently immoral.
That a number of such women (admittedly a small number) could
and did take Aboriginal girls into their homes reflects the ubiquity of
what art historian Madeline McGuire has called the ‘good fella missus
legend’ (1990: 135-139). This ‘dominant historical myth about the rela-
tion between white women and Aborigines [that] portrays the former
as kind mistresses and the latter as objects of their maternal care’
(McGuire 1990: 124) was an integral strand of a popular mythologising
of pioneer and frontier life that held sway in middle-class urban Aus-
tralian culture throughout the Board’s regime. Its classic expression
was found in the immensely popular writings of Mrs Aeneas Gunn,
who described her relationship with the Aboriginal women workers of
Elsey Station in the Northern Territory thus:
They knew as well as I did that, as long as the work was well
done, I would let them play over it as much as they liked. You
see, I was what white people would call a ‘bad mistress;’ but the
blacks called me ‘goodfellow missus,’ and would do anything I
wanted without a murmur (Gunn 1924: 40).
An index of class status ascribing an honourable, indeed, virtuous role
to white women who utilised the cheap labour of those whose land
they had appropriated, a desire to cast themselves in such a light un-
derpinned the willingness of women like my great-grandmother Joan
Kingsley-Strack to engage Aboriginal apprentices through the Protec-
tion Board. Studies of the imagined relationships between white wo-
men and Aboriginal people have tended to focus inwards, mirroring
the nationalistic thrust of such constructions (see, in addition to
McGuire 1990: Godden 1979; Grimshaw & Evans 1996; Vivers 2002).
However, with a reorientation of Australian studies of colonialism di-
recting our attention toward transnational influences (for instance,
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Woollacott 2003; Grimshaw & Standish 2007) it might be suggested
that the fashionable image of the white mistress was in fact a wider,
transcolonial construction, created in the Raj and reworked in other co-
lonial contexts – including Australia.
‘Mrs Anglomaniac’: transporting the Raj
By the late nineteenth century, the relationship between the ‘memsahib’
and the Indian servant who was her foil was recognised throughout
the Anglophone world as a symbol of British rule. A telling ‘joke’ was
published in an 1888 newspaper produced by and for the Native Amer-
ican students of Carlisle School in Pennsylvania, Massachusetts. This
school was originally established to cater to prisoners-of-war during the
western plains wars, and subsequently started up the so-called Outing
System under which young American ‘Indian’ girls were placed in do-
mestic service indentures. The gag runs so:
Must be English. Mrs Anglomaniac – I see you advertise to fur-
nish servants of any nationality.
Employment agent – Yes: madam, no matter what. If we haven’t
’em on hand we’ll get ’em.
Mrs Anglomaniac – Very well. I see by the Court Journal that
Queen Victoria is using Indian servants, and I want some nice,
tidy squaws, right away.3
Offering an illustration of Tony Ballantyne’s point in his study of Or-
ientalism in the British Empire, notwithstanding the emphasis on the
metropole, the joke reminds us of the need to ‘foreground the rela-
tional quality of the imperial past’, focusing on imperial networks and
cultural exchange patterns to elucidate the integrative power of empire
and the indigenising forces that worked to adapt introduced ideas to lo-
cal imperatives (Ballantyne 2002: 2-3, 14-15).
We might note, indeed, that the Australian impulse to support ag-
gressive intervention by the state over Aboriginal lives in the 1920s
and 1930s was directly connected to what contemporary Australians
conceived to be the British way in India. When the NSW Aborigines
Protection Board presented its 1925 report to Parliament newspaper
coverage reported that the ‘problem’ was the ‘future of the half-caste
race’:
The same difficulty is encountered in other countries under Brit-
ish rule. In India, despite every effort, the half-caste remains as
an unassimilable section of the community. It has to be remem-
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bered that the Indian half-caste is for the most part a higher type
than the Australian. Many of the half-caste women of Hindustan
have exhibited talent of an advanced order to which they add a
certain personal charm, which is not always noticeable in other
half-caste races. In Australia, the half-castes are the product of
an aboriginal mother, wholly untutored, and but little removed
from barbaric races (Maynard 2007: 80).4
Let us not forget that the British first introduced the very term ‘half-
caste’ in India, back in 1789. A derogatory term for mixed-race children
of European and Indian unions designed to begin the long process of
social exclusion of such hybrid people (Edwards 2003), it was to have a
longstanding and poisonous impact in Australia.
From the turn of the twentieth century mixed-descent people in Aus-
tralia were a source of great and increasing anxiety to the authorities;
while there was no place imagined for Aboriginal people in ‘White
Australia’ (it being assumed their extinction was inevitable) the vitality
of Aboriginal communities was attributed to the ‘white blood’ within
them but they remained ‘unassimilable’. ‘It is a danger to us’ one NSW
Board member and parliamentarian warned in 1915, ‘to have a people
like that among us, looking upon our institutions with eyes different
from ours’. Such fears drove the impulse to go into Aboriginal commu-
nities and take out the girls and women of child-bearing age, to be
placed in service.5
Today, the live-in, indentured or bonded domestic worker is typically
a ‘foreign worker’ rather than a ‘native’. Nevertheless a pattern set in
the colonial period persists. Native female domestic workers were al-
most always in some sense ‘colonial hybrids’ themselves, individuals
who both culturally and racially straddled the divide between coloniser
and colonised, often drastically and even violently displaced from their
native communities of origin, and occupying a vulnerable yet danger-
ous liminal status in the colonial world. Nupur Chaudhuri’s study of
white women’s attitudes toward Indian servants found that ‘many’ pre-
ferred Christian ayahs. However, they also considered ‘converts’ un-
trustworthy, and that these Christian servants were descendants of the
Portuguese, Indians and Catholics meant that they were also viewed
with distrust by the predominantly Protestant British (1994: 552). The
classic example from the colonial period is the 1860s ayah Anna de
Souza, a Goan Christian from Calcutta, who in giving us one of the
few recorded voices of an ayah, reveals that she was keenly aware that
she had no family of her own (Prasad 2003: 12, 18). Then as now, how-
ever, the workers’ role was more than just the performance of repro-
ductive labour. As the symbol of domesticated otherness they served to
define racial, cultural and class borders and to indeed, affirm the integ-
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rity of their employers as individuals and representatives of their collec-
tivities as being unquestionably of the ruling race and class.
She was born in India: creating Maggie Hobbes
So, by the early twentieth century, the figure of the native nursemaid
was a crucial signifier of status in a transcolonial world, where identi-
ties that might be traced to colonial origins were often unstable, frac-
tured, and subject to sudden reversals. Margaret Ann Hobbes nee Gold-
ie, the grandmother of my great-grandmother Joan Strack, would serve
as a model ‘little Missus’ for her granddaughter Joan Strack in Joan’s
relations with Aboriginal people in the 1920s and 1930s. Joan Kings-
ley-Strack employed a series of young Aboriginal women as servants
through the Aborigines Protection Board in the 1920s and 1930s and
in her doing so, she consciously modelled her behaviour on her own
great-grandmother, who had used the domestic labour of women from
the Aboriginal camp adjacent to her selection on the Far South Coast
of NSW in the nineteenth century. Maggie Hobbs ‘mothered nursed
and cared for the Aboriginal men women and babes … she fed and
clothed them until they came to look upon her as their own “little Mis-
sus”’ wrote my great-grandmother, as Maggie lay on her deathbed in
1934.6 This was the panegyric of obituary, but in a letter written
around the same time, reflecting on her grandmother’s life, Joan
Strack touched on her exotic colonial origins:
Gran was a very beautiful and proud Scotch girl (her father was
… Commodore of the Brit. East India Clipper fleet). She was
born in India and sent at an early age back to Scotland with her
Ayah. She had never ‘worked’ in her life, but did most exquisite
embroidery and artistic work of all kinds...7
In this account, the native ayah functions as a potent signifier of Mag-
gie’s class and race (and, by extension, her descendants’), the link be-
tween the two clauses, ‘she was sent back with her Ayah’ and ‘she
never worked in her life’ makes this even more clear. And importantly,
the ayah also functioned as a link between Maggie’s ‘imperial’ position
in India and her colonial role in Australia, as the loving mistress of ser-
vants, and again, by extension, the position of her granddaughter Joan.
Thus, in a manuscript Joan crafted, which she hoped (in vain, as it
turned out) to have published as a series of Aboriginal legends for chil-
dren, Joan wrote that her grandmother had a ‘a carved Indian box’ that
‘had been given to her by her old Ayah for she was born in India many
years ago’. This box became a rhetorical device to launch into a recol-
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lection both of her own childhood relationships with the Aboriginal
people on her grandparents’ property, as she and a few Aboriginal
friends pored through the box for treasures on a rainy day, and her re-
lationship with her grandmother’s Aboriginal maid, the ‘Queen’ of the
local tribe, who brought them ‘hot scones, Brownie, sweets and glasses
of milk all round’.8
Joan’s wistful evocations of her grandmother’s Indian childhood do
not, however, totally agree with Maggie’s own account. For Maggie as-
serted she was brought from her Scottish birthplace to India by her
mother, at four months of age, leaving behind an older brother and
rather incredibly, surviving a shipwreck and several days in a small
boat at sea, to meet her father. Her earliest memories, moreover, were
of Singapore, where her maternal grandfather was harbour master, and
where two younger sisters were born in quick succession. At about the
age of four, according to Maggie, she was returned to her mother’s fa-
mily in Scotland and soon left orphaned, her father having died of cho-
lera (en route to Russia) and her mother of longstanding childbirth
complications. As her mother’s family was not ‘kind’, at the age of se-
venteen, Maggie and her next youngest sister ‘ran away’ on an assisted
passage to the Australian colonies, where more maternal relatives lived.
Having listed their occupations as ‘nursery governess’, Maggie found
work as a governess in Sydney, in the process meeting and fairly
quickly – as was the way in the colonies – marrying an English wi-
dower. She raised his children, and another eight of her own, on land
selected by her husband and sons on the far southern coast of NSW.9
Though Maggie had been in India only briefly, potent mythologies
of empire suffused Joan’s depiction of her return to her ancestral home
with a loving ayah. Maggie’s position as a young, poor and unattached
Highlander woman looking for work was precarious. Upper-class Eng-
lish emigrant Amy Henning in her seaboard journal written onboard
the Calcutta from England to Australia in 1854 described meeting a
‘Mrs MacDonald’, ‘quite a lady,’ who had ‘been in India a great part of
her life’ and knew various friends of the Hennings, thus cementing
her equivalent status. She was going to Australia to meet her husband
who had had to give up his Indian appointment ‘from bad health’ and
had been seeking his fortune in Australia for the past two years. How-
ever, Hennings’ editor writes that ‘the unfortunate’ Mrs MacDonald
had, in fact, been abandoned by her husband, and ‘As a result of his re-
jection of her, on her arrival in Sydney she was reduced to taking a po-
sition as a governess …’ (Thomas 1984: 82, 88). Mrs MacDonald’s pre-
dicament reveals the dangers that awaited Maggie Hobbs. Arriving in
1858, Maggie came just at the start of an influx of some 90,000 single
British women to the Australian colonies in the second half of the
nineteenth century (Gothard 2001: 2). Single women emigrating on as-
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sisted passages to Australia in the 1850s primarily to supply the need
for domestic workers (these included women brought from the Scot-
tish Highlands to alleviate poverty there) were treated with a discern-
ible anxiety by the authorities and respectable society in general who
subjected them to rigorous moral scrutiny (see Gothard 1991; also
Gothard 2001: 3). In fact, not long before Maggie’s arrival, some of the
women sent out to colonies ‘under the auspices of the Highland and
Island Emigration Society had been rejected by the colonists because of
the extreme poverty of their background and their total inexperience in
domestic service’ (Gothard 2001: 45). Cautionary tales advising single
emigrant women of the need for appropriate behaviour circulated, such
as ex-Indian army officer Charles Mundy’s account, published in 1852,
of the downfall of ‘two young orphan girls, little more than children,
daughter of a respectable professional man, [who] came out from Eng-
land’ with the ‘ostensible object [of ] procure[ing] situations as nursery
governesses’ but the real aim of finding marriage, ‘soon began to show
such levity of manner as to forfeit the protection of [their] kind patrons’
and their downfall was ‘predictable’. ‘… And these were emigrants at
the cost of the territorial revenue of the colony!’ (Baker 2006: 180-181).
A socially ambiguous position for an unmarried woman in British so-
ciety (Gathorne-Hardy 1972: 71) it was even more so in the colonies
(Higman 2002: 9). Would-be governesses dominated the female job
seekers in Sydney between the 1850s and the 1870s, and they could
not easily resist the pressures to take on a wider range of more menial
domestic duties (Higman 2002: 149, 150; Daniels & Murnane 1980:
237-238): Maggie could well have ended up as a servant herself. In this
situation, emphasising her Raj origins was a way of identifying her in-
clusion in the colonial elite.
The ayah played an important role as a foil not only of class, but of
race – and for Maggie, arriving in the Australian colonies not twelve
months after the Indian Mutiny of 1857 (as it was then called by the
British), perhaps more significantly. It had not been uncommon in the
earlier colonial period for British men in India to call upon their Brit-
ish wives or female relatives to take on responsibility for their children
born to Indian women, and even later into the nineteenth century
when attitudes to mixed-descent children were less hostile in England
than in India. Rosemary Raza, for instance, writes of the acceptance of
‘the Eurasian children who arrived [ from India] in the Highlands’ in
the late 1700s, where ‘illegitimacy was prevalent at all levels of society’,
but noted the ‘deepening prejudice’ in India since the 1820s against
‘half-castes’ (2006: 78; see also Brendon 2006: 41-67; Ghosh 2006:
100-105, 125). Whether or not orphaned Maggie and her sister had In-
dian ancestry, in the gossip-ridden and prejudiced colonial society of
NSW we may be sure that many would have thought so. (As Kirsten
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McKenzie [2004] shows, while colonial societies offered opportunities
to British settlers for re-invention that they exploited with a vengeance,
scandal was never far behind.) A faded photographic portrait of a pen-
sive young Maggie reveals, above a tartan neck bow and stiff Victorian
bodice, her olive skin and dark hair and eyes. In 1866, Maggie’s hus-
band in his diary recorded that his ‘dear wife’ had been ‘most grossly
insulted and treated most cruelly’ by one of his sisters:
I was very sorry and greatly grieved for her sake, she, who does
her duty so nobly and works so hard for the children, to be trea-
ted by people so much inferior to her in every thing, except per-
haps, in having a greater share of money in their pockets. There
is much need for me to be very kind indeed to her, more so in-
deed than I am, to make amends for the cruel deficiency exhib-
ited by the rest of my family may they be forgiven, I cannot do
it.10
While her husband did not reveal the nature of the insult, such was
her sisters-in-law’s hostility that they would not even offer their condo-
lences when the couple’s first-born child died in an accident as a baby.11
It may well be that for Maggie herself as well as her own female rela-
tives in the colony playing up her position as a blue-blooded Scottish
daughter of the Raj was strategic. Considering the numbers of women
migrants coming to Australia with similar fragments of colonial experi-
ence, we might hazard a guess that the class and race-defining role
served in the figure of the native nurse was more generally more pro-
minent than actual experience warranted.
Chaudhuri quotes a white mistress who wrote, when Maggie was
one year old and by her account had just arrived in India, that ‘If my
child were to stay long in this country, it would be worthwhile to send
for an English nurse, but as it is, I hope to bring her home before it be-
comes of any consequence and meanwhile I keep her as much as pos-
sible with me’ (1994: 552). British wives were expected to send their
children away or leave their husbands in India when the children came
of an age to require education ‘back Home’. Thus we might – conceiva-
bly – justify the decision of Maggie’s mother to leave her young son in
Scotland but bring her newborn daughter with her to India to join her
husband, and again, her decision to go back when Maggie was about
four or five years old in 1844. According to a recent historian of Benga-
li domestic service, Swapna Banerjee, during the British colonial peri-
od, Indian domestics were sometimes taken back to Britain but she
suggests that this was not typical: ‘Some of [the British] even took back
to England their ‘faithful’ Indian domestics’ (2004: 53-64). Perhaps,
Maggie’s mother was indeed very attached to her children’s caretaker.
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However, it is intriguing that, despite Maggie later telling her descen-
dants she was born in Scotland, she had actually given her birthplace
as Singapore on her Australian shipping record. Had Maggie’s ostensi-
ble mother collected Maggie (and perhaps her sisters too) upon voya-
ging to South-East Asia to join her husband? Could Maggie’s ayah have
been, indeed, her biological mother?
Maggie never mentions the ayah in her own few surviving written
accounts; and after Maggie’s prodigal return to Scotland the woman
fades from the scene altogether in Joan’s stories. I suspect that,
whether she was Maggie’s nurse or mother, the ayah did not, in fact,
return to Scotland, but this was an embellishment that Maggie’s grand-
daughter could not resist.
Changing attitudes: Native nursemaids in India and Australia
By the 1930s the image of a cherished ayah had been enshrined in the
nostalgia of the Raj that was generated at the close of the nineteenth
century. As that image took on a life of its own, individual recollections
of British colonials were compressed and compelled into the one abid-
ing memory, as Margaret MacMillan put it, of ‘a much-loved ayah,
usually a small, plump woman with gleaming, oiled hair, dressed in a
white sari, who had sung to them, comforted them, and told them
wonderful Indian stories’ (1998: 137).
The ayah, the lady’s maid, was very likely the only female servant in
a British home, but her presence had become ubiquitous in the nine-
teenth century, with even lower-class British women in India (i.e., sol-
dier’s wives) likely to have had an ayah to assist them (Procida 2003:
127-128, 146). In 1828, a doctor dispensing advice to young British
mothers arriving in India declared ‘native nurses’ to be a great danger.
He was at pains to explain that their object was to make money and
make ‘ingratitude’ their invariable stance: ‘I have known ladies to be-
stow on them repeated presents of clothes and money, to induce them
to be kind to their infants, but without avail; kindness, in fact, seemed
to induce, in many of them, impudence and threats, for the purpose of
exaction’, he warned (Fildes 1988: 204-205). The appearance of an
etching showing an ‘Ayah stealing a child’12 at this time suggests a
complex of fears about the dependence of white women on Indian
childcare. At this time, the native female servant was in fact destabilis-
ing social boundaries. By the twentieth century, however, the ayah’s
function had fundamentally shifted, from necessary evil to status sym-
bol for a beloved white wife. Now the memsahib was explicitly exhorted
to take on an ayah, even if she had no young children. ‘Chota Mem’ –
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linguistically the Raj equivalent of the ‘Little Missus’ – told her readers
in 1909:
[I] was always very glad my husband insisted that I should have
one. The ayah is a most useful servant and if she is willing and
clever will be a tremendous help to you, and you must own it is
nice to have one woman in the house. It is such a comfort when
you come in hot and tired… (Blunt 1999: 432).
The ayah’s significance as a female at this time had become heightened
in a way unlike that of earlier generations. Steel and Gardiner, those
custodians of correct female behaviour in India, advised their readers
to treat the ayah ‘with consideration and respect’, being ‘the only wo-
man-servant in the house’; both they and a writer in the early 1920s
advised that the memsahib should demonstrate she held her ayah
‘equal’ to the other servants ‘whether she be a sweeper or not’ (Blunt
1999: 432).
As ideas about uplifting downtrodden Indian women infiltrated the
domestic service relationship, the paranoia expressed about native wet-
nurses in the 1820s gave way to the admonitions against ‘race preju-
dice’ evident in the now apparently ‘universal horror of wet-nurses’ in
India. ‘[If ] the Western woman is unable to fulfil her first duty to her
child, let her thank Heaven for the gift of any one able to do that duty
for her’, Steel and Gardiner stated (Blunt 1999: 433).
The ayah’s role as caretaker of the older children was still hazardous,
however. Steel and Gardiner themselves argued that an ayah should
help care for infants but young children were better cared for by an
English nurse, whose superiority in ‘upbringing and nice ways, knowl-
edge, and trustworthiness’ was assumed. ‘The Indian ayah has many
good points; she surrounds her charges with an atmosphere of love
and devotion and has infinite patience,’ another writer conceded in
1923:
They make a charming picture – the fair-haired English child
and the swarthy-faced ayah with her voluminous white drap-
eries, tinkling silver bangles, and gay scarlet coat, as she sits
soothing him with magnetic touch, crooning an old-world lulla-
by…
But, she warned, ‘children left to the care and companionship of native
servants run a serious risk of acquiring bad habits, of becoming un-
mannerly, and of developing in undesirable ways’. Interestingly, the
same writer was also critical of the practice of engaging orphanage
girls as nursemaids, underlining their unsuitability whether mixed-des-
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cent or of ‘pure English extraction’, because of their ‘infectious’ Eura-
sian accent. A ‘judicious English nurse or governess’ was needed to
train the older children of the British elite (Blunt 1999: 433-435). The
ayah becomes essentially a picturesque foil to the young white child,
underlining, not threatening, the inviolability of her mistress’s race
and class.
Meanwhile, in Australia, white women were being called upon to
‘uplift’ Aboriginal girls by taking them into their homes, where they
tended to the care of pre-school aged children and babies. As in India,
there had been a significant shift in the way that relationships were
imagined between white and Aboriginal women. In the 1850s, one
Emma McPherson published her account of a Lady’s travels in the co-
lonies in which she stated she ‘been told, that the native women make
kind and careful nurses to European children’ but she did not have the
confidence to trust them out of sight. She did archly admit to ‘get[ting]
one of the young girls to carry [the baby] for me when I went out for a
stroll, or to walk up and down the veranda with him awhile I sat at
work, and very glad I was of such assistance, for nursing in hot weath-
er is a somewhat fatiguing business’. The girl had to first ‘bathe in the
river’ and put on ‘a frock’ she kept for such occasions, before she ‘al-
lowed her to touch my wee one’ (1860: 230-231). Emma McPherson
and her husband both had Indian backgrounds; their son, also, would
join the Indian civil service in the late nineteenth century.13 Through-
out the nineteenth century the requirements of white feminine genti-
lity was transported to the colonies by such women (Russell 1994),
which meant there was a noticeable preference for mixed-descent, fair-
er-skinned women to work as servants. Mrs Gunn’s young live-in work-
er Bett-Bett, for instance, was the daughter of a white man (Ellinghaus
1997: 85). Atlanta Bradshaw relied on the assistance of another aban-
doned daughter of a white man for the care of her children in late-
nineteenth-century central Australia, insisting that her other ‘house-
girls’ left their specially made white uniforms back at the house when
they went back to their camp and ‘slept with their beloved dogs’ (De
Vries 2005: 119-120, 123). In the twentieth century, however, the strik-
ing yet familiar depiction of the picturesque ayah would be echoed in a
series of portraits of demure dark-skinned Aboriginal women in white
aprons, produced by government administrative ‘Protection’ boards to
circulate amongst prospective white employers, and to promote the pol-
icy of indenturing Aboriginal girls and women.
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Her old ayah: colonialist nostalgia and identity
In my book One Bright Spot I have written about Joan Strack’s story
and touched upon her grandmother, but did not elaborate on the sig-
nificance Joan invested in the stories of her grandmother’s Indian
childhood and an ayah who accompanied her young mistress back to
Scotland before fading from the scene altogether. But there, amongst
Joan’s many photographs of her beloved Aboriginal servant, Mary (ap-
prenticed to her between the years 1920 and 1926 under the terms
and conditions established by the Aborigines Protection Board), is a
creased and unidentified sepia shot of a small nineteenth-century white
child – sex indeterminate – with a sari-clad ayah. I have no idea who
the child or woman are, nor when the little photograph was taken, but
I can be sure that this anonymous image was treasured as a memento
of colonialist nostalgia that helped Ming to identify and locate her own
experience in a familial web of empire.
There is a well-established, even classic tri-generational genesis of
the ‘good fella missus’ ideal: from the ‘sterling mother’ (the British
emigrant) to the ‘Australia’s daughter’ (born in the bush), and then fi-
nally, the ‘modern urban woman’ (McGuire 1990: 143). In this persua-
sive paradigm, my great-grandmother Joan Strack can be depicted as
the third generation and her grandmother Maggie as the first. But the
elusive and provocative wisps of story that point to the Indian connec-
tion suggest that the imagined relationships between white women
and ‘natives’ in Australia were constructions of a larger transcolonial
network of women’s lives. Maya Jasanoff (2005) writes of the plethora
of exotic items, transported around the world by colonial travellers be-
fore 1850, that helped to fashion a collective mythology of empire. Just
as I suspect that in reality no ayah actually accompanied young Maggie
back to Scotland, I am rather sceptical of my grandmother’s story about
a carved Indian box of treasures, given to Maggie by her ‘old Ayah’
many years ago. Yet, if it did exist, it surely was an instance of the im-
perial mania for collecting. Certainly as a metaphor for an imaginary
idea of colonialism transported from colony to colony, the carved In-
dian box signifying a gift of native devotion certainly evokes the way
that cultural ideas were transported around the webs of Empire. In the
travels of women like Maggie Hobbes, the image of the loving ayah
they carried with them fundamentally shaped our understandings of
white womanhood in colonialism.
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The Chinese, the Indians and the French
Exchange Control during the French Indochinese
War or How to Endure, Fight and Mock the
Colonial Power (1945-1954)
Daniel Leplat
Introduction
‘The piastre is not a currency, it is an object of traffic.’ A government
official, in the French Ministry of Finance, summed up the whole
monetary history of Indochina from 1945 to 1954 in this way.1
Whereas the exchange rate of the piastre had been set at FF 17 on 25
December 1945, piastres could soon be found on the Asian markets for
the equivalent of FF 3 or FF 10 (FF = French francs). This phenomenon
led to multiple arbitrages and caused a stir in France where this ‘ordin-
ary’ Asian speculation became a scandal, because it was through this
trafficking, that the French Treasury resources were prodigally spent.
The French and Indochinese press soon started to depict the suspect,
frightening circle of Asian financiers. The journalist-cum-novelist L.
Bodard wrote:
They are the souls of the markets, speculations, exchanges, and
trafficking. Each of them has a fortune of his own which often
amounts to dozens of millions of piastres. Each of them is at
the head of an organisation of his own, namely his own men of
straw, touts and even ‘killers’. His family is a tribe.2
This paper does not aim to present a full account of the Asian net-
works of money trafficking or draw up an exhaustive list of the wrong
ideas that have circulated on this subject.3 The police archives and mili-
tary archives are unfortunately seldom or never used, especially since
access to them is restricted. My study is essentially based on the
French public civil archives (mostly from the Ministry of Finance and
the Ministry of Justice) and belongs to the study of the diasporas and
colonialism, notably in the economic field. Lastly, it aims to provide a
historical approach to the current studies by the international financial
organisations on the Alternative Remittance Systems.
The Chinese and Indian diasporas were the main Asian diasporas in
French Indochina in the period 1945-1954. These two groups were se-
verely hit by the troubles in Asia after World War II: the independence
of India in 1947, the victory of the Communists in China in 1949, and
the presence of the Chinese nationalist armies in Southeast Asia. In
addition to all of these major events, there was also a troublesome colo-
nial war in Indochina. Because of all this, the diasporas had to change
their organisations.
However, a strict exchange rate aiming at protecting the piastre was
established in Indochina at the very same time and it was the source of
particular difficulties for the groups in question: not only were the usual
financial practices suddenly prohibited, but this prohibition took place
at the worst possible moment, when they had to change their positions.
By what means did international communities in Indochina succeed
in circumventing the French exchange controls? How can we account
for these dealings, which, even if illegal, are far from being totally in-
spired by the rapacious thirst for profit?4
After presenting the rules that were imposed on the two diasporas, I
shall study the practices of money transfers among the Chinese, and
then the Indian, diasporas.
I. The game and its rules
A. Indochina as a ‘golden cage’
On 25 December 1945, the French government set the exchange rate of
the piastre at FF 17. This rate was to remain unchanged until 11 May
1953 when it was reduced to FF 10. The reasons for this choice and for
its confirmation were the cause of much debate. It was mainly the re-
sult of French politicians’ desire to stimulate a quick return to prosper-
ity in Indochina and to win the support of the local populations. Later,
however, the ongoing negotiations between France and the Associated
States prevented any alteration in the exchange rate.
It proved a costly choice, however, for the overvaluation of the piastre
triggered inflation and the monetary difficulties that hit France at the
time.5 The French Treasury consequently tried to lower the value of the
piastre: it tried to limit the circulation of the piastre to Indochina exclu-
sively. In the Indochinese colonies, imports were still facilitated by the
parity of the franc and the piastre. Yet the official import plans tried,
without much success, to limit the purchases.
The Indochinese Exchange Office (IEO), a branch of the Exchange
Office of the French Ministry of Finance in Paris, was responsible for
controlling the circulation of the piastre. Year after year, the Treasury
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attempted to reduce the cost of the prolonged Indochinese war, and the
IEO thus became the all-governing body of Indochina’s financial world.
What were the relationships between the IEO and the diasporas
being studied?
In commercial matters, Chinese or Indian distinctions should not be
overstated. The Chinese and Indians both sought to protect themselves
against the risk of a sudden devaluation of the piastre, and similarly to
what the French and Vietnamese merchants did, they also imported
and stocked goods, especially non-perishable ones.6 Like the Indochi-
nese, the Indians and Chinese got lost in the intricacies of the IEO’s
regulations and unwittingly committed fraud, but most of these inno-
cent traffickers were Chinese people.
Why? We will now turn to an analysis of these two communities.
B. The Chinese in Indochina and the French Exchange Control
The presence of the Chinese in Indochina is fairly long-standing and
multifaceted (the first mention of Chinese merchants in Vietnam dates
back to the fourteenth century, moreover a large number of political re-
fugees arrived in the seventeenth century). This presence has had a
great influence on the history (i.e., the case of the eighteenth-century
sub-kingdom of Ha Tien in southern Vietnam), demography, and econ-
omy of Vietnam, and it has accordingly been thoroughly studied. Dur-
ing colonial times, the activities of Chinese people as essential media-
tors between the colonisers and the colonised have been abundantly de-
scribed, with most of these studies stressing the ambiguity of this role:
the Chinese being exploited by but also exploiting the colonial power.
However, all these studies have not been able to resolve the many is-
sues raised by the Chinese diaspora in Vietnam. The precise delimita-
tion of the group that should be considered is an unsolved, probably
unsolvable, problem. Consequently, estimates of the economic or de-
mographic place of the Chinese community diverges widely: in 1955,
the estimates of the Chinese population living in South Vietnam varied
from between 620,858 to more than one million. According to the Sta-
tistical Yearbook of South Vietnam, Chinese companies received 31 per
cent of the delivered trading licences, but some specialists believed that
their influence probably accounted for 50 per cent of the South Vietna-
mese economy.7 Thus, the Chinese were the largest diaspora on the pe-
ninsula, and the French had to set up exchange controls accordingly.
Moreover, the international context forced the French to adopt an ap-
parently benevolent position towards the Chinese. In 1945-1946,
Chiang Kai-shek had the upper hand and the French had to concede a
great many privileges in order to gain a peaceful evacuation of Chinese
troops from Northern Indochina. Later, the fall of the Nanjing regime
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restored the balance of power, but soon after, the silent threat of a
Communist invasion from the Beijing Republic and the wish to negoti-
ate the preservation of the French position in China itself convinced
the French to maintain their benevolent attitude.
Yet this benevolence was very ambiguous. Admittedly, some deci-
sions show that the French wanted to establish peaceful relations with
the Chinese. The Bank of China received an agreement for the carrying
out of international operations at the very same time as two prominent
British banks did so.8 Besides the French took into account the specific
needs of the Chinese consumers and granted them licences to import
tea, spices and other products. Lastly, when Indochinese 500-dollar
bills were devaluated, the authorities in Nanjing obtained the conver-
sion of the funds of piastres held in the Yunnan Province. These fa-
vours, however, are typical of the complicated game that was then
being played in Indochina. If France authorised the repurchase of the
piastres held in Yunnan, it was because some of these bills had a com-
promising origin. In other words, because they lacked currencies, the
French troops in North Indochina had sold their stocks of devaluated
bills in early 1946! In spite of instructions requiring discretion, Chi-
nese authorities discovered this manoeuvre, and France was thus
forced to repurchase the piastres!9 The episode of the special import li-
cences is perhaps of the same nature. Indeed, if the French administra-
tion gracefully authorised the imports, it forgot to provide the corre-
sponding currencies, and the Chinese thus had to buy them on black
market.10 The Chinese Embassy diplomatically asked France to correct
this mistake. However, it is possible that the French authorities had ta-
ken this problem into account, but that, by forcing the Chinese to buy
currencies on the black markets, France hoped to spare itself the chore
of having to provide currencies. The French benevolence was thus very
diplomatic and though seemingly peaceful, Franco-Chinese relations
were plagued with difficulties.
Another difficulty was that the Chinese were still using gold as a
common currency, but trading with gold was tightly regulated by the
exchange control. While gold could generally be openly transported
within Indochina, exporting or importing it required special permits.
Eventually, the French legal system gave in and a few convictions were
overturned, in consideration of these traditional Chinese uses for gold.
More often, however, the Chinese were still being portrayed as vulgar
traffickers.
As for the currencies, the exchange office required some documents
to allow financial transfers but most of the Chinese were not accus-
tomed to these administrative procedures. In order to get around them,
they preferred to use simpler, yet illegal, ways.11
120 DANIEL LEPLAT
Even for the merchants’ group, which was acquainted with the offi-
cial regulations and operations regarding money, these transactions
were not that easy. The Indians could rely on the structures if not on
the support of the powerful English banks established in Indochina
(HSBC, Chartered). The Chinese, on the other hand, sometimes suf-
fered from weaknesses in their own banking structures. Admittedly,
powerful Chinese banks were established in Indochina (Bank of China,
Bank of Communication, etc.) but at the beginning of 1950, these insti-
tutions were affected by the revolution in China and their transfer ca-
pacities were limited.
The role of the Chinese in the trafficking should also be cautiously
interpreted because to some extent, it reflects the difficulty, not to say
the impossibility, of the latter to adapt to French exchange controls.
However, in spite of the attested activity of the Chinese networks
and the daily difficulties raised by and with the ‘Celestial’, the question
of the exchange controls in Indochina never contributed to the tensions
existing between France and China. This contrasts greatly with the
Franco-Indians relations.
C. The Indians in Indochina and French Exchange Controls.
The Indian communities in Indochina have been far less studied than
the Chinese diaspora.12 The Indians, however, had an important influ-
ence on the history of the countries that constituted the former Indo-
china (like Kampuchea, South Vietnam and the kingdoms of Champa
and Founan) – but the rather small size, the diversity of the cultures,
and the situations or the legal statutes that characterised the Indian
community in colonial Indochina makes any study difficult.
Some studies estimate the number of Indians living in Indochina in
1930 as follows. 5,000 came from the British Empire, especially from
Tamil Nadu in the south although there were groups of Indians from
the north as well, coming from Sind or Gujarat. There were also 1,000
Indians coming from the French Indian Settlements, primarily from
Pondicherry and Karikal. However, these estimates are quite unreliable
since only males were counted. The community originating from
French India was surely the more important.
We can basically distinguish three groups, according to their sta-
tutes:
1. the renonc¸ants came from the French territories and were mainly
employed in the administration or the army.
2. the non-renonc¸ants from the French territories13 lived sparingly from
employments in private companies, especially manual labour.
3. the merchants, comprised mostly of British subjects. There were
Moslems and Hindus, as well. Among the Moslems, the Sindi mer-
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chants should be mentioned, because they were important in the
textile trade, particularly the silk trade. Among the Hindus, there
are 300 chettys (or bankers) listed in 1930.
It was primarily due to the latter category that the Indian diasporas,
although of smaller size, played a significant role in the economy of In-
dochina: a 1929-1930 report estimated that the chettys’ resources
amounted to 12 billion francs, including 500 million invested in Indo-
china (approximately E 230,000 in 2000 terms).14 We know that the
upheavals of the 1930s and the war drove some Indians out of Indo-
china. The economic importance of this diaspora remained consider-
able: in June 1946, the assets of 117 chettys near the Saigon branch of
the Chartered Bank increased to 4.9 millions piastres,15 and we know
that the assets of one Sindi merchant from Hanoi were worth several
millions.
The introduction of an exchange control in Indochina produced var-
ious problems for the Indians. The renonc¸ants could easily transfer
their salaries to the French Settlements. The financial networks and
the domestic finances of the non-renonc¸ants, and especially the mer-
chants from the former British Indies, were stretched to the limit. The
majority of these Indians had left their families in India and they
needed to regularly transfer sums to provide for the needs of their rela-
tives and finance their own return to India (a chetty returned to India
every 2 or 3 years).
Did France take the Indians’ need for a certain freedom in handling
their funds into account?
I did not find any examples of hostility or racism in the documents I
reviewed and, given the small size of the Indian community (and thus
the limited financial consequences of their requests), the French autho-
rities would no doubt have been well disposed towards their requests.
The question of Indochina’s Indians, however, is part of the history of
the whole region.
The French Treasury at first feared that if they granted favours to the
Indians in Indochina, then the Chinese community would ask for si-
milar favours – which, because of the size of the Chinese community,
would have exceeded the financial capacities of France. The requests
for the transfer of non-French Indian inheritances of those who had
died in Indochina were thus rejected.16
However, the crucial question of the French Indian Settlements and,
in general, of French goods in India, remained. Since the end of World
War II, the Indian Custodian of Enemy Property retained 4 to 10 mil-
lion rupees worth of French possessions.17 These goods were mostly
concentrated in the French Indian Settlements and, as early as 1947,
the problem of Pondicherry was raised. The government of indepen-
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dent India tried through commercial, political and financial pressure to
retrieve these lost pieces of Indian territory, pointing out its hostility to
the French policy to come back to Asia as a colonial power.18 In finan-
cial matters, the tensions were further fed by the fact that Pondicherry
was the centre of the diamond and gold trafficking trade – and these
two items were not allowed to be imported into India.19
The problems of freeing the French Indian Settlements were never
really solved during these years and they have helped to give a very spe-
cial tone to the Franco-Indian negotiations that contrasts greatly with
the threatening yet tactful tone used by both the Chinese and the
French. Although the Indians could have hoped for more flexible treat-
ment, their capacity to engage in transfers was basically dependent
upon the progress in the negotiations between the two governments
and thus some transfers were blocked or limited.
The French authorities did not persecute the Indian communities,
however, particularly because a significant part of these Indians were
by then French citizens. Besides the dozens of refusals already men-
tioned, the Indians enjoyed rather favourable, if not privileged, condi-
tions when engaging in transfers. They were allowed to promptly trans-
port currencies for them to take along on their journeys. The transfer
formalities involving families were also made easier.20 This is undoubt-
edly one of the reasons for their apparently insignificant part in the
trafficking of piastres. To carry out their daily transfers, they did not
need, as the Chinese did, to use illegal means – and if they wanted to
speculate, they had more discreet means (i.e., dummy entries between
Pondicherian and French companies, trafficking via the Stock Ex-
change, etc.). In this way, they easily evaded the authorities.
II. ‘The International Celestial Corporation Ltd.’: Chinese
commercial practices and fraudulent methods in Indochina
The problem of the exchange control system was very different for the
Chinese, because the Chinese communities did not have the same
needs and they had a different set of rules to observe. How did the dia-
sporas react to these constraints?
Because of the lack of resources, we cannot truly study how the Chi-
nese and Indians complied with the exchange controls put into place
and thus we have to limit our study to the infringements on the system
committed by the diasporas. This aspect has real historical implications
because it concerns the criminal behaviour of some of the Chinese (the
gang of ‘le Grand Monde’, etc.) who came to the attention of French
public opinion. Use of the various sources is made more difficult, how-
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ever, by the inaccuracies that are discerned among the writings of var-
ious protagonists.
First, with the Chinese community I will first try to specify the types
of fraudulent financial practices that the Chinese preferred, before
studying in greater detail how their networks operated. Finally, I will
deal with the existence or the non-existence of definitely criminal or
politically influenced networks.
A. Trade and fraud: a statistical study of some Chinese financial
practices
The police files have some characteristics which make their statistical
use difficult: the services performed are often cyclical, qualifications
vary, etc. In the Ministry of Justice archives relating to piastre traffick-
ing, the files of various jurisdictions within the Marseilles-Aix area are
thus fairly equal in percentages compared to France in general. No
doubt, this partly reflects reality: as Marseilles was then the principal
port for ships heading to Indochina, most traffickers had to go through
Marseilles. This development is however largely contingent on the fact
that in 1948-1952, the national administration turned its attention to
trafficking that took place through the postal service but lacked the
means to successfully deal with these crimes. Thus the authorities
could only examine the problem locally at the Marseilles post office.
The statistics drawn from a simple census of the files preserved in the
Ministry of Justice archives can thus not be used to study piastre traf-
ficking (inter)nationally.
Our study is based on a census of all those mentioned in the piastre
trafficking files kept by the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Finance
and the Ministry of Relations with the Associated States (i.e., the old
colonies). Two lists have thus been produced. The first one includes
3,008 individual names, listed by country of origin (Europeans, In-
dians, Chinese, Vietnamese, etc.), by the types of fraud perpetrated,
and the total amounts involved. The second list presents the groups of
traffickers, using the same categories.
We should not be impressed by these figures because they are not
particularly reliable: the majority of the files are still being investigated,
thus the list includes people who will later be found innocent; also,
there are other files that we know exist, that are not mentioned here.
In particular, those who were tried in Indochina are barely mentioned
because the Indochinese Exchange Office, as well as the local police
force and Indochinese courts, supplied very little data. What is really
notable, however, is that this list only mentions the cases prosecuted in
urban areas, which is a severe limitation when one is studying colonial
history and the colonised people!
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Despite these limitations, these lists do provide some valuable informa-
tion. Table 3 synthesises the information that focuses on the Chinese
networks.
First, we will notice the very small number of Sino-Vietnamese net-
works comprising a dozen people out of a total of 900. The number is
far fewer than we expected. This small sample may mean that there
was a certain distance between Chinese and Vietnamese economic cir-
cles, but it also reflects the particular modus operandi of the Asian fi-
nancial networks. Indeed, we generally know only the central aspects
of these circles; the incoming (supply of the funds) and the outgoing
(final destination) details of the trafficking remain unknown. I will re-
consider this problem later.
Second, the Chinese often resorted to a system of ‘private compensa-
tion’ (in one-third of the cases, as opposed to less than three per cent
among the French networks). This technique simply consists of mak-
ing a sum in one currency available to a client in one place, while the
equivalent of this sum is paid out somewhere else in another currency.
For example, M. Dupont gives 10 piastres to M. San in Saigon and,
upon his arrival in Paris, M. Dupont withdraws 170 francs from M. Si,
cousin of M. San. This very simple system is almost impossible to de-
tect by the authorities: If the French authorities managed to discover
three Chinese cases, it means that the Chinese were very actively in-
volved in this type of transaction, which largely went undetected.
Thirdly, we note the importance of the Chinese in the business of
world-wide traffic (WWT). By WWT we mean the return of a sum origi-
nating from Indochina back to Asia. The exchange rates made this op-
eration far more beneficial than the simple conversion of overestimated
Table 2 Composition of the group of traffickers described in the files of the French
Ministry of Justice
Number of people in... Per cent
Group with only French names 343 42.5
Group with only Vietnamese names 122 15.1
Group with only Chinese names 29 3.5
Total for groups with only
one kind of names
494 61.1
Group with French and
Vietnamese names
118 14.6
Group with French and Chinese names 16 2
Group with Chinese and
Vietnamese names
12 1.5
Group with three kinds of names or more 166 20.6
TOTAL 806 100
Source: CARAN, BB 18 7092 sq.
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piastres into francs. Of the 141 people suspected of having taken part
in world-wide trafficking, 46 per cent were French, while only 10 per
cent were Vietnamese and 15 per cent Chinese. These data show that
the Chinese often did resort to world-wide trafficking: 11.8 per cent of
the Chinese traffickers took part in WWT, versus less than 4 per cent
of the French traffickers and 3 per cent of Vietnamese traffickers. The
diagram below represents one WWT system developed by a network
known as TCC and its allies, according to statements by two of its
members.21
The two framed initials are those of two brothers. The unbroken ar-
rows represent currency transfers and broken arrows represent the
transmission of information.
And finally, we must deal with the immense transport capacity of
the Chinese networks. The data, however, remains dubious, as is also
the case for business data. In other words, the number of funds in-
volved changes during the various stages of the procedures. A list
based only on the files of the Ministry of Justice shows that, whereas a
fraudulent transaction committed by a French person involved 9.8 mil-
lion francs on average (2.91 million per person), a fraudulent transac-
tion committed solely by Vietnamese suspects involved 21.1 million
(6.52 million per person) and those committed by Chinese people aver-
aged 28.45 million (9.95 million per person).
Figure 4 World-wide traffic: TCC’s network
Key: HK$ = Hong Kong
Dollars
P = Piastre
FF = French Francs
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However, while the first three points are fairly certain, provided our re-
marks are taken into account, this last point appears particularly du-
bious. The files show not only that the Asian networks could mobilise
a great number of people but also that the French networks are de-
scribed in an abnormally precise manner. These discrepancies result
largely from the working conditions the police faced in metropolitan
areas. The networks involving solely French suspects were easily ana-
lysed as a whole and individual names were often put in charge. How-
ever, when it came to the Asian networks, only their French compo-
nents could be scrutinised, and even research on the latter quickly
butted against the silence or the pretended ignorance of the convicts. A
better statistical analysis (factor analysis) carried out on all of the re-
cords, does not show any strong connections between nationalities and
the amounts of the fraudulent transactions.
A further method should be added for a proper exploitation of these
data. We know that a regrouping along patronymic bases is a dubious
method but some aspects that do not concern criminology and involve
the study of the diasporas in Asia, however, appear to be established
here. Without the development of any culturalist model and by means
of a comparison imposed by two facts, namely (1) the actual existence
of the Chinese networks; and (2) the attestation of relations of confi-
dence which hold a significant place (cf. use of the private compensa-
tion), it matters very little what name (guanxi, xinyong) one gives to this
spirit of ‘confidence’.22 It is the effectiveness of these networks that
made it possible for some Chinese people not only to adapt to but also
benefit from the hardening of the monetary sector, which characterised
the post-Second World War period. ‘The Chinese are born exchangers’,
acknowledged J. Maxime-Robert, a director at the very influential Bank
of Indochina.
B. Operation of the Chinese networks: case studies
The above quotation by one of the most important French bankers in
Indochina is not that original, however, because all visitors to Indo-
Table 3 Comparison between networks involving individuals of only one nationality
criteria / group Metropolitan French Vietnamese people Chinese people
Number of files
= Involved Money
70 files
= 685.59 million FF
21 files
= 443.16 million FF
9 files
= 256.13 million FF
Average involved
money per file
9.8 million 21.1 million 28.45 million
Average number
of people per file
3.36 3.2 2.8
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china soon recognised the talents of the Chinese moneychangers and
their networks. It is necessary to recall a cliche´ about both the frame-
work and the context of activities involved in exchange trafficking
among the Chinese, which were known to everybody.
The collapse of China after the war, the difficulties of the French ‘Re-
construction’ period, the war in Indochina, and the installation of the
Bretton Woods system, all occurred within a few years. They could not
have taken place without being first phased in to acclimatise the var-
ious actors involved. The Chinese had to engage in their money chan-
ging activities in various grey zones, just below the radar of the autho-
rities.
Because of French regulations, Chinese exchange activities had to be
practised discreetly (underground) but it was far from being totally
clandestine. In December 1950, for instance, a Chinese travel agency
as a natural thing recommended that the Indochinese Exchange Office
should feed the French financial reserves with Hong Kong Dollars by
means of its clients’ money.23 When, in January 1953, the French Min-
istry of Finances came up with the idea of buying piastres for itself on
the black market, Chinese businessmen naturally came to the IEO to
offer their services.24 Of course, none of these moneychangers were
ever prosecuted.
Actually, the discrepancies between the official and black quotation
of the piastre was so big that the trafficking was integrated in the econ-
omy of Indochina. The Chinese took the lead in exploiting this parallel
economy without meeting much resistance, because the French gener-
ally feared being prosecuted in the metropolitan areas. Large, world-fa-
mous companies, such the rubber companies25 and various import-ex-
port businesses26 thus turned to the Chinese community to engage in
speculation but also simply survive the times. They used trafficking to
limit the increase in their selling prices, which resulted from the parity
of the piastre.
How was this grey economy organised? In the multi-cultural net-
works, in particular, we constantly find the figure of the single inter-
mediary, who exclusively ensures transactions between various parties.
These individuals, who may have had a specific title or not, clearly
acted as compradors, or go-betweens, for various economic groups;
they also provided lists of names and raised capital.
Thus, if the piastre trade was declared illegal, it was these grey zone
networks that were used to foster money exchange traffic. This re-
course to the old system of the ‘instituted passor’ reinforces some scien-
tific notions that the compradors were not specifically part of a colonial
structure.
However, is this similarity with the comprador relevant? The re-
course to an intermediary is found in most networks that introduce
THE CHINESE, THE INDIANS AND THE FRENCH EXCHANGE CONTROL 129
people of the same culture, and is easily turned to by those working in
a hostile or foreign environment. The use of the delegate system had
numerous advantages: it covered or repudiated the intermediary if
caught by the police but, most of all, this system was very mobile and
made contacts easier and, thus, facilitated the exploitation of all the op-
tions. Asian people contacted French citizens who then sold their big
transfer options to them,27 and the Chinese sometimes even profited
from the Vietnamese diaspora to France28 – these Vietnamese were
contacted through the efforts of this ‘grey comprador’.
In fact, this similarity seems relevant because of the social position
of most of the known intermediaries. Indeed, it was just simple stu-
dents who were implicated in some of these cases, but the Chinese in-
volved in the most documented cases were influential people in the In-
dochinese commercial world. For example, at least one President and
one Vice-president of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce,29 one mem-
ber of ‘Le Grand Monde’,30 and one comprador,31 are mentioned in
these files – not to mention one more dubious case.
Did all this go on secretly, right in the middle of the war in Indo-
china? Chinese networks were in fact put to a severe trial and, while
the structures remained more or less stable, individuals had to over-
come the shock of the upheavals. General G. Buis tells how, when he
was the head of the ‘Se´curite´ Ge´ne´rale de Saigon’, the head of a Chi-
nese congregation asked him to hold on to his money or transfer it
back to his widow, because he feared for his own life. Mr. Buis refused,
thinking he was trying to bribe him. And yet, two days later and de-
spite extra police protection, this notable Chinese person was mur-
dered and his fortune disappeared.32 Thus we need to study the black
zones after we have looked at the grey zones.
C. Asian gangsters?
The illegal activities of the Chinese gave birth to fantasies and various
French writers in Saigon spoke of the ‘Chinese Al Capone’,33 who was
the ‘suave and always smiling yellow billionaire.’34 Some supposedly
informed authors wrote about ‘the Chinese communist network’ that
was speculated in the piastre, with worldwide networks going from Sai-
gon through Paris, Zurich, New York, and returned to Asia, via Manila,
Hong Kong or Bangkok.
TCC’s business dealings, along with some other cases, reveal that
there was some truth in these descriptions. Geneva, New York, etc.,
were all interested in the piastre business – but imagination and xeno-
phobia were to play a large part in these descriptions. What was the ac-
tual importance of these global speculation networks led by the Chi-
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nese? Was it for their own benefit or that of specific interest groups
(i.e., the Communist Party, criminal organisations)?
The French intelligence services were already trying in 1949 to come
up with an assessment. A very secret report dated 25 August 1950 from
the Technical Office of Connection and Coordination (Bureau Technique
de Liaison et de Coordination), which was in charge of intelligence in In-
dochina, pictures a Chinese group related to a group in Macao. It was
‘the richest and most powerful group, [which reportedly accounted for]
70% of the Chinese traffic’, and quickly imposed itself upon an older,
local Chinese group. These two groups were known as ‘Le Groupe du
Grand Monde’.
Some developments are well-known like the surge of a new group in
collaboration with the great centres of international currency traffick-
ing. The information was, however, very unreliable. In fact, a report
from August 1950 gives a C/3 value to the intelligence, which means
the lowest level of intelligence reliability.
The French did not manage to get more information and in 1956, all
piastre exchanges were re-examined in order to better detect the traf-
ficking that could have been directly used to benefit the Viet Minh. A
senior police officer, after having card-indexed nearly 900 people,
could only conclude that ‘it is materially impossible... to bring the least
solid proof [that the piastre traffic had benefited to the Viet Minh].’35
By comparing information found in the archives, a historian can
only draw conclusions about the activities of some individuals such as
the Lau brothers – one was the President of the Chinese Chamber of
Commerce in Saigon and had contact with the Viet Minh as well as
Binh Xuyen in 1952.36 However, these cases only point to the obvious,
that is, that it was impossible for the Chinese to remain neutral regard-
ing all of the political turbulence on the peninsula. The Chinese, who
had to pay tithes and put their sales networks at the service of the belli-
gerents, could obviously not avoid having to offer their exchange net-
work services.
The movements of gold during this period in Hong Kong and bound
for Indochina were probably used to support the Viet Minh via interna-
tional exchange revenues, but to what extent has not been fully estab-
lished.
III. The Indians of Indochina and piastre trafficking
A. There are as many ways to traffic as there are Indians
We do not have as much on the Indians as we do on the Chinese, and
no instructive statistical study can thus be carried out. However, the
files that have survived show that the Indians used every existing trick
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to outfox the French: via the postal service,37 via the commercial
world,38 or via financial transactions,39 the Indians in Indochina at-
tempted to evade the French authorities.
We might characterise the fraudulent practices of the Indians. They
had a liking for gold,40 which at that time certainly had a connection
with the Pondicherry trafficking. They seemed to practice speculative
traffic in a fairly important proportion. Resorting to ‘daily’ frauds was
spared them thanks to the generous legislation which has already been
described. Moreover, the people associated with the Indians came from
a wide variety of different groups: the French, Lebanese, the Vietna-
mese, etc.41
However, as we noted earlier, all of these observations were based on
very few cases; therefore they remain uncertain and only two points
seem to have been verified on any level.
B. The Indians’ diplomatic traffic
First, the groups that made up the Indian diaspora were aware early on
of the political aspects of the situation, and they did their best to pur-
sue their interests during the Franco-Indian negotiations. It is there-
fore possible that, among the transfers requested by the authorities,
some were used for speculative trafficking.
There were no illegal operations that could be pinpointed, but the
French government was indeed impressed by the philanthropic gener-
osity of the Indians in January 1951, when India requested authorisa-
tion to send 193,000 rupees to Sind. Then in July, the Indian Consu-
late transferred 75,000 piastres for various Indian social organisations,
while a second donation by an Indian merchant went to the construc-
tion of a maternity hospital in his village. In 1951, people donated
money to India because of a major earthquake in Sind, not to mention
that 1951 was the worst economic year of the entire 1950s-1960s peri-
od.42 However this generosity also came at the time of France’s major
defeats in Tonkin, and it was also the same year that French businesses
began leaving Indochina.
While the Vietnamese and French may have profited from political
transfers, the Indian people tried to do so via diplomatic transfers.
C. Mister L.’s story: mocking the colonisers43
My other observations are based on a single case. The documents of
this case are more numerous than for all of the other cases, since the
guilty party was living in France at the time.
Mr. L. was born in Hyderabad in 1921. He was an English citizen
but he established a successful textile business in Lyons. His success,
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however, attracted the attention of the French police who discovered
that Mr. L., besides having established a vast European exchange sys-
tem (France – Switzerland – Italy), had organised a system of over-in-
voicing in an Indochinese context. Buying kilos of textile from the ‘Ply-
mouth company’, L. invoiced the same produce but replaced the kilos
with meters, thus quintupling the price of the goods (according to cus-
toms estimates). This kind of fraud, which consists of replacing the
unit of measure, is the first point which distinguishes L. from the
usual traffickers because it is the only known example of this practice.
The second point relates to the relations between L. and the French
justice system. The behaviour of the accused is seldom mentioned in
the police files but that of L. is condemned as disdainful – which was
all the more intolerable for the French policemen since the person of
L. was unassailable. Indeed, whereas abusing transfers was an offence
in Indochina, the over-invoicing that had allowed these transfers was
not punishable in France. Consequently, L. only went back to India,
thus escaping French legal proceedings.
The case of L. does not readily lead to generalisations, but this exam-
ple of a citizen from a French colony cunningly manipulating the colo-
nisers, remains an interesting case because it points out the well-
known defects of French legislation which could be exploited by this
young man. One has to wonder whether the practice of faking the
measurement units was not the idea of someone with a British connec-
tion, who knew the difficulties of people used to the metric system in
handling Anglo-Saxon measurements.
Conclusion
The unique nature of the Indochinese situation and the French politi-
cal will to maintain a strong sense of parity to the then still unstable
piaster, lent the entire piastre trafficking case its distinction. This epi-
sode, however, occurred in a broader history of the entire international
monetary system. By imposing a system of fixed parities on a troubled
world, the system of Bretton Woods provided numerous occasions for
exchange trafficking to emerge and the piastre affair is only one exam-
ple of this larger issue.
However, the Indians and the Chinese of Indochina both felt the ill
effects of the exchange control system because they had specific needs
regarding the mobility of capital. However we need to insist on giving
attention to the human cost of this exchange control, especially for the
diasporas. But that falls outside of our limited scope and time re-
straints, and thus I can only further present the singular case of the
Kouo Tsing couple. Mrs. Kouo had come to France looking for a cure
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for her tuberculosis and was soon immobilised by her disease. How-
ever, she eventually had to return to Asia in order to evade the Ministry
of Finance’s investigations of her. There is no doubt that this Chinese
woman, who was confined to bed and under treatment, did not survive
long after her return to her war-torn homeland. The Kouo couple, it is
true, did resort to various illegal practices, misleading the Foreign Ex-
change Office and tax officials – but how could this Asian couple have
successfully abused an exchange control legislation that frightened
even French citizens?
In order to evade the French government, the diasporas used their
community’s Alternative Remittance Systems (ARS). To some extent
they therefore managed not only to free themselves from the con-
straints imposed on them by the colonial power, but also – for some of
them and to some extent – to make profit from them, selling their as-
sistance to the colonisers, who had become the captives of the Indochi-
nese ‘golden cage’.
Many details remain unclear, however. It would have been interest-
ing to specify the particular behaviour of the sub-groups that consti-
tuted each of the diasporas; whereas the South Chinese Tch’aoutche´ou
group seems to have had a very active role in the traffic, the Indian
chettys do not appear anywhere. It could have also been interesting to
study the repressive activities of the French authorities in Indochina
vis-a`-vis the traffickers. A thorough study of the expulsion laws enacted
against the Indians and Chinese could perhaps offer some new data.44
Lastly, we would have liked to have been able to specify the characteris-
tics of each network such as whether the typologies established by the
contemporary experts of ARS stand up to historical proof.
If money circulates, it does not circulate everywhere in the same way
– and in order for it to circulate well, the protagonists must agree and
a precondition to any agreement is that they truly understand each
other. The study of the Alternative Remittance Systems has blossomed
during the past 5 to 6 years, but almost exclusively in Pacific Asia:
from the Tokyo meeting of the Asia Pacific Group on Money Launder-
ing in March 199945 up to the latest (at the time of this article) Inter-
pol report from May 2005.46
The management of traditional remittance systems is an old pro-
blem. Only a truly general reflexion which has other objectives than
the particular, will enable us to understand them better.
« Un ami fide`le est une tour forte et
qui l’a trouve´ a trouve´ un tre´sor. »
: dix mille merci a` Anne Tassin
pour l’aide indispensable
apporte´e dans la traduction de cet article.
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Living the Colonial Lifestyle: Australian Women
and Domestic Labour in Occupied Japan 1945-19521
Christine de Matos
Introduction and background
The United States may have dominated control of the Allied Occupa-
tion of Japan (1945-1952), but Australia also contributed to the occupa-
tion force and occupation control machinery. The aims of the Occupa-
tion were to demilitarise and democratise Japan. Australian male mili-
tary personnel began to arrive in Kure, a city in the Hiroshima
prefecture southeast of Hiroshima city, as part of the British Common-
wealth Occupation Force (BCOF) in February and March 1946, where
they retained a presence until 1952.2 About 45,0003 Australians served
overall with BCOF, the most provided by any of the participating Com-
monwealth nations. The Australian base was in Hiro, while the BCOF
headquarters was located in nearby Kure. BCOF was comprised of Aus-
tralian, New Zealand, British and British-Indian troops, but always had
an Australian Commander-in-Chief. At the height of its presence in
1946, Australia provided almost 12,000 troops to BCOF. Diplomati-
cally, Australia contributed: the British Commonwealth representative
to the advisory body, the Allied Council for Japan (ACJ), based in To-
kyo; the president of the International Military Tribunal of the Far East,
Sir William Flood Webb; and a separate delegation to the policy-mak-
ing body for the Occupation, the Far Eastern Commission (FEC), based
in Washington DC.
In addition to male service personnel, Australian women came to Ja-
pan as wives, mothers, teachers, nurses, medical corps and volunteers,
the latter including the Women’s Voluntary Service, the Red Cross, and
the YWCA. Women began to arrive from April and May 1946, first as
nurses and medical corps, then as teachers and civilian volunteers, and
finally as wives of servicemen along with their children. As Roma Don-
nelly has argued, the presence of women in the Australian area was
meant to have a ‘civilising’ influence on the Australian soldiers – that
is, to prevent or at least minimise them from ‘fraternising’ with Japa-
nese women and help maintain an acceptable spatial barrier between
the occupier and the occupied to reinforce the power hierarchy. It is
the role of Australian women as occupiers, particularly in relation to
the domestic workers they were assigned by BCOF authorities, that this
chapter seeks to elucidate by placing the experience within a longer
term colonial discourse and practice.
Creating a feminised ‘neo-colonial’ occupation space
Many writers have argued that the Allied Occupation of Japan was an
exercise in neo-colonialism and orientalism, both generally and specifi-
cally in relation to the female occupier/occupied. John W. Dower,
author of Embracing Defeat, calls the occupation the ‘last immodest ex-
ercise in the colonial conceit known as “the white man’s burden”’
(Dower 1999: 23). Mire Koikari argues that ‘US and European wo-
men’s reform efforts in Asia, including “feminist” interventions, were
inextricably intertwined with Western imperial and colonial endeavour
in the region’, and this too is reflected in the Occupation of Japan (Koi-
kari 2002: 27). Lisa Yoneyama, in a critique of feminist reforms in Ja-
pan during the occupation, called the occupation a ‘colonized space’
linked to the western image of Japanese women as ‘submissive yet li-
centious’ (Yoneyama 2005: 895-898). Yet there are also differences be-
tween the Occupation of Japan and Western imperialism/colonialism
that need to be noted. Japan had itself been a colonising power in Asia
and very quickly found itself in the reverse position after the war. Aus-
tralia had been a British colony; had pursued a colonising role in Pa-
pua and New Guinea after Federation in 1901 and, particularly, follow-
ing World War I; had colonised/occupied indigenous lands in Austra-
lia; and actively played the neo-coloniser/occupier role in Japan.
Therefore, Japan and Australia experienced, to some extent, both posi-
tions as the coloniser/occupier and colonised/occupied.
Postcolonial studies are useful in informing interpretations of the
Occupation as a colonised, or neo-colonised, space, and in the construc-
tion of asymmetrical power relations within that space. As Pierson and
Chaudhuri state,
[T]he power relations of gender have intertwined with those of
class, race, and sexuality and … these technologies of power have
been at the heart of the histories of imperialism, colonialism
and nationalism shaping our modern world (Pierson & Chaud-
huri 1998: 1).
This chapter is interested in the asymmetrical relationship constructed
with the ‘technologies of power’ between occupier women and the oc-
cupied in the domestic or ‘private’ spaces of the occupation. While
there were non-white occupiers (for example African-Americans, Brit-
ish-Indians, New Zealand Maoris, Australian Aboriginals and Torres
138 CHRISTINE DE MATOS
Strait Islanders, Australian-Asian), occupation power was defined and
controlled by white men, and white women’s roles defined in relation
to that power, ostensibly designed to ‘protect’ them from the occupied.
Yet, the relationship between white male and white female in the occu-
pation space provided access to a ‘borrowed’ power: white female occu-
piers ‘often gained opportunities lacking at home and played a central
role in shaping the social relations of [occupation] because of the con-
tradictory experiences of being “members of the inferior sex within the
superior race” in [an occupation] setting’ (Strobel in Janiewski 1998:
57).4 It was their race, combined with victory in war, rather than, or in
spite of, their gender that gave Australian women access to power. The
role of women as occupiers therefore shares similarities with that of co-
loniser women in terms of the relations of power as shaped by gender,
race and class.
One of the implicit tasks of the occupiers was to create tangible bor-
der markers between occupier women and the occupied similar to
those found in colonial contexts. These border markers functioned to
make visible the hierarchies of power between the victor/vanquished
and the occupier/occupied. In November 1946, the Australian govern-
ment approved a policy to allow the wives and children of soldiers ser-
ving in Japan to join them if the soldiers continued to serve at least
one year in Japan after his family’s arrival (Donnelly 1994). Five hun-
dred and sixty-one new western-style buildings built especially for the
‘BCOF families’ and a further 134 Japanese homes were taken over and
renovated to suit Western tastes and household practices (Donnelly
1994).5 The largest dependents’ development was just outside the Aus-
tralian base of Hiro, where a whole village was built especially for the
BCOF families. It was named Nijimura, or rainbow village, after the
colourful pastel buildings. Built with Japanese labour under BCOF
supervision, the village boasted a church, a school, a library, a shop, a
cinema, the fire brigade, a medical post, a sporting field and a play-
ground – a complete mini-suburb (Donnelly 1994). It was not only the
house, but, in that terribly English-style, the garden that was seen to
differentiate Australian, or Western homes from those of the surround-
ing devastated and/or rural Japanese homes (Dawson 1994).
The Western-style architecture of Nijimura contributed to the creation
of an ‘occupation landscape’ by emphasising the ‘modernity’ of the oc-
cupier over the ‘traditional’ occupied, who were part of a rural landscape
(despite, of course, the fact that the Japanese had very modern buildings
elsewhere, including in nearby Kure). It created an architectural barrier
to keep the occupied out (except those authorised to enter in their ap-
propriate roles, for example, as domestic workers and labourers), and
keep the occupier women in – they could not move freely through the
occupied zone without occupier males escorts, especially after dark,
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quite unlike the men. Therefore, while the occupation created opportu-
nities for women to access ancillary power, it also limited their activities
in relation to white male power. The arrival of larger numbers of mostly
white occupier women in Japan threatened the previous white male
homo-social occupation space, and feminised domestic spaces such as
Nijimura, combined with rules of non-fraternisation and requirements
to have escorts after dark, helped to limit feminine intrusion into that
space. The home was the appropriate designated and controlled place
for occupier women to exert their ancillary occupation power.
White women and ‘the Home’ as markers of ‘civilisation’
Australian women, particularly the wives of soldiers, were sent to Japan
as agents of ‘civilisation’ and ‘modernity’. ‘The Home’ is an integral
component of nationalist discourse in that it represents an imagined
microcosm of the dominant gender narratives of the nation, and the
occupier women in Japan were part of a ‘showcase’ of the perceived
superiority of western/Australian culture, as vindicated by victory in
Figure 5 Dependents’ housing built for BCOF families by Japanese labour in Niji-
mura, complete with western-style gardens and streets (Photo courtesy of
Mr Len Chapman, originally appearing in a publication for soldiers called
As You Were, published by the Australian War Memorial).
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war, through their role in a transplanted Australian domestic space.
The linking of the home to the state, the private-domestic to the pub-
lic-political, had also been an integral component of Japanese national-
ist discourse, with the idealised role of the housewife, or shufu, seen as
determining the quality of the home that in turn determined the qual-
ity of the nation – the ‘good wife, wise mother’ (ryo¯sai kenbo) discourse
(Uno 2005). Thus, the gendered national discourse of the occupier was
not very different from that of the now occupied when the Japanese
state had pursued its own imperialist/nationalistic vision in Asia and
the Pacific. This similarity was not acknowledged by the occupier, and
instead, the Japanese woman was framed by the occupier’s orientalist
stereotypes. In fact, in the discourse of the occupier, the entire history
of Meiji modernisation-westernisation was ignored and the occupied
instead were constructed as feudal, backward and barbaric. This dis-
course, or the silences within it, was necessary to justify the occupation
and the extraordinary levels of intervention into Japanese social, politi-
cal and economic life, and to claim victory for the Allies as based on a
‘good’ versus ‘evil’ dichotomy. The possible war crimes of the victors,
including the atomic and incendiary bombings of Japanese cities, were
thus also silenced, justified, or ‘whitewashed’.
Australian women as occupiers in their purpose-built occupier
homes combined to exhibit the occupier’s self-perceived superior civili-
sation – a ‘glass display case’ of Australian society and nation. Austra-
lian women were provided with a handbook called BCOF Bound to aid
them in their occupation role. The forward to this handbook informed
them that they were
bringing once more to members of the Force the ties of home
and family on which our Western civilization has been built.
You are coming to live in a country whose people, together with
their ways of living and their ways of thinking, are vastly differ-
ent from our own (AWM114 130/2/58 1947).
These women were further warned and simultaneously comforted:
Japan is still a primitive country populated by a primitive people,
and the Japanese scene is only partially coated with a thin ve-
neer of Occidental civilization.…
Initially, everything will be strange to you, but you will find that
as long as you conform to the various Occupation Force instruc-
tions and live the life of the community of which you are now a
member, life should be pleasant (AWM114 130/2/58 1947).
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The ‘community’ was the BCOF community and excluded the Japa-
nese, and ‘instructions’ included rules of non-fraternisation with Japa-
nese locals (other than for work purposes) and architectural segrega-
tion. The creation of segregated domestic spaces for the occupier wo-
men reinforced idealised notions of the Australian occupier woman as
more civilised than the occupied, and, at the same time, ostensibly pro-
tected her and her children – the future white Australian citizens –
from the ‘uncivilised’ ‘Other’.
Constructing self to ‘Other’: domestic workers and occupier
women
In occupied Japan, the Japanese government supplied female, and
some male, domestic workers to BCOF and their families. Domestic
workers’ wages were paid by the Japanese government, but the BCOF
Labour Unit allocated them to occupation families, barracks and dor-
mitories. Worker duties included housekeeping, cooking, childcare and
gardening. As a rough guide to the numbers employed, an Australian
officer without children was entitled to three, officers with children to
four, other ranks without children to two, other ranks with children to
three, and men in barracks or women in dormitories shared one or
two between them. Donnelly provides one reason for the use of domes-
tic labour: ‘it was considered undesirable for [Australian] wives to per-
form menial and domestic tasks, particularly as it was thought that
they would be unable to cope with such duties in the hot, humid
months’ (1994: 111).6 The types of work undertaken were an expression
of occupation power relations. Domestic and other forms of labour
were generally considered the work of the occupied, while occupiers
served in supervisory roles. The treatment of domestic workers was
subject to the post-war labour reforms and workers were entitled to a
forty-hour week, paid leave of two days per month, three days of men-
strual leave per month, and six weeks pre-and-post natal leave. They re-
ceived between ¥150-250 a month. It is difficult to determine from the
available records how well these rights were upheld. It can be sur-
mised, however, that the unequal power relationship, occupier/occu-
pied and victor/vanquished, allowed at least some violations to be over-
looked or excused, and prevented some workers from making com-
plaints against their employers. Domestic workers were required to
undergo regular medical examinations to check for contagious and
sexually transmitted diseases (Donnelly 1994) (the Japanese woman as
unclean/diseased and immoral), and if they failed the test, they could
lose their jobs (Warner-Bishop 2006).7
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Many Australians in the 1940s still aspired to be more British, and
the Occupation gave them an opportunity to pretend this through the
‘rituals of domesticity’ in a racialised/occupied domestic space (McClin-
tock 1995: 35-36). Race, class and gender combined to inform the Aus-
tralian female occupier’s role. As Hobsbawm has noted, the ‘widest de-
finition of the middle class … was that of keeping domestic servants’
(cited in McClintock 1995: 85). Most Australian women were unlikely
to have domestic workers in their homes in Australia, but the Occupa-
tion allowed them to ‘class jump’ through a transient, upward mobility.
Domestic workers were constructed as the inferior ‘Other’ in that do-
mestic space, where the occupier woman could perform on a daily ba-
sis the idealised role of the victorious, civilised, superior self – a self
that also contributed to the wider nationalist discourse of Australia as
victor nation in Japan. The occupier woman could perform occupation
power over occupied women and men and enjoy a privileged, high-sta-
tus lifestyle that she would have been unlikely to have had in Australia.
She could play the role of the ‘coloniser’ and participate in a (declining)
British Empire.
The relationship constructed between Japanese and Australian wo-
men in the domestic occupation space conforms to Anderson’s descrip-
tion of Victorian English ‘values’:
The employment of domestic workers meant women could ne-
gotiate the contradiction between domesticity, requiring physical
labour and dirtiness, and the cleanliness and spirituality of femi-
nine virtue. ‘Ladies’ need servants … once established this rela-
tionship helped to maintain difference: workers proved their in-
feriority by their physicality and dirt, while female employers
proved their superiority by their femininity, daintiness, and
managerial skills (Anderson 2000: 18).
The Occupation hierarchy was further reinforced through language, in-
cluding references to domestic workers as one’s ‘servants’. That is, even
though the workers were paid by the Japanese government, possession
was taken of the domestic worker and justified by Australia’s status as
an occupier. Discursive distinctions between white Australian women
as occupiers and Japanese occupied reflected that of the master-slave
relationship. As Anderson describes of southern slavery in the United
States, the ‘master gains honour through the slaves dishonour,’ and in
Japan that dishonour came with defeat and was reinforced through the
types of tasks and duties the Japanese performed for the occupiers
(2000: 143). ‘Servants’ in the home raised the status of the white occu-
pier women. This status was discursively reinforced by the widespread
use of ‘housegirl’ or ‘houseboy’ to describe domestic workers in occu-
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pier homes. These diminutive labels were an integral part of Western
colonial discourse where a woman is described as a girl and a man as
a boy, and constructed and named the unequal domestic relationship
between the occupier and the occupied. These terms removed the indi-
vidual identity of the Japanese worker, their personal and family name,
and instead referred to them through a ‘labour category’… and the
identity of servitude’ (McClintock 1995: 268), thus further reinforcing
their lower status as the vanquished.
Having a domestic worker allowed Australian occupier women to pur-
sue other ‘middle-class’ activities during the Occupation that she usual-
ly could not have participated in, at least not as often. She could play
tennis, go on outings with her family, host a cocktail party or engage
in philanthropic activities. Domestic help ‘liberated’ her from house-
hold chores and childcare responsibilities. The occupation wives also
often acted in the orientalist role of ‘tutor’ to their domestic workers,
teaching Western ways of housekeeping. One BCOF child remembers
her mother teaching their domestic workers about housekeeping and
cooking:
Figure 6 Ruth Warner-Bishop outside her Nijimura home standing over her three
Japanese domestic workers (c. 1947) (photo courtesy of Ruth Warner-
Bishop).
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I remember how they watched with surprise when my mother
made her deliciously light sponge cake. How did that sloppy
mixture become that beautiful cake? There were several comical
results from misunderstood directions from my mother. I recall
some confusion about the starching of my father’s uniform
which eventuated in his undies also being starched (Ladyga
2004: 10).
Through this relationship, Australian women participated in the wider
occupation discourse and practice of democratisation/westernisation by
extending it to the domestic space, thus taking the public/political aims
of military occupation into the private space of the Home.
Women’s newspapers in Australia reflected orientalist stereotypes
and the privileged role of Australian women as occupier. A group of
Australian nurses interviewed on their way to Japan said that they were
‘hopeful of getting Japanese labour to do their washing’ (Powe 1946:
17). They were not disappointed, but some took on the role of ‘tutor’ to
the occupied ‘Other’. In a follow up article, it was noted that ‘Jap girls
[sic] wash out the quarters using plenty of water and much energy, but
Sister Kath O’Bryan gave some in our dormitory a lesson on the correct
technique’ (Drain 1946: 19). Another article, titled ‘Shopping in Japan
presents few difficulties,’ proudly declared: ‘No crowds. No queues. No
waiting. Instead a carefully planned system to make their [Australian
women’s] lot happy and comfortable’. Australian women came with
‘their shopping lists and housegirls’ (Jackson 1948). The article implied
that Australian women were ‘making it big’ on the world-occupation
stage, and the role of the occupied was to serve the Australian women.
However, another article lamented:
Japanese servants have been so accustomed to paying deference
to boys that it’s just as well [Australian] fathers are around to
counteract their indulgence.
Sensible parents are keeping the training of their children in
their own hands (Australian Women’s Weekly 1947).
There was a perceived negative side to the presence of domestic work-
ers in occupier’s home where there were children – the Japanese could
corrupt that ‘home and family on which … Western civilisation has
been built’ with their ‘feudal’ ways, potentially affecting idealised Aus-
tralian gender roles. Overall, the articles informed their female reader-
ship of the positives and perils of occupation life for Australian wo-
men, but, more importantly, participated in a discourse that privileged
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an Australian female self as constructed against the inferior female Ja-
panese ‘Other’.
Domestic workers were often the only source of contact with the Ja-
panese for many Australian women as they were forbidden to have any
other contact, such as informal socialising.8 Relationships often devel-
oped between Australian and Japanese women, and also between
BCOF children and their Japanese caretakers. For instance, one Austra-
lian woman recalled that she ‘really liked the Japanese, especially the
old mama-sans, they were really nice and they were lovely to the chil-
dren. Our housegirls were really good … we had young housegirls and
… they really enjoyed the children’ (O’Brien 2006). Gifts were often ex-
changed and sometimes contact was maintained, at least for a short
while, after the family returned to Australia. The development of bonds
between domestic workers and their employers is common everywhere,
but Anderson points out that it is still an asymmetrical, ‘maternalistic’
relationship: ‘Maternalism is based on the supraordinate-subordinate
relationship with the female employer caring for the worker as she
would a child or a pet, thereby expressing, in a feminized way, her lack
of respect for the domestic worker as an adult worker’ (2000: 144).
For Australian women, one of the positive legacies of close contact
with Japanese women (and men) was that at the same time that stereo-
typical gendered, raced and classed images of the Japanese were rein-
forced to construct a national and self image of the Australian woman
as victor and occupier, other stereotypes were challenged or subverted.
When they returned to Australia, many Australian women spoke about
Japan and the Japanese in a positive way, which shocked and disap-
pointed many other Australians who were still influenced by wartime
images and orientalist stereotypes. Rose O’Brien conducted talks about
Japan to the Country Women’s Association (CWA), a conservative rural
women’s organisation, when she returned to Australia:
they used to be amazed that I spoke kindly of the Japanese be-
cause their idea was of the war and all the very vindictive things
that had happened during the war, that’s what I felt, I felt that I
could speak as I knew them. … I felt we were giving them first
hand information which I was able to project to them instead of
the suppositions that they had before we went away.
I used to tell them [CWA] how I was living in Japan and they
used to wonder how I could speak decently about the Japanese.
They thought it was stupid, they thought that there was no way
you could speak nicely about the Japanese at all and yet living
with them made you feel like that…because you saw them in a
different light (2006).
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Thus, the positive legacy of the Occupation and contact between Aus-
tralian women and their domestic workers was that Australian women
(and men) acted as a vanguard of changed attitudes towards the Japa-
nese in post-war Australia. Their experiences in Hiroshima allowed
them to deconstruct many of the stereotypical cultural representations
of the Japanese that had been created and exacerbated by fear, racism
and war.
Many Australian women were reluctant to leave the ‘British style,
upper-class colonial lifestyle’ behind to return to Australia after their
sojourn in Japan had ended (Woodward 2006). One Australian woman
upon returning to Japan said: ‘We wives all wondered what we were
heading for in Japan, but none of us imagined things would be so nice’
(source provided by Hogg, c. 1950). The Melbourne Sun reported that
‘Many Australian wives in Japan would be reluctant to leave their com-
fortable home and abundant home help for a servantless Australia’
(Melbourne Sun 1950). But, despite the fond relationships that devel-
oped between many Australian and Japanese women, their positions in
the Occupation power hierarchy were never contested. As one Austra-
lian woman informed, ‘they [Japanese domestic workers] were a thing
apart from us, if you know what I mean … they were just treated as the
servants. … A lot of us were possibly nice to them as we weren’t used
to people as servants all the time’ (O’Brien 2006). There is little, if any,
evidence of awareness amongst Australian female occupiers of the
‘emancipation’ of Japanese women, an aim of, and a justification for,
the Allied Occupation of Japan. Rather, it is the power that they re-
member: ‘we were the “top dog” over there’; ‘we were the head of the
occupation forces’; ‘there was a superiority feeling of “we are the occu-
piers”’; ‘we were the ones they had to kowtow down to’ (O’Brien 2006;
Olney 2006). The main role of occupied women, particularly in the do-
mestic space, was to reinforce the status and power of occupier women
and, ultimately, that of the Australian nation.
Conclusions and postscript
An examination of Australian women as occupiers, and especially their
relationship with Japanese women as domestic workers, reveals a num-
ber of factors. First, it demonstrates the imperative of increased social
and class status for Australian women offered by the Occupation (albeit
a transient one). Australian women constructed a national image and a
self-image in relation to the Japanese ‘Other’, one that distracted them
from their own subordinate position in Australian society in terms of
gender and class. Second, it demonstrates the racialised, neo-colonial
attitudes prevalent in the Occupation, not just at Occupation centres
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such as Tokyo, but within the daily practices and interactions between
occupier and occupied at the grassroots level.
Third, Australian women were constructed as ‘bearers of morality
and modernity’, the Japanese women as traditional, oppressed, submis-
sive, and in need of tuition by the ‘modern’ Australian woman. This in-
cludes the construction of the occupied ‘Other’ as the inferior other
through language as well as practice – ‘servants’, ‘girls’, ‘boys’, and
‘Japs’. Fourth, the Occupation reinforced orientalist racial stereotypes
previously held (even contradictory ones) – clean, dirty, submissive, ar-
rogant, child-like, dangerous, and warlike – and, at the same time,
challenged previous stereotypes and even changed attitudes towards
the Japanese from those of wartime propaganda to one that at least ac-
knowledged the humanity of the Japanese people.
Lastly, the role of the occupied domestic worker in Australian occupier
homes served to construct and reinforce a wider narrative of Australian
national identity as victor nation through the performance of the victor
over the vanquished in the domestic realm. This representation evoked
the dominant gender stereotypes in Australian national narratives, in-
cluding, for Australian women, the middle-class imaginary of the wo-
man in the home serving family and nation. Victory in war had en-
hanced this imaginary further to allow the Australian woman a num-
ber of domestic ‘servants’ and thus she could participate in the wider
collective imagining of a strong Australian post-war nation and, concur-
rently, in the British empire with its privileged ‘colonial lifestyle’. But
what of the legacy of Japanese women and men in these domestic oc-
cupation encounters? Perhaps most informative is the fate of the BCOF
family village of Nijimura – bulldozed and replaced today by an indus-
trial complex and hospital.9 The erasure of the physical memory of the
occupier silences the difficult, probably humiliating, public and private
memories of the occupied, especially those of the workers in the do-
mestic space of occupier homes. ‘Nijimura’ has now been relabelled
with a more palatable public memory that instead narrates the success
of Japan’s post-war economic and industrial growth.
Notes
1 This essay is based on a paper presented at ICAS 5, Kuala Lumpur, 2-5 August 2007.
Some parts also appear in De Matos, ‘A very gendered Occupation: Australian women
as ‘conquerors’ and ‘liberators’, US-Japan Women’s Journal, 33, 2007: 87-112, and De
Matos, ‘Gender, nation and power in occupied Japan’, part of a forthcoming collection
of essays on Australia and military occupations, edited by De Matos & Gerster, to be
published by Cambridge Scholars Publishing (2009).
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2 The end date for the Australian presence in Hiroshima prefecture was actually 1956,
as part of the British Commonwealth Force Korea (BCFK), which replaced the BCOF
after the peace treaty was signed in 1952.
3 This is the statistic usually given, however, there is some dispute over its accuracy
and whether it includes only service personnel, or also their families and other civi-
lian occupiers.
4 Note that the original words pertaining to colony/colonial/colonisation in this quote
have been replaced by ‘occupation’ to demonstrate the synchronicity between gen-
dered power relations in colonial and occupation settings.
5 Other early statistics on housing suggest the following: 80 houses erected at Etajima;
157 at Hiro; 55 at Okayama; 41 at Iwakuni; and 5 at Tokushima (total of 348) (AWM
114: 130/1/23 Pt II, 1947).
6 There was a similar idea about Australian women unable to work in tropical condi-
tions amongst the Australian colonial residents in Papua and New Guinea. See Chilla
Bulbeck (1992), Australian Women in Papua New Guinea: Colonial Passages 1920-1960.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 64.
7 A domestic worker in the household of Mrs Warner-Bishop lost her job this way (the
decision was made by male BCOF authorities, not Mrs Warner-Bishop, who regretted
losing a good worker).
8 There were some instances where this rule was broken, particularly by the Australian
women who worked for the YWCA in Kure, who often developed closer relationships
with Japanese women. However, these relationships were still marked by the inevita-
ble power inequities that existed between occupier and occupied.
9 Only the original Nijimura park remains and is now used for baseball games.
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Decolonisation and the Origin of Military
Business in Indonesia1
Bambang Purwanto
Military business has been an attractive theme for foreign and local re-
searchers in the literature on Indonesia, especially those studying Indo-
nesian politics and Indonesian political economy during the New Or-
der (Robison 1986; Muhaimin 1990; Iswandi 1998; Samego et al.
1998; Singh 2001; Widoyoko et al. 2003). The abovementioned studies
tend to suggest that military business evolved and operated solely dur-
ing the New Order, a time of military dominance in the socio-political
life of the country. Those who do discuss pre-New Order military busi-
ness tend to argue that the earliest of Indonesia’s military business oc-
curred no earlier than 1950, and developed especially during the period
of the 1950s when the nationalisation policies, nasionalisasi, were en-
acted.
Harold Crouch’s text on the Indonesian military business, one of the
earliest studies ever conducted on the topic, clearly concurs with the
general opinion that the 1950s were the starting point for military busi-
ness in Indonesia (Crouch 1975/1976). Even further, Richard Robison’s
oft-quoted book explicitly avoids the economic reality of the period
1945-1949. To Robison, the discussion of the process of early capital
formation and military involvement in Indonesian economic and politi-
cal history only needed to start with colonial capitalism and the failure
of domestic private capital in the period 1948-1957. Robison also con-
siders the period of the Japanese occupation and the subsequent revo-
lution to be of no value to the country’s economic history (Robison
1986). Even in the two chapters discussing the period of 1949-1965,
Robison is mostly silent on the topic of military business, despite the
fact that he argues that the most significant development of the rela-
tion between power and capital occurring from 1957 to 1965 was the
emergence of the military as the most powerful ‘politico-bureaucratic’
force in the country (Robison 1986). Instead, Robison focuses more on
political party business activities, indigenous entrepreneurs, and gov-
ernment economic policies. A similar rendering can furthermore be
seen in two books published in Indonesia, which admit the importance
of the period of 1945-1949 for the process of Indonesian military busi-
ness formation. Unfortunately, not much information on military busi-
ness can be gleaned from the two books in question (Samego et al.
1998; Widoyoko et al. 2003). Despite the fragmentary facts, several stu-
dies have shown that the process of military involvement in the eco-
nomic and capital formation process occurred during an even earlier
period, in conjunction with the process of decolonisation since the
middle of August 1945.
This paper will discuss the formation of Indonesian military busi-
ness during the process of decolonisation between 1945 and the early
1960s. Despite the fact that the Dutch relented and officially acknowl-
edged Indonesia’s independence in 1949, and despite the differences
of opinion among historians as to the status of Indonesia’s indepen-
dence prior to the signing of the Round Table Conferent, one undeni-
able fact remains, that the early process of Indonesian decolonisation,
politically, socially and economically, started immediately after Soekar-
no and M. Hatta proclaimed Indonesia independent on 17 August
1945. Several basic questions arise from this, such as: When did the In-
donesian military first become involved in the practical economic and
capital formation initiatives? Why did the Indonesian military conduct
business functions outside of its core function as an institution of de-
fence? Who or what military groups conducted these businesses? Were
there different goals among the various military departments in their
responses to the opportunities available for conducting business?
Generally speaking, the decolonisation process leading to the weak-
ening of colonial influence and a strengthening of the identity and
authority of Indonesia’s character between 1945 and the early 1960s
can be divided into at least five general periods: First, we have the short
period between the proclamation of Indonesian independence and the
coming of the Dutch-Allied troops. Second, we have the war period,
starting with the arrival of Allied-Dutch troops, and ending in the ac-
knowledgement of independence in 1949. Third, we have the period of
the Republik Indonesia Serikat (RIS), until just prior to the adoption of
the state of war and siege policy. Fourth, is the period starting with the
widespread takeover of Western, especially Dutch, economic assets in
1957. Fifth, is the period after the nasionalisasi policy had been officially
introduced. This is why this essay, in contrast with previous studies
that focus on the development of the Indonesian military business only
through the lens of the dwifungsi (dual function) principle (Singh
2001), will also address the significant meaning of decolonisation for
the formation of the Indonesian military business complex of the next
period. The word military or soldier in this text will not only cover the
official military apparatus through its evolutionary transformation from
the Badan Keamanan Rakyat (BKR), Tentara Keamanan Rakyat (TKR),
Tentara Rakyat Indonesia (TRI) to the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI),
but also armed groups such as youth militias involved within the deco-
lonisation process.
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The war and the emergence of the military business
The process of Indonesian decolonisation resulted in the creation of a
unique historical creature in the form of the Indonesian military, un-
ique in comparison with the military history of most other Western co-
lonial possessions in Asia. On the one hand, the creation of the BKR
on 22 August 1945 and the TKR on 5 October 1945, as the initial or-
gans that formed the Tentara National Indonesia, did not come from
groups that fought for independence during the colonial period. Nor
was it a continuation of the previous colonial army, neither personnel-
wise nor institutional-wise. Although the BKR and TKR members were
sociologically a combination of the manpower trained in the military
during the colonial period and the Japanese occupation, these soldiers
had never fought against the colonial rulers to uphold independence.
Suddenly, however, they faced new challenges that forced them to work
together with newly armed civilian groups, in order to fight against
their former Japanese and Dutch masters who were aided by the Allied
British, to once again shore up colonial power after the proclamation
of Indonesian independence by civilian leaders.
In the context of the Indonesian national enlistment movement, the
war suddenly transformed the army from what was once a sociological
and political non-existence, into one of the most dominant aspects in
the formation of the image and identity of Indonesian nationhood. Ci-
vilian politicians, in the process of creating Indonesian nationalism
forty years prior, had to face the fact that their role had been margina-
lised or replaced because of the war. The war made the military into
the new symbol of Indonesian nationalism and, at the same time,
made them the new dominant elite of the country. As explained above,
the state of affairs could only happen because Indonesia’s early decolo-
nisation process had to deal with a stronger military opponent bent on
recreating Western colonial dominance. This was further enforced by
the sociological impact of the Japanese occupation and the formation
of a new elite and socio-cultural conditions which were adapted to the
subsequent war.
During the war, personnel and institutional consolidation of the In-
donesian military occurred. The various differences inherited from the
diverse social and ideological backgrounds, and the unique role played
by the army in protecting the independence movement, has, on the
one hand, resulted in political conflict and competition within the
army itself and with other parties as well, including the government.
On the other hand, the military grew to become a corporation that not
only functioned as an institution of the state that handled protection
and defense, but also conducted matters of practical politics, bureau-
cracy and economy. Under Soedirman’s leadership, the Indonesian
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military since its inception identified itself as the representative of the
people while at the same time functioning as an apparatus of the state
responsible for the freedom of the newly proclaimed Indonesian state
and a party that would ensure independence (Said 1991). Its civilian
policies were clearly mirrored by the principle of the system of total
popular defense and security, sistem pertahanan dan keamanann rakyat
semesta.
The combination of the civilian and military roles of the soldier as a
freedom fighter started as early as the BKR period, not after the forma-
tion of the TKR as many experts believe. Many believe that the BKR
had neither a military organisation in place nor a clear recruitment pol-
icy, and thus could not be called an army in its own right. However
looking at the development of the BKR on the regional level, such as
the development engineered by Soedirman in Banyumas, A.K. Gani in
South Sumatra or Dahlan Jambek in West Sumatra, it is difficult to
maintain that the BKR was an unstructured armed organisation with-
out a command line. In many areas, the BKR functioned as more than
just as a keeper of the peace and also engaged in active self-defense
against foreign enemies that threatened its borders. Although the BKR
membership was mostly dominated by young people with military
training gained during the Japanese occupation, in other areas, it was
very difficult to distinguish between the BKR and the youth militias or
struggling organisations, or those who were members of the provi-
sional parliament of Komite Nasional Indonesia (KNI) in charge of run-
ning the civilian government.
Besides acting as soldiers, BKR members and the militias were routi-
nely involved in political, social and economic activities. Most members
of the KNI in regional areas were also members of the BKR or militias.
On the other hand, the Hizbullah or Barisan Pelopor, militarily trained
under the Japanese, also had people with dual membership in the BKR
and KNI. Nationally speaking, historical facts have also proven that the
TKR was merely a superficial transformation of the BKR, given that
the ranks and certain fixed structures accorded with the professional
military organisation. One prominent historical fact that needs to be
considered is that almost all of the TKR units in the regions formed
after 5 October 1945 came from the BKR. The TKR commanders, in-
cluding Soedirman in Banyumas, had been BKR commanders.
Furthermore, the formation of the TKR as an official army did not in-
stantly mean that the armed youth groups or militias affiliated with
certain political or ideological powers would disappear (Purwanto
2000).
The decolonisation process placed the army in a dominant position
and led to a lack of separation between the military and civilian sectors;
this played an important role in determining the involvement of the
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military in the nation’s economic sector. This process was furthered
along by battles with the Dutch army that weakened Indonesia’s civi-
lian government and its ability to function effectively following the arri-
val of the Allied forces at the end of September 1945. The government
actually had to be moved from Jakarta to Yogyakarta on January 1946.
As the war raged on, logistical support was needed to uphold the gov-
ernment, the people and especially the army, both the formal units and
the militias. According to current historical records, logistics were pro-
vided exclusively via community support because of the Dutch block-
ade. This statement is not entirely incorrect, but through further inves-
tigation, we discover that the statement functions more as a proof of
community support for the military than as an accurate view of the lar-
ger situation. The statement basically disregards other aspects that in-
dicate various sources used for logistic support, the conduct of the gov-
ernment and continuance of the armed struggle. One of these was the
involvement of the army in the economic arena, whether that was large
or small, legal or illegal.
The involvement of the army – both official and the militia – in the
management of economic resources began when the BKR and subse-
quently TKR members and the militia in many areas took over strate-
gic economic sources such as factories, telephone offices, estates,
power generators and installations, transport companies, mines, and
various daily necessities previously controlled by the Japanese army.
In Wonosobo, Central Java, for example, the military took over the
Dutch privately owned tea estates and factories from the Japanese, who
had used these tea facilities to supplement their economic needs dur-
ing the occupation. In Yogyakarta, the military took over the Dutch-
owned tool factories and even requisitioned several Chinese owned
companies, factories and warehouses. Similar events occurred in many
other cities such as Surabaya, Semarang, Surakarta, Cirebon, Jakarta,
Palembang, Padang, Medan and Makassar. Some of these armed forces
even acted as if they were official branches of the Indonesian govern-
ment, despite the fact that their actions were mostly focused on perso-
nal or group economic gains.
The important role of the military in Indonesia’s economy can also
be clearly seen in the distribution of the Indonesian currency, the
Oeang Repoeblik Indonesia (ORI) in October 1946. Other similar curren-
cies were issued by various regions to replace the Japanese currency
and compete with that issued by the Netherlands Indies Civil Adminis-
tration (NICA). The chaos and confusion caused by each region trying
to print and circulate their own currenciy led to the involvement of
practical economic activities in several regions. For instance, when the
Oeang Repoeblik Indonesia Propinsi Sumatra (ORIPS) started printing
money in Bukittingi, after being moved from Pematang Siantar, the
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printing of currency came under the direct control of local military lea-
ders (Zed 1997). Although the civilian government and local banking
authorities formally kept an eye on these activities, in reality no explicit
control over military management of currency printing, which was
needed to meet the needs of each region, was ever implemented. In
fact, in several places, the army purposefully produced low quality cur-
rency, using ink that had a tendency to wash away easily. Consequently,
this resulted in unavoidable inflation as too much money was pro-
duced with no control (Zed 2003; Kahin 1997).
Other episodes, in other areas, also show how military involvement
in the economy was an important fact of decolonisation as a whole, in
areas such as Sumatra and Sulawesi. For instance, although A.K. Gani,
resident of Palembang after the proclamation of independence, was a
civilian, he was also a major general and held the title of Coordinator
of the Sumatra Military since November 1945 (Zed 2003). His double
function resulted in the absence of a clear division between civilian
and military involvement in the economic activities of Palembang and
other parts of Sumatra within his jurisdiction. In reality, the military
played an important role not just on the battlefield against Dutch mili-
tary action, but also fielding the area of fund raising to support the ac-
tivities of the civilian government and the military struggle. This is
clearly shown in the ‘oil diplomacy’ policy and the presence of ‘oil mili-
tias’ and ‘oil battalions’ that made quite a few economic contributions
to both the local and the central government. The fund acquisition
through tax and tariffs, known as the iuran perang (war contribution),
was conducted by the local government of West Sumatra, which was
dependent on the military and had to justify its actions before the local
military leader; this was another example of military involvement in
the business activities of Sumatra.
One very important policy issued by A.K. Gani in support of military
business in Palembang was the creation of a Liaison Body, a body
formed in January 1947 to function as a liaison for oil and coal sales
and to distribute the vital needs of the Indonesian government and
military (Zed 2003). A.K. Gani also gave opportunities to many young
TRI officers to conduct trading activities through the Usaha Muda, an
organisation fully under the control of the military leaders situated at
Bukittinggi. The policies he had chosen had become a stimulant for
the creation of military-owned corporation groups that controlled a
large part of Sumatra’s trade economy. Other trade organisations, such
as Soematera Import and Export (SOEIMEX), which had subsequently
been formed and become an important element in Palembang’s econo-
my, were also part of the military influence. A similar thing occurred
when the Central Trading Corporation and the Sumatra Banking and
Trading Corporation (SBTC) was formed in 1948. The trading organi-
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sations were under the control of army traders who had also assumed
the role of military leaders in each area. This can be verified by merely
looking at the military-dominated board of directors of each trading
company, with members coming from both the army and navy (Zed
2003).
In South Sulawesi and surrounding areas, the various militias,
such as Laskar Pemberontak Republik Indonesia Sulawesi Selatan (LA-
PRIS) and Badan Pemberontak Republik Indonesia (BPRI), focussed on
the city of Pare Pare, and were involved in inter-island trade, especially
in numerous areas in Kalimantan and Surabaya, and with trading in
the Sulawesi area. Copra was a major commodity traded by army
groups at the time. Moreover, many BPRI army groups, for instance,
had run other businesses such as land and sea transport companies,
grocery stores, and even a barbershop. While the other groups of sol-
diers incorporated within the Gabungan Pemberontak Indonesia Soppeng
(GAPPIS) had done the same. Besides copra, the military had also
brought coffee and rice up to Kalimantan to sell or trade for other ne-
cessities, including firearms. Although the military groups were for-
mally integrated into the TRI in January 1947, the business activities of
these groups did not cease (Limbagau 2000). There is even strong evi-
dence to suggest that the business activities of the military widened in
conjunction with the organisational consolidation and the appearance
of young officers capable of taking advantage of the condition of mili-
tary dominance for business gains, whether for their men or for perso-
nal gains.
The presence of oil diplomacy, oil militias and oil battalions, as sta-
ted above, is important to keep in mind when we reconstruct and ex-
plain the important role of the military in large-scale economic pro-
cesses during decolonisation. As Mestika Zed notes, since the year
1946 ‘the role of the militias and the TRI was no longer warfare, but
actually trading and other productive activities for logistical support
and supplies for civilian and the military of all the areas of Sumatra’
(Zed 2003). The military controlled all of the productive oil fields and
oil refineries present in the hinterland of South Sumatra, including its
distribution. They not only supplied the oil for all of South Sumatra,
but also for the republic’s supporters in West Sumatra and Java.
Although the Plaju and Sungai Gerong oil refineries were handed over
to the allies in the month of August 1946, the military’s oil business
continued unabated in many other oil-producing areas in the interior.
Therefore it comes as no surprise that the period was coloured by the
appearance of ‘oil barons’ in the many oil producing areas of South Su-
matra who also happened to be military rulers of the areas. Prabumu-
lih, an area controlled by the republican army, which also functioned
as the Second TRI Division command headquarter, developed to be-
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come the main centre of Indonesian oil production in the Palembang
area at the start of 1947 under the management of Perusahaan Minyak
Republik Indonesia (PERMIRI), an oil company dominated by the mili-
tary. The same situation was paralleled in Aceh and East Sumatra. The
Indonesian Army controlled oil production and distribution in the area
through the oil company Perusahaan Tambang Minyak Negara Republik
Indonesia (PTMNRI). In the subsequent development, most of the indi-
viduals involved in the oil business had military backgrounds; people
like Hasymi A. Taher and Ibnu Sutowo headed the state oil company,
Permina, which eventually became the present-day Pertamina.
In other areas, the military also played an important role in the area
of barter trade, especially the trade between Sumatra and the trade area
along the Malay Peninsula, in particular Singapore (Yong 1997; Much-
tar, ed. 1992). Audrey Kahin in one of her books wrote that through
the first years after the proclamation of independence, barter trade be-
tween West Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula was effectively domi-
nated by the IX Army Division centred in Bukittinggi (Kahin 2003). In
exchange, aside from providing daily provisions, the soldiers in the di-
vision also supplied guns and distributed them to the republican resis-
tance groups, as they had done in Riau through Pekanbaru. In Palem-
bang, these trader-soldiers succeeded in making rubber, coffee and qui-
nine a lucrative economic source capable of contributing a large sum
of money to the republic, aside from the traditional oil and coal. Aside
from the above commodities, opium also became one of the major
trade items to cross the Malacca Strait. Sumatran opium traded via the
Strait by the army, but, according to Dutch intelligence, Javanese
opium was brought in as well. In Java, Dutch military intelligence re-
ports that many of the regular and militia army, including those under
the command of Soeharto regularly traded opium from Yogyakarta in
the centre of the Republic, to occupied territories in cooperation with
Chinese middlemen (Elson 2001).
The explanation above attempts to prove that the business activities
conducted by the military during that period not only built up a strong
economic source for local military rulers, but also had a huge political
influence that would greatly affect the trajectory of the next period. The
involvement of the military in economic activities cannot be explained
away as the mere activities of a war economy; instead, it prospered to
become a large business on both group and individual levels in the per-
iod after Dutch recognition of the Indonesian independence, a new
phase in Indonesia’s decolonisation.
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The final stage of decolonisation, chaos and the strengthening of
military business
In conjunction with the cessation of hostilities, the Dutch acceptance
in December 1949 of Indonesian independence and the unilateral dis-
solution of the United States of Indonesia in 1950 marks a new period
of Indonesian decolonisation. Economically speaking, on the one hand,
there was a great desire by the Indonesian government and community
to change the present colonial economy into a national economy con-
current to the rising dominance of the nationalists. But, on the other
hand, in a relatively short period time, the dominance of foreign cor-
porations in the economy was again cemented as a result of the weak-
nesses inherent in the state and local businessmen in running the lo-
cal economy. That is why two major patterns marked the macro-eco-
nomic decolonisation process after 1950. First, the takeovers of
corporations previously owned by the colonial government into a public
or state company were conducted, whether they were compensated or
not. Aside from Bank Indonesia, acquired from de Javasche Bank,
most of the other large corporations were public utilities such as the
trains, ports, bus transport, water supply, post offices, telephone com-
panies, pawnshops, electricity company, and hospitals, while the rest
were commercial companies. Second, there was support for the devel-
opment of indigenous Indonesian businessmen, leading to an indigen-
isation or pribumisasi policy (Sutter 1959; Robison 1986; Muhaimin
1990).
The policy of takeovers and pribumisasi provided a good opportunity
for the military to get involved in business after 1950. This condition
was strengthened by the fact that the government was unable to pro-
vide sufficient funds for the costs of military operations. The pribumisa-
si policy within the Benteng Policy tried to limit the opportunities of
Chinese businessmen. In fact, however, it did not seriously affect their
role in the economy. With some exceptions, these policies had an im-
pact on producing dependent groups or individuals of military or indi-
genous civilian businessmen, rather than independent indigenous mer-
chant capitalists. The military not only functioned as patrons but also
as actors directly involved in the economic activity of the time. The pol-
icy of giving preferential license to indigenous copra traders to compete
with their Chinese counterpart in other areas of Sulawesi, for instance,
inadvertently created a trading alliance between the military and Chi-
nese traders, and the increasing strength of local individual military
leaders in business activities. The cooperation paved the way for the
trading of copra between Sulawesi and Singapore. In fact, after several
more years, similar business ventures involving the military and Chi-
nese middlemen appeared in many other areas. Using the excuse of
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routine and military operations and soldier welfare costs as reason to
seek funds, the military business activities, which involved most of the
local elite military rulers, developed to become a neat and profitable
commercial enterprise. This is why, to a certain extent, the decolonisa-
tion process must be considered an important factor used to justify the
military business activities.
The opportunity for soldiers to conduct business activities widened
as a result of political conflict and labour problems in some areas,
creating uncontrollable security conditions from the start of the 1950s
in several areas such as West Java, Central Java, the Moluccas, most of
Sulawesi, Aceh and North Sumatra. Armed political conflict involving
Andi Aziz and Kahar Muzakkar in South Sulawesi, for instance, re-
sulted in the control of the trade in copra, rice and other daily necessi-
ties by one of the battalions in the VII Territory Army. The army forced
the growers of copra, rice and other export commodity crops to sell
their produce cheaply to certain companies chosen by the military or
directly to the military itself. The military also forbade the populace to
sell their produce to other parties and did not hesitate to react violently
against those who were connected to other buyers, or did not want to
sell their produce. There is even some evidence that the army or their
henchmen themselves harvested coconuts from growers’ fields, taking
the coconuts and turning them into copra from growers’ groves left un-
attended because of unsafe conditions. Moreover, the military also had
trading companies centred in Majene and controlled the import and ex-
port trade between Sulawesi and Singapore, so it is no surprise that
the battalion was renowned as the ‘dollar battalion’ (Limbugau 2000).
The involvement of the military in the business arena became more
widespread as the government decided to proclaim a state of emer-
gency and war in the country in the first quarter of 1957, being the re-
sult of the appearance of armed movements in Sumatra and Sulawesi,
increasingly uncontrollable labour problems and land conflicts, and the
fall of the elected 1955 cabinet lead by Ali Sastroamidjojo in the month
of March 1957. These business ventures gained even stronger legiti-
macy after the diplomatic failure of Indonesia on the matters of West
Papua (Irian) in the United Nations, the issuing of the 5 July 1959 Pre-
sidential Decree, and the start of the confrontation with Malaysia. Simi-
lar to the hostile conditions after the proclamation of Independence
and the arrival of the Allied-Dutch troops, the declaration of a state of
war and emergency, long running conflicts among civilian politicians
and political instability that interfered with the next phase of decoloni-
sation, gave the military a very important position, since the situation
provided them with political as well as social and economic authority.
In Semarang, for example, Soeharto devised an economic policy and
founded an institution to run the businesses of the Diponegoro divi-
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sion, explained as a fund raiser needed for the troops to keep guard
over the safety of the country and sustain Indonesia’s sovereignty. Dur-
ing a fairly limited time, several companies that ran various forms of
businesses – agricultural trading, fishing, shipping lines and sugar fac-
tories, all of which involved Chinese businessmen – were able to pro-
vide lucrative profits for the Diponegoro Division. It is therefore no sur-
prise that at the beginning of 1959, the capital owned by the corpora-
tion reached 35 million rupiah, or the equivalent of a little less than
eight hundred thousand US dollars (Elson 2001). Besides the official
businesses, the development of the Diponegoro Division military busi-
ness was also supported by the ability to manage illegal barter trade in
the form of sugar traded for rice between Semarang and Singapore. In
connection with the capital accumulation of the Diponegoro Division
above, not all of it was conducted openly or officially. There is evidence
that shows that many military businessmen in many other parts of In-
donesia consciously created a condition whereby civilian traders, espe-
cially Chinese traders, had to pay certain forms of taxes or levies for
each economic activity they conducted, apart from the official taxes
they paid to the government. Furthermore, civilian traders also faced
conditions that forced them to build alliances with the military busi-
nessmen. This clearly shows that manipulation and corruption had al-
ways been the hallmarks of military business, and was always consid-
ered a normal thing from the very start.
Robert Elson, in his biography of Soeharto, notes in connection with
Soeharto and the Chinese businessmen that the business development
of the Diponegoro Division was not so much determined by the perso-
nal relations between Soeharto and Liem Sui Liong, as stated by many
previous experts, but through other Chinese trade groups such as Bob
Hasan and Sukatia. This was because Lim Sui Liong had moved from
Kudus to Jakarta when Soeharto began developing his military busi-
ness. Even if that had happened, the business relations between the Di-
ponegoro soldiers and Lim Sui Liong took place through Sujono (Elson
2001). Moreover, Bob Hasan, a businessman deeply involved in the
business ventures of the Diponegoro Division, was the adopted son of
Gatot Subroto, a very influential army general in Central Java.
As mentioned above, a similar military business development oc-
curred in Sulawesi and Sumatra, although, to a certain extent, this was
based on a different set of reasons than the Javanese situation. The
trade activities conducted by army groups who defied the economic
centralisation policy and demanded that the central government should
distribute economic resources to the regions, resulted in armed con-
flicts with the central government and with other army groups loyal to
the central government. Way before an open political and military con-
flict erupted with the central government, the army leaders of Sulawesi
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that supported the local civilian government routinely conducted trade
or condoned smuggling, especially copra from Sulawesi to Singapore.
They used the excuse that they were supporting the regional govern-
ment and the military budget, an issue never addressed by the central
government. It was a similar thing with the military leaders of Suma-
tra, where rubber and oil exports helped raise necessary cash or barter
for various other necessities (Widoyoko et al. 2003).
The army continued to try to monopolise the copra trade of Sulawe-
si. The formation of the Yayasan Kopra created an opportunity for busi-
nessmen outside the army but these efforts garnered fairly negative re-
actions, which resulted in the regulations signed by the Teritorium VII
commander and the Copra Board (Badang Urusan Kopra), an organisa-
tion that took direct orders from the military governor, to monopolise
the copra purchase in March 1957, just after the Permesta proclama-
tion of 2 March 1957. Meanwhile, at the same time, several individual
soldiers from the 710th Battalion of South Sulawesi, which supported
the central government in Jakarta, became influential businessmen in
the 1950s and early 1960s (Limbugau 2000). These soldier-business-
men from South Sulawesi, along with other business soldiers from
many other parts of the nation, became the main element in the for-
mation of a new social group present in each region and at the na-
tional level. It first appeared in the 1950s and was known as the Orang
Kaya Baru, New Rich. Awareness of this process opens for the possibi-
lity of a better understanding of the political revolt in Sulawesi at the
end of the 1950s, and to a certain extent in Sumatra as well. The armed
revolts appear to have been caused by more than just the problems that
arose between the local government and the military on the one hand,
and the central government on the other; they were also caused by the
competition for economic resources among the soldiers, or with other
interest groups which also involved soldiers.
The policy of the state in a state of emergency and a time of war, as
well as deteriorating political sentiments toward the Dutch in connec-
tion with the problems of West Papua, resulted in massive takeovers of
Western corporate interests, especially those owned by the Dutch. The
takeovers took place from 1957 and reached their climax in 1959. La-
bourers, especially labour unions with political ties to various parties,
specifically the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), initiated these ta-
keovers. In several areas, the takeover process began much earlier,
while talks between Indonesia and the Netherlands were still taking
place. Anti-Dutch sentiments were expressed by President Soekarno in
his many speeches demanding the repatriation of the territory of West
Papua, and boosted the confidence of the labours to demand the pro-
cess of indonesianisasi of foreign corporations that had previously em-
ployed them. The labour actions that began in December 1957, espe-
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cially those of leftist labourers, increased in scope and depth and in-
curred the interest of the soldiers, especially the army which was in-
creasingly involved in the process due to safety issues and the attitude
of rivalry it developed towards the PKI. The army’s involvement was
not solely to keep the peace during the process of Dutch economic ta-
keovers, but also functioned to deny economic resources to its most
important political rivals. In their effort to control the labour unions,
the military formed alliances such as the Military Labour Cooperation
Body or Badan Kerjasama Buruh dan Militer (BKSBM) (Pikiran Rakjat,
11 December 1957).
The widespread involvement of the military, especially the army, in
connection with the takeover process was clearly demonstrated in the
many regulations and actions that were not just conducted by the cen-
tral military leaders but repeated in each individual territory as well.
The II Territory Army leader who was responsible for the West Java ter-
ritory had garnered a lot of foreign-owned plantations, and issued regu-
lations specifying that all transfers of rights of foreign corporations in
the area could only be conducted via the military (Keng Po, 9 Decem-
ber 1957). One day later, the same military leader announced that all
Dutch-owned companies in West Java would come under military con-
trol to avoid chaotic takeovers (Keng Po, 11 December 1957; Pikiran
Rakjat, 11 December 1957). Prior to that, the Bandung military com-
mander of Pelaksana Kuasa Militer Bandung took over the ‘Fateru’ com-
pany, ‘Vorkink’ and ‘De Kleyne’ publisher, which had already been ta-
ken over by labourers (Pikiran Rakjat, 7 December 1957). The V Terri-
tory Army had already conducted similar actions in Malang, East Java
and the Greater Jakarta Military Commandery. Both of them issued
proclamations stating that all Dutch-owned companies in the two pro-
vinces were under the supervision of the military (Keng Po, 10 and 12
December 1957). Prior to that, in September, the military leaders of
East Java even managed to take over the distribution of Gresik Cement
in the area (Keng Po, 17 September 1957). In South Sulawesi, the 710th
Battalion, which had developed their business since independence,
took over the Dutch-owned coconut and coffee ondernemers in the areas
of Polewali, Mamasa, Majene and Mamuju. During December 1957,
the West Java military commander of Pembantu Utama Pelaksana Mili-
ter conducted a similar act by taking over the tea plantation in Ciawi,
Bogor (Keng Po, 5 December 1957). These takeovers were not only lim-
ited to companies, but also included company-owned houses, as hap-
pened in Jakarta. Until February 1958, the military commander of Ja-
karta expropriated no less than 321 houses; the houses were subse-
quently distributed among civil service and military personnel (Keng
Po, 20 February 1958). The position of the military in the takeover pro-
cess became politically stronger after president Soekarno issued his de-
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cree in the month of July 1959, an action Douglas Paauw has charac-
terised as ‘having opened the opportunity for real takeovers of impor-
tant economic and political function by the military elite’ (Paauw:
1960).
The takeover process of foreign oil companies, and the formation of
a national oil company, strengthened the accusation of widespread
military business participation in the process of Indonesian economic
decolonisation (Muhaimin 1990; Kanumoyoso 2001). Although the
government began to pay more attention to the oil industry, beginning
in at least 1954, it did not do a lot prior to 1957. At the time, the decolo-
nisation or indonesianisasi of the oil fields was mostly influenced by
group activities related to oil labour unions. But a large shift that fa-
voured the military took place when labour unrest in the oil companies
became more radical, with the appearance of initiatives to take over for-
eign corporation to support the build-up of the national economy. The
Department of Industry, that was responsible for issues relating to the
oil industry, passed the responsibility for the country’s oil companies,
such as PT Exploitasi Tambang Minyak Sumatra Utara, directly over to
the army under General A.H. Nasution, which was to eventually be
consolidated under P.T. Permina. Colonel Ibu Sutowo was subse-
quently appointed the President-Director, while Major S.M. Geudong
became Director in October 1957 (Humas Unit I PN. Permina: 1966).
Ibnu Sutowo then appointed Major Harijono, Major Pattiasina and
Capten Affan to run the newly created national oil company. The first
headquarters of the company were even located within the army head-
quarters complex (Bartlett III et al. 1972). The activities of the national
oil company, which began with Pangkalan Brandan, developed swiftly,
especially because it had gained capital from a Japanese consortium
(Karma 2001). The problem was not merely that PT. Permina (which
became PN. Permina and, eventually, the present-day Pertamina, which
was the result of a merger of Permina and Pertamin in 1968) was con-
trolled by the military. The indonesianisasi process toward the Indone-
sian oil business since 1957 appeared to come hand in hand with the
process of increasing the strength of military business ventures, which
also played an important role for the military in the decolonisation pro-
cess, especially in the cases of West Papua and Malaysia. The nationali-
sation of the NIAM oil company, previously owned by Shell, into the
Pertambangan Minyak Indonesia (PERMINDO) in the year 1958, and
also that of Sorong Petroleum Maatschappij and Nederlands Nieuw Gui-
nea Petroleum Maatschappij, for instance, resulted in the opening up of
large military business participation in Indonesia’s oil sector during
other periods, at the personal as well as group level.
In Java, Western-owned sugar and tobacco companies, once among
the major contributors of foreign trade on the island, were inevitably
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taken over by the military as the nationalisation policy continued. In
Central Java, in accordance with the stipulation that the military would
become the highest commander of the area in a state of war, the Dipo-
negoro IV Territory Army swiftly issued a notification of the takeover
of all Dutch-owned companies in the region on the 10 December 1957.
The Gondangwinangun sugar factory in Klaten for instance, was im-
mediately taken under the command of the Klaten Regency Supervi-
sion Officer (Perwira Pengawas Perusahaan Kabupaten Klaten) and
Surakarta’s 15th Infantry Regiments (Suyitno 1996). The Cipiring sugar
factory in Kendal, which was taken over by farmers and labourers on 15
December 1957, immediately came under the control of the Kendal
military commander (Afandi 2004). It was from these factories that
the Diponegoro Division soldiers got their sugar that they bartered, as
mentioned above. The takeovers of those sugar factories were part of
the actions of the Diponegoro Division which took over 31 plantations
and 13 sugar factories owned by 6 Dutch companies in the area on 26
December 1957. Similar conditions occurred in Cirebon, West Java’s
sugar producing centre, where all the sugar and spiritus factories in the
Paliaman regency were taken over by the local military just before
Christmas 1957 (Pikiran Rakjat, 24 December 1957).
Closing remarks
The appointment of Colonel Suprijogi as the Minister for Economic
Stability, and Colonel Suhardiman as the Head of the Nationalisation
Board in charge of handling the nationalisation process, within the
new cabinet of Prime Minister Djuanda in 1958, shows that the mili-
tary had truly taken over a large part of Indonesia’s economic activities
as the decolonisation process of the nation drew to a close. The once
political party-controlled banking sector began to change hands as a re-
sult of the initiation of the guided economy, when military business-
men started to control Dutch-owned banks. At the same time, the mili-
tary also expanded their business activities to cover such things as rice
monopolies, trading companies, shipping lines, plantations, sugar fac-
tories, oil fields, foreign exchange and many other economic activities
previously controlled by Western- and Chinese-owned companies.
The decolonisation process, which placed the military in a central po-
sition, compounded by the inability of the civilian government to man-
age the politics and economic resources of the nation, stimulated the
interests of the soldiers and officers to conduct business, either at a
group or personal level. In the context of Dutch company takeovers
since 1957, for instance, it was not just a question of military involve-
ment in the takeover process as the result of the national state of war. It
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also involved the domination that military personnel wielded over the
board members of companies, and the expansion of control of military
organisation into every aspect of business policy. This resulted in the
positioning of the military as the main power in the business world of
the country, whether via the private sector or government bureaucracy.
When General A.H. Nasution realised the gross violations of the
army in their business affairs, and reacted by calling for an investiga-
tion of the culpable soldiers in mid-1959, it was already too late. The
military officers had already slotted themselves into dependent posi-
tions with regard to their business activities, and were reaping large
profits – socially, economically and politically. The army as an institu-
tion had also become dependent on the financial benefits gained from
the military business conducted by these soldier businessmen. As the
decolonisation process wound down, the business community and the
military had become two sides of the same coin.
The army was not the sole violator in the field of military business
activities. Every other aspect of the military, including the police force,
was involved in similar business activities, whether directly or indir-
ectly. The navy, for instance, conducted its business ventures with the
official support of the cabinet meeting of June 1958, which allowed it
to own companies and to militarise trade-based shipping lines (Kedau-
latan Rakjat, 6 June 1958). In the end, decolonisation provided a firm
base from which the military could carry on its business activities in
Indonesia, eventually supporting the creation of the new and more so-
phisticated military business network that emerged during the 1960s,
especially during the period of the New Order.
Notes
1 This was originally a paper presented at the 4th International Convention of Asian
Scholars, in the panel entitled ‘Social and Economic Decolonization in Southeast
Asia, in Particular Indonesia’ in Shanghai, China, 20-24 August 2005. I would like
to thank Farabi Fakih for the English, and Rika and Beti for their assistance. The
author is a staff member at Department of History, Universitas Gadjah Mada Yogya-
karta Indonesia. For further information and any comments, please contact: purwan-
tougm@yahoo.co.uk.
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